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From the Founding through the Second World War well estab-
lished understandings constrained executive power over foreign rela-
tions. Since the Cold War, the executive has enlarged its foreign
relations power. Courts and commentators justified and defended the
growth of executive power in relation to two geopolitical phenomena.
First, the executive was better positioned to command the United States'
wider global responsibilities. Second, the threat posed by Soviet expan-
sionism and nuclear missile technology did not afford time for congres-
sional deliberation. While scholars have debated whether the Cold War
actually justified the extent of executive power, they have generally ac-
cepted as self-evident the proposition that the President's authority
should expand in response to geopolitical circumstances. Professor
Paul characterizes the proposition that presidential power expands
relative to geopolitical exigencies as a "discourse of executive expedi-
ency." Paul traces the origin of this discourse to the domestic debates
over the Bricker Amendment, McCarthyism, and the war in Indochina
and shows how courts used this justificatory rhetoric to construct a new
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method for interpreting the President's constitutional powers. Focusing
particularly on the use of executive agreements, Paul argues that even
in the absence of any external threat, courts willingly suspended critical
judgments and embraced expediency discourse. In Paul's view, the ex-
pansion of the President's foreign relations power obstructed public
accountability, facilitated interventionism, and corrupted the policy-
making process. Paul challenges the continued reliance on Cold War
discourse and offers an alternative approach to adjudicating questions
on the reach of executive foreign relations power.
INTRODUCTION
The Cold War has ended, but the experience of the Cold War con-
tinues to shape the way that courts interpret the Constitution's allocation
of presidential power.' The Cold War offered courts a ready excuse to
justify the shift in foreign relations power from Congress to the
President as an expedient response to an external threat. Through the
Cold War to the present, defenders and critics have debated the extent of
the President's foreign relations powers.2 That debate has turned on the
question of whether the Cold War in fact justified the expansion of
presidential power over the last half century. The debate assumed that
the President's powers should expand in response to geopolitical exi-
gencies. This way of framing the issue, which I call the "discourse of
executive expediency," was invented at the dawn of the Cold War by
liberal and moderate defenders of the Truman administration. By inter-
preting constitutional powers in light of the executive's claim of geopo-
litical necessity, courts have colluded with the President and Congress in
legitimating the growth of executive hegemony. Some conservative
1. Historians disagree as to precisely when the Cold War began and ended. Certainly, by
1946, following Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" address at Fulton, Missouri, it was clear that the
United States was prepared to resist Soviet expansion by military force, if necessary. See JOHN L
GADDis, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1941-1947, at 353-61 (1972);
WALTER LAFEBER, AMERICA, RuSSIA, AND THE COLn WAR, 1945-1992, at 38-48 (7th ed. 1993). By
the end of 1989, with the dissolution of the Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe, the Cold
War had definitely ended. It is contestable whether a strong executive branch contributed to the end
of the Cold War. See WILLIAM G. HYLAND, THE COLD WAR: FIFTY YEARS OF CONFLICT 190-205
(1991) (arguing that the Soviet Union collapsed both because of the economic burden of competing
with the NATO alliance and the inherent flaws in the Soviet system); GADDIs, supra, at 155-67
(arguing that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of three fundamental long-term global historical
trends: the emergence of new criteria for defining national power;, the failure of communist ideology;
and the decrease in the use of violence as an instrument of statecraft both domestically and
internationally); but see Brian Hall, Overkill is Not Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Mar. 15, 1998, at 42
(arguing that the risk of nuclear war has increased with the end of the Cold War).
2. Some of the leading scholars critical of the growth of the executive's foreign policy-
making role include Louis Fisher, Thomas Franck, Michael Glennon, Harold Koh, Jules Lobel, Arthur
Schlesinger, and Laurence Tribe. Some of the leading scholars defending the executive's role and
critical of congressional interference include Monroe Leigh, Myers McDougal, John Norton Moore,
Eugene Rostow, and Judge Abraham Sofaer.
(Vol. 86:671
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critics of the Democratic Congress during the Reagan and Bush admini-
strations argued, on the other hand, that congressional interference in
foreign policy-making threatened to diminish the executive's power.3
The debate has survived the Cold War, precisely because scholars have
failed to examine the relationship between constitutional powers and
geopolitical reality. This Article changes the terms of that debate by
identifying and explaining this interpretive mechanism.4
In questioning the relationship between claims of geopolitical ne-
cessity and constitutional meaning, I am not rejecting a contextual in-
terpretation of the Constitution. As Professor Lawrence Lessig has
argued, fidelity to the Constitution may require courts to engage in a
"factual" or "structural translation" when historical or theoretical
contexts shift.5 My concern is that courts have been unduly deferential
to the executive's self-serving characterization of the geopolitical con-
text. In the name of expediency, the executive has lulled courts and
Congress alike into a collective fantasy about the nature of the foreign
threat. Geopolitics, as a basis for a claim of executive authority, has be-
come a talisman that overrides critical judicial analysis.6
This Article is not another argument for giving more power to
Congress. Rather, it is an argument against the reliance of judges on ex-
ecutive expediency as an interpretive mechanism. Admittedly, rejecting
the discourse of executive expediency may result in an expansion of
3. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch? 83 AM. J. INT'L L
740 (1989).
4. My contention is that the discourse of executive expediency has determined the static
character of the debate. The assertion of executive power in opposition to congressional power is an
example of what Derrida called a "dangerous supplement:' JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (G.G. Sprivak trans., 1976). Derrida has shown how two supposedly
opposite terms may actually both contain the other and threaten to displace each other. The
executive's power is a necessary supplement to congressional power: there are some things that
Congress cannot do, such as negotiating treaties or commanding military forces in the field. But the
executive's supplemental role has developed in tension with congressional power such that the
supplement threatens to displace the dominance of Congress over law making. Our idea of
congressional power contains an idea of what we mean by executive power. Thus, every assertion of
congressional power reinforces executive power.
5. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L
REV. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Theory]. Lessig shows by example how changes in
economic conditions and in political understanding led to a re-interpretation of the Constitution during
the New Deal. According to Lessig, this changed interpretation represented a translation of the
Constitution's meaning from the nineteenth century to contemporary circumstances. See id. at 410-14.
In this way, the Court kept faith with the Constitution's true purposes. See also Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L REv. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation].
6. For example, the President's power to make executive agreements expanded dramatically
during this period even though the articulated claim of necessity was unfounded, as discussed below.
See infra Part III. I am not denying that there may be extraordinary crises in which the executive
may need to take action that exceeds his constitutional authority. However, in such emergencies,
courts should avoid giving their imprimatur to the executive's action by a finding of nonjusticiability.
As a practical matter, in a real emergency, the executive is unlikely to wait for judicial interpretation.
1998]
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congressional power. However, my preference for shifting power back
toward Congress is based upon neither a nostalgia for the past nor
originalist claims about the Framers' intentions. Rather, I believe that,
on balance, foreign policy works best when there is an opportunity for
public deliberation and consensus building. As foreign relations power
has shifted to the executive, the process of policy-making has become
less open, visible, and responsive to democratic interest-group politics.
Foreign policy will fail in the absence of strong public support, as even
U.S. military leaders have acknowledged.' The Constitution should be
read to restrain the executive from intervening abroad without congres-
sional support, not to isolate the United States from the world, but to
ensure a more effective, coherent, and democratic foreign policy.
A. Nature of Executive Expediency Discourse
As the United States assumed global leadership and the threat of
nuclear war required rapid decision-making in crisis situations, a sense
of urgency characterized U.S. foreign policy. To U.S. Cold Warriors,
the threat of Soviet communism changed constitutional norms.' Propo-
nents of executive power argued that the President needed a free hand
to conduct foreign relations to protect national secrets and expedite de-
cision-making in crises The executive branch alone had the necessary
7. The Powell Doctrine articulated by Chief of Staff General Colin Powell advocated the same
principle that the United States should not use military force overseas unless there is a clear public
consensus favoring it. See Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF., Winter
1992/93, at 32-45. This position is not an argument for isolationism. Rather, it calls for the political
leadership to generate the necessary public support for intervention when U.S. national interests are
threatened.
8. In 1950 President Truman adopted a policy statement known as "N.S.C. 68," which forecast
a permanent state of high tension with the Soviet Union until the Soviet system collapsed and warned
that "the integrity and vitality of our [democratic] system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in
history." NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, N.S.C. 68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OaJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY 34 (1950), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1950:
NATIONAL SEcuRITY AFFAIRS; FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 234, 262 (1977). N.S.C. 68
recommended a rapid military expansion to counter Soviet power worldwide. It also provided the
justification for executive control of foreign policy to confront the Soviets decisively and without time
for public deliberation. See WILLIAM TAUBMAN, STALIN'S AMERICAN POLICY: FROM ENTENTE TO
DIITENTE TO COLD WAR 198-203 (1982).
9. See WILLIAM F. MULLEN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND POLITICS 39-40 (1976) ("In an age
when crisis has become perpetual and the everyday condition of life, however, the trend has been
toward lodging ever-increasing and permanent authority in the one institution [the presidency] judged
capable of a unified response."); JAMES A. NATHAN & JAMES K. OLIVER, FOREIGN POLICY
MAKING AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 6-28 (3d ed. 1994) (describing the expansion of
the executive's foreign policy-making as a consequence of the Cold War); GORDON SILVERSTEIN,
IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 65-100 (1997) (tracing the growth of executive control over foreign policy from
the administrations of Truman through Nixon); John M. Berry, Foreign Policy-making and the
Congress, in RESOLVED: THAT EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILED, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Doc. No. 298, at 183 ("As the
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expertise to process complex information concerning foreign relations
and military threats. Reliance upon the Constitution's quaint eighteenth-
century process for conducting foreign affairs was no longer practical.
Centralized executive control was the most expedient response to a hos-
tile external environment. Thus, the discourse of executive expediency l°
legitimated executive power and relieved Congress of responsibility for
foreign affairs. The discourse of executive expediency justified the ex-
ecutive's virtual monopoly power over foreign affairs and constituted
the method of constitutional interpretation accepted by the Cold War
generation. As long as the historically contingent origin of the discourse
remained invisible, its legitimating power was ensured. Judges and
scholars reasoning about constitutional powers did not question the core
assumption that the Constitution dispersed powers depending upon
geopolitical exigencies. The discourse made this relationship appear
natural, thereby transforming the way we think about the Constitution.
Cold War exigencies offered convincing rationales for the use of
presidential power in deploying military forces,' conducting covert
cold war replaced the hot, Congress, under the pressures of modem crises, began deferring more and
more to the Executive Branch."); Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (L. Giordon Crovitz & Jeremy B. Rabin eds., 1989).
Bork writes:
The president's [sic] powers are not susceptible of definition in advance. Changes in power
relations, the shifting nature of alliances and adversarial postures, and most cetainly, the
rapid development of military technologies mean that he must often act in ways that no one
can foresee even a day in advance, much less in the ages to come.
Id. at ix-xii; see also Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military
Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 118-19 (1995) ("Today we must understand the constitutional
division of authority between the President and Congress with respect to the use of the armed forces
in light of evolving modem day realities concerning the multivaried uses of military forces.");
Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Participation in the
Defense of Viet Nam, reprinted in 75 YALE LU. 1085, 1101 (1966); Edgar E. Robinson, Presidential
Power in the Nuclear Age, in RESOLVED: THAT EXECUTIvE CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILED, supra, at 58-64 ("The President's power
in foreign affairs appears to have undergone a qualitative transformation.... But the use of these
powers is now conditioned not only by the possession of the nuclear deterrent but by a change in the
actual practice of war."); George Szamuely, The Imperial Congress, 84 COMMENTARY, Sept. 1987,
at 3, 27-32 ("the exigencies of exerting the nation's will in a world full of rivals required the
expansion of the executive's discretionary powers."); Caspar W. Weinberger, Dangerous Constraints
on the President's War Powers, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra, at 95-101; Aaron Wildavsky,
The Two Presidencies, in RESOLVED: THAT EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY SHOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILED, supra, at 71-82.
10. By "discourse," I mean that expediency rhetoric represented more than a mere argument; it
formed a common ideology that colored how both proponents and opponents of executive foreign
policy thought about constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations.
11. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310-12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 936 (1974) (holding nonjusticiable the bombing of Cambodia); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1146,
1147 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding nonjusticiable the President's decision to mine harbors and bomb targets
in North Vietnam without congressional authorization); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that congressional funding and extension of the Military Selective Service Act
were sufficient to authorize the executive to send military forces to Vietnam).
19981
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operations, 2 classifying information, 3 suppressing publication of sensi-
tive information, 4 restricting the export of sensitive technology and
data, 5 denying the entry of some immigrants and permitting others, 6
conducting internal surveillance, 7 requiring loyalty pledges, 8  and
12. See, e.g., Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding a secrecy agreement required of
all CIA employees which prevented appellant from publishing even unclassified material about CIA
activities without prior approval by the Agency); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948) (holding nonjusticiable a presidential decree that denied the airline an overseas route
based upon secret intelligence information bearing upon national security). In Chicago & S. Air Lines,
the Court opined that "the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial.... They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, nor
responsibility ..... Id. at 111; Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a
member of Congress has no standing to seek a declaration that certain activities of the CIA are illegal
or an injunction prohibiting the Agency from using funds undisclosed to Congress). See generally
Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA.
L. REv. 1035, 1109-10 (1986) (arguing that the increased use of covert paramilitary operations has
supplanted Congress' authority under the Constitution's Article I, § 8, cl. 11 to grant letters of marque
and reprisal for the purposes of empowering private persons to use force against foreign states).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 660 (D.Md.), appeal dismissed, 774
F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that disclosure of classified information to the press is a criminal
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I §§ 1, 6, 40, Stat. 217, 219, as amended by 18
U.S.C. §§ 793-794, even though Congress did not expressly authorize the classification system and
even though the Act was not amended to refer to classifed information); see-also Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (holding that the executive has plenary authority to classify
information and to determine whether a grant of security clearance is inconsistent with the national
interest). See generally Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security
Information, 103 HARv. L REv. 906 (1990) (arguing that courts should scrutinize executive
classifcation decisions).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that technical information on the hydrogen bomb fell
within the narrow exception to the "rule against prior restraint"). Cf. New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 720-21 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that Congress did not authorize
a government injunction to restrict publication of the Pentagon papers based upon national security
considerations).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which empowered the President to control the export of technical
data regarding arms and other implements of war, prohibited the exportation of certain technical
information); see also United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352, 356-58 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that
the Munitions Control Act protects blueprints of an armored vehicle as "technical data").
16. I am thining here of the Haitian boat people who fled political terror and were denied
entry even for humanitarian medical purposes. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Refugee
Litigation: A Case Study in Transnational Public Law Litigation, 18 MD. J. INT'L TRADE 1 (1994);
Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. Sci. J. HuM. Rrs.
269, 290-91 (1993). On the other hand, Cuban immigrants were welcomed to the United States as
opponents of the Castro regime. See Katherine Tonnas, Out of a Far Country: The Sojourns of
Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, and Chinese to America, 20 S.U. L. REv. 295, 314-18 (1993).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 172 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 403 U.S. 698
(1971) (holding that the Communications Act of 1934 did not prohibit the President from ordering
wiretap surveillance to obtain intelligence information when he was acting to further national security
objectives); see also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that
reasonable warrantless searches and surveillances are justified in preliminary espionage
investigations); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 71-73 (D.N.J. 1970), affid, 494 F.2d 593
(3rd Cir. 1974) (allowing the Attorney General to conduct telephone surveillance in espionage
investigation).
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scrutinizing the private lives, beliefs, and associations of military per-
sonnel' 9 and civilians." The commander-in-chief s authority expanded
exponentially in response to the new reality of "permanent" war
against communism waged in multiple facets of military, civilian, com-
mercial, and technological life.
Unexamined, the assumption that geopolitical exigencies may re-
quire shifts in constitutional authority appears to be a commonplace
example of contextual interpretation. In fact, expediency discourse per-
verts contextualism. Contextual interpretation requires courts to judge
the relevant circumstances independent of the political branches; expe-
diency discourse relies upon the executive's own representation of geo-
political events. By invoking geopolitical circumstances as a justification
for its own actions, the executive has secured the judiciary's acquies-
cence in expanding executive power. Geopolitics have obscured judicial
analysis, rather than facilitated it. Congress and the courts have abdi-
cated constitutional responsibility for checking the executive's power to
conduct foreign relations.2
The extraordinary growth of executive agreements concerning for-
eign trade relations provides perhaps the clearest and least justifiable
instance of expediency discourse expanding executive power. The most
recent examples are the United States' accession to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). These executive agreements are binding under international law
18. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 89-92 (1953) (affirming the President's power
to mandate that a military physician take a loyalty oath prior to receiving a promotion in rank). But
see Ozanoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that loyalty oath's chilling effect on
free speech is a cognizable real injury); Hinton v. Devine, 633 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding
that a "loyalty" requirement for employees of the United Nations and other international
organizations was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
19. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part)
(stating that courts should not review the Director of the CIA's decision to discharge an employee
especially where, as here, termination may be necessary to control access to sensitive national
security information); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506 (1986) (holding that the military
interest in maintaining uniformity in the wear and appearance of the military uniform while on duty
outweighed an individual solider's interest in wearing religious items); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Naval Academy had a rational basis to presume that, where a
midshipman admitted being a homosexual, he was likely to engage in illegal homosexual conduct and
could be discharged).
20. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 575-78
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Department of Defense's policy of conducting expanded
investigations into the backgrounds of gay and lesbian applicants for secret and top-secret security
clearances did not violate the applicants' equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment); see
also Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that homosexuality was not a supect or
quasi-suspect classification and that the FBI's reasoning that homosexual conduct could adversely
affect the Bureau's responsiblities was rational).
21. See HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 134-48 (1990).
19981
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as treaties.2 They obligate the United States to comply with the deci-
sions of multilateral entities.' Yet, the President never submitted these
agreements as treaties for the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate. Instead, the executive negotiated and signed both agreements as
"executive-congressional agreements," and simple majorities of both
houses of Congress approved them pursuant to "fast-track authority."'
An agreement submitted on a fast track must be voted on by both
houses within a limited time frame, and each house agrees to suspend
their respective rules and prohibit any amendments to the agreements.
Supporters of fast-track authority for NAFMA and WTO argued that the
President "knows best" what is good for the country and that delicate
trade negotiations would be threatened if the President had to bargain
with Congress. 26 There was no security threat justifying the use of ex-
ecutive agreements in lieu of treaties. Yet, the appeal to economic expe-
diency moved majorities in both houses of Congress to approve NAFTA
and WTO, even though the agreements intruded upon the Senate's ex-
clusive authority to advise and consent to treaties.
B. The Consequences of Reasoning from Geopolitics
The Constitution "diffuses power.., to secure liberty."7 Consti-
tutional checks and balances create resistance to the exercise of power.5
22. Any international agreement in writing governed by international law, is a treaty for
purposes of international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.129/15.
23. Although the decisions the WTO's dispute settlement panel renders are not ipso facto U.S.
law, such decisions are international law, and a U.S. court is "bound to utilize international law
obligations in its interpretation of national law." John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L 60, 61
(1997). As the Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), "international law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." Id. at 700.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
303 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
25. In recent years, Congress has delegated to the President authority to negotiate trade
agreements to be submitted to Congress on a "fast track." On the fast track, both houses of Congress
approve or disapprove the trade agreement without amendment within a limited time-frame.
Technically, the fast track is merely a suspension of the rules of each house, and the rules could be
restored by a simple majority of either house at any time. In principle, the executive invites
congressional leaders to advise and participate in the negotiating process in order to assure that they
will support the final agreement. See generally Harold Hongiu Koh, The Fast Track and United States
Foreign Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992).
26. See id at 176.
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
28. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 82 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The purpose
[of the doctrine of the separation of powers] was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
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So long as constitutional authority over foreign affairs remained divided
between the executive and Congress, neither branch was able to commit
the nation abroad without a popular consensus.29 These institutional ob-
stacles are not merely quaint vestiges of an earlier era of relative isola-
tionism. They serve the normative value of discouraging foreign
adventures to which the nation is not fully committed.
The discourse of executive expediency undermined this constitu-
tional structure? Specifically, the expansion of executive power allowed
Congress to avoid public accountability for U.S. foreign policy, facili-
tated more frequent foreign interventions, undermined the coherence of
our foreign policy, and exposed foreign policy-making to "capture"
by foreign governments.
First, the shift in power from the Congress to the President has di-
minished the degree of democratic accountability in foreign policy."
While the executive may be no less "representative" than Congress as
an institution, accountability results from the way in which Congress
operates, which tends to be more open than the executive. Congressional
business is conducted on the record and in public. With rare exceptions,
all of the information available to members of Congress is also available
to the public. By comparison, the executive operates behind closed
doors. The executive has access to information that is unavailable to the
public, and only when a decision is reached is the policy outcome
known to the public. The executive can often justify its decisions by
claiming to know something the public does not know, which makes it
more difficult to challenge the executive's decision. For these reasons,
the shift of foreign relations power from Congress to the executive has
shrouded the policy-making process from public view and diluted
democratic accountability.
Second, the growth of executive power has created a bias in favor
of internationalism that has often led to failure. Possessing a virtual mo-
nopoly power over foreign relations has tempted presidents to send
troops abroad or to make foreign commitments. Time and again the
executive has stumbled into foreign conflicts, like Bosnia, Lebanon, Iran
and Somalia, with tragic results. 2 At a minimum, congressional
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the
people from autocracy.").
29. See KOH, supra note 21, at 74-84.
30. A formalistic approach to separation of powers doctrine is not useful in resolving the
allocation of foreign affairs power. For an intelligent discussion of the interpretive problems of
separation of powers in the context of foreign relations, see MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
CONSTIrUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 35-70 (1990).
31. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1821-
28 (1996).
32. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1288-1313 (1988) (describing how the absence
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participation might have slowed decision-making, leaving time for pub-
lic deliberation.33
Third, the absence of congressional debate has often accounted for
the lack of public support for foreign commitments. When U.S. forces
have suffered casualties, such as in Somalia or Beirut, public opinion
turned against the executive. Without the popular will to stay the course,
presidents have withdrawn U.S. forces in some cases. As a result, U.S.
policy has often lacked coherence. Though Congress was blamed for
this inconsistency in many cases, one reason members of Congress so
readily changed their minds was that they were not politically invested
in the policy.
Fourth, concentrating power in the executive has made it easier for
foreign governments to influence U.S. foreign policy. Leaving foreign
policy to the sole discretion of the President has invited foreign regimes
to pressure, cajole, and ultimately capture the executive. Foreign gov-
ernments have employed former executive branch officials in the ex-
ecutive branch to represent them as lobbyists and attorneys.,, Foreign
governments also have influenced the executive in more subtle ways
through "personal diplomacy." Recent allegations that the Chinese
government and foreign business interests attempted to buy influence
with President Clinton" highlight both the importance of the executive's
control over foreign policy and the possibility that foreign constituen-
cies could capture the executive. If Congress shared the responsibility
for U.S. foreign policy, foreign governments would have to influence
the decisions of a broader group of decision-makers. The diffusion of
policy-making authority might help deter foreign governments from
influencing policy. In sum, the expansion of executive power over for-
eign relations has both undermined the constitutional value of demo-
cratic accountability and distorted foreign policy-making.
Courts often articulate reasons other that executive expediency for
deferring to the executive branch. Courts may reason that the executive
of congressional oversight contributed to the Iran-Contra fiasco); Adam Clymer, Foreign Policy Tug-
of-War: Latest in a Long String of Battles, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 19, 1993, at A18; Michael Kinsley, Free-
Lunch Foreign Policy, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1993, at 6; Michael Lind, Beirut to Bosnia, NEw
REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 1995, at 20.
33. Even FDR, in the years leading up to and during World War II, insisted upon consulting
with Congress and obtaining congressional support every step of the way. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER,
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 105-19 (1989). Perhaps a modem President would be in a stronger
position to act earlier than FDR, but FDR's political sensitivity toward Congress ensured that
throughout the War the nation was united in support of his policies. See id.
34. See PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE 49-63, 216-57 app. A (1990) (listing former
federal officials who later represented foreign interests from 1980-1990).
35. See Brian Duffy & Bob Woodward, FBI Probes China-Linked Contributions, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 1997, at Al.
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possesses greater expertise in foreign affairs,36 that a judicial determina-
tion would risk interfering with and embarrassing the executive in the
conduct of foreign relations,37 or that the court lacks any justiciable
standards.3 1 Courts do not always distinguish these reasons from expedi-
ency discourse, and sometimes these rationalizations merely disguise an
appeal to expediency. In reality, courts rarely require any special ex-
pertise to judge the legal issues presented in such cases. Judicial pro-
nouncements rarely offend foreign states or embarrass the executive, so
long as it is clear that the courts are acting independently. As a practical
matter, in a federal democracy with a divided government, it is likely
that one branch of government may express views in opposition to an-
other's with regard to foreign affairs, and foreign states can be expected
to distinguish among the governmental branches and not react hastily.
Finally, courts are often faced with mixed questions of law and fact to
which they can bring justiciable standards, even where the law is un-
clear. 9 Nevertheless, in principle, I will concede that in some cases there
may be good reasons, other than expediency, for courts to defer to the
political branches in the conduct of foreign relations. However, courts
should examine those reasons critically, and should not automatically
defer to the executive as opposed to the Congress.
C. Summary of the Argument
The Cold War normalized a sense of crisis, and the discourse of
executive expediency legitimated a permanent expansion of executive
power. This Article rebuts two forms of argument about presidential
powers. The first, more familiar argument, is that the Framers intended
that the President would be the "sole organ of foreign relations."' The
intentionalist, or originalist mode of interpretation, upon which this ar-
gument rests, has been rebutted elsewhere, and there is no point in reit-
erating the case against it.41 In fact, the "sole organ" theory is
36. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the court is
incompetent to judge whether the President's actions in Indochina are consistent with ending the
war).
37. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), affd on other
grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding, inter alia, that claims by members of Congress that
U.S. action in Nicaragua were unauthorized cannot be adjudicated because of the risk that multiple
pronouncements would embarrass the executive in the conduct of foreign relations).
38. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that there were no
justiciable standards for judging whether the bombing of Cambodia constituted a basic change in the
war in Indochina requiring additional congressional authorization).
39. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the executive's
argument that there were no justiciable standards for deciding whether the appellant's crimes fit
within the political offense exception to the Treaty of Extradition with Great Britain).
40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936).
41. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1996); William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C.
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peculiarly ahistorical, as I will show. Focusing on executive agreements
in particular, my reading of the history from the Framers' time to the
present reveals a clear, consistent understanding of a more limited role
for the President in foreign affairs up until the Cold War.42 My own in-
terpretation of presidential power, which is evident throughout this
Article, rests instead on a structuralist analysis. 3 I intend not merely to
disprove claims about the Framers' intentions, but more significantly, to
show that the Cold War brought about a fundamental shift in the way
courts interpreted the executive's constitutional authority in foreign re-
lations.
The second argument I address is the contention that the
Constitution's allocation of presidential powers was changed by a trans-
formative exercise in popular sovereignty under President Franklin
Roosevelt. Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove advanced this
argument with regard to executive agreements during the congressional
debates over the approval of WTO and NAFTA. 4 The Ackerman-
Golove thesis, which is a variation of Professor Ackerman's famous the-
ory of popular sovereignty,' deserves particular attention.46 I argue that
Ackerman and Golove read too much into the historical record. In my
view, the courts turned toward executive expediency under the cloud of
Soviet expansionism. Expediency discourse, rather than popular support
for the United Nations, as Ackerman and Golove contend, enlarged the
executive's control of foreign relations.
This Article has four Parts. Part I outlines the origin of executive
expediency rhetoric and jurisprudence during the early years of the
Cold War. In Part II, I show how expediency discourse transformed the
full scope of presidential powers in foreign relations, effectively insu-
lating executive power from either congressional check or judicial
DAvis L. REV. 1, 2 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L REv. 469 (1981);
Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 5; Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 5; H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985).
42. My effort to rebut the originalists' historiography of the executive's foreign relations
powers is similar to the approach taken by Professors Lessig and Sunstein, who refuted originalist
historiography about the executive branch while questioning the validity of originalism. See
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L REV. 1, 4
(1994).
43. By "structuralism" I mean interpreting the Constitution based upon the relationships it
established among the institutions of government and the citizen. See generally PHILIP Bonarrr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-22 (1991).
44. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L REv. 799
(1995) (tracing the rise of the congressional-executive agreement in U.S. diplomacy).
45. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
46. Ackerman and Golove's thesis has been the subject of serious scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free.Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L REV. 1221 (1995). Professor Tribe criticizes Ackerman
and Golove's conclusion as based upon an illegitimate form of constitutional interpretation. Id. at
1223.
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review. Then in Part III, I contend that this transformation did not de-
pend upon any actual emergency. To demonstrate this point, I discuss
how during the Cold War the executive justified the expanded use of
executive agreements as substitutes for Article II treaties by reference to
economic interests, as opposed to any actual threat to security. Finally,
in Part IV, I conclude that courts should refuse to legitimate executive
actions based upon claims of necessity. Failing this, they should inde-
pendently evaluate those claims in light of contemporary circumstance,
rather than rely upon the executive's own version of events.
I
THE ORIGIN OF EXECUTIVE EXPEDIENCY DISCOURSE
A. Overview: Normalizing Emergency Powers
The Constitution balanced the political branches to avoid the dan-
gers that a concentration of power in one branch might invite. It divided
power between the executive and Congress over domestic and foreign
responsibilities. 7 That division of authority institutionalized the diplo-
matic isolation of the United States in the early days of the Republic and
ensured that the United States would remain officially neutral during a
century of European wars.'
The rise of industrialization and the accompanying drive for world
markets transformed both the economic potential and the national inter-
ests of the United States. By the First World War, the United States could
no longer hope to exist in isolation.49 It now possessed both the ambi-
tion and the economic and military means to project its influence on the
exhausted nations of Europe. The United States rose to the challenge
posed by fascism in the Second World War and Soviet communism
during the Cold War.'
47. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 50, 63 (James Madison), Nos. 68, 69, 74, 75 (Alexander
Hamilton).
48. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 32-36 (1994).
49. See FOSTER R. DULLES, ARmERCA'S RISE TO WORLD POWER, 1898-1954, at 59-107
(1955).
50. See, e.g., GADDIS, supra note 1, at 353-61 (arguing that the United States was drawn
reluctantly into the Cold War by the aggressive moves of the Soviet Union and domestic political
constraints on U.S. policy); PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 359-72
(1987) (arguing that the United States occupied a power vacuum after the War as a result of its
economic dominance); KISSIGER, supra note 48, at 429-47 (concluding that at the close of the
Second World War the United States resisted British realpolitik in favor of a more conciliatory
approach toward the Soviet Union and later felt it had to assume the role of power politics to preserve
the peace in Europe); TAUBMAN, supra note 8, 3-9, 166-92 (1982) (contending that
misunderstandings and miscalculations between the Soviet Union and the United States resulted in the
Cold War).
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Innovations in military technology and the spread of nuclear
weapons marked the Cold War period. The technology reduced the time
available for decision-making and raised the stakes of an attack by the
Soviet Union. The executive claimed that increased control over foreign
policy-making was necessary both to expedite military decision-making
and to guard national security secrets.5' Thus, the rise of U.S. power led
to the expansion of executive power over foreign relations. 2 Courts and
commentators justified the transformed relationship between the execu-
tive and Congress as a necessary expedient for survival in an increas-
ingly complex and threatening world.
53
It is a general feature of constitutional democracies that in time of
crisis the ordinary constitutional norms and processes are relaxed: 4
John Locke defended the use of extra-legal measures necessary for the
survival of the society. 5 Locke argued that a society has a right and a
duty to protect itself, even at the expense of individual liberties, in order
to preserve liberty:m In particular, it was the prerogative of the executive
to exercise emergency power, even where contrary to law, in order to
preserve the society. Locke characterized the rule of necessity as distinct
51. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9, at 67-82.
52. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S.
REP. No. 91-129, at 7-8 (1969); HERMAN RNER, THE PRESIDENCY: CRSIS AND REGENERATION 51,
87 (1960); EDGAR F. ROBINSON ET AL., POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1945-
1965, at 3-7 (1966); Craig Matthews, The Constitutional Power of the Executive to Conclude
InternationalAgreements, 64 YALE LJ. 345,365, 389 (1955) (arguing that the President's power to
respond in crisis has grown as U.S. interests have grown globally) ("The experience of recent years
has shown that the United States must be capable of prompt and sometimes secret action as an
indispensible condition of survival.... If the Executive does not possess powers adequate for these
occasions, no branch of government does."); Eugene V. Rostow, The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L
REV. 833, 870-71 (1972); see also ROBERT J. SPITZER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: EXECUTIVE
HEGEMONY AT THE CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 37-39 (1993).
53. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (holding that the President
has the power to settle claims that are necessarily incident to the resolution of major foreign policy
disputes where Congress has acquiesced in the President's action). In the Pentagon Papers Case,
Justice Stewart opined,
In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the Executive is endowed with
enormous power in the two related areas of national defense and international relations.
This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative and the Judicial branches, has been
pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear age.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
Koh, supra note 32, at 1310-12.
54. Liberal jurisprudence posits a clear separation between the rule of law and emergency
situations. See Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ.
1385, 1388-89 (1989); see also CLINTON L RossITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP 290-97
(1948).
55. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 159-64 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
56. See id
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from the rule of law. Exigent measures occurred outside of the legal
system and did not affect legal norms.57
The Lockean dichotomy between the rule of law and the rule of
necessity shaped our Constitution, which did not provide for any emer-
gency powers.58 Early presidents embraced the Lockean idea of extra-
legal executive powers.59 While U.S. courts have long recognized that
extraordinary actions are sometimes required by the exigencies of the
moment, they refused to endorse extra-legal measures,"°with the notable
exception of the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during
the Second World War.6 Extra-constitutional powers might be tolerated
as a necessary evil to protect the security of the state and preserve con-
stitutional government; but such powers lasted only for the duration of a
crisis.62 In this way, a shared understanding of the distinction between
"normalcy"'63 and emergency" sustained constitutional democracy.
Justice Robert Jackson wrote that "[i]t would be impracticable and dan-
gerous idealism to expect or insist that each specific military command
in an area of probable operations will conform to conventional tests of
constitutionality."' Jackson cautioned, "But if we cannot confine mili-
tary expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the
57. See id.
58. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 7-10.
59. Thomas Jefferson, for example, invoked this argument in defense of the Lousiana
Purchase. See id. at 23-25. Jefferson later wrote that
[a] strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen,
but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country
when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to
written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 10, 1810), quoted in 4 DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT 320 (1970).
60. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1956) (holding that international treaties and
executive agreements must be consistent with the Constitution); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 247 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that civil courts must abide by the Constitution in
reviewing military orders even if such orders are considered to be reasonable exercises of military
authority).
61. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (upholding the constitutionality of the internment of U.S.
citizens of Japanese descent).
62. Extra-constitutional power has been exercised over immigrants and Indian tribes throughout
U.S. history. Recently, scholars have attacked this form of plenary power as unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Nell J. Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L
REV. 195 (1984).
63. I use the term "normalcy" in an ironic sense to refer to what is regarded as the ordinary or
normal state of society. Though normal often implies the absence of government intervention in
society, in fact, government often constructs what is regarded as normal. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Free
Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 29 (1995).
64. Justice Cardozo warned, "Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.
But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of
constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power."
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
65. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient.",
Once a court legitimates a military expediency, "[t]he principle then
lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."'67
Thus, the rule of law maintained the appearance of neutrality and
procedural fairness even in circumstances where the executive sup-
pressed individual liberties, such as suspending habeas corpus68 or de-
taining civilians without a warrant. 69 The argument for executive
expediency eviscerated the Lockean dichotomy between a rule of neces-
sity and the rule of law, so that extraordinary actions undertaken in the
face of external threats, real or imagined, were seen as "legal" rather
than "extra-legal." In this way, the judiciary, like the military and in-
telligence apparatus, came to occupy a permanent "militarized" status.
What accounted for this transformation of a core principle of liberal
jurisprudence?
A conventional history of the "imperial presidency" would paral-
lel the growth of the United States as world power and the growth of
executive power over foreign affairs from the Monroe Doctrine,
through the Spanish-American War to the World Wars, Korea, and
Indochina. In the conventional view, presidential power grew in re-
sponse to external events.71 Conventional histories assume the relation-
ship between geopolitical exigencies and presidential power as the
norm. The Cold War triggered a rapid expansion in the scope of presi-
dential power, but the normative foundation for this expansion was al-
ready well established, according to this view. Before World War II, a
series of landmark Supreme Court opinions had held that the President
was the "sole organ" of foreign relations. 7' Thus, the President as the
sole organ of foreign relations exercised greater authority in response to
the geopolitical conditions of the Cold War.
66. Id.
67. 1&t at 246,
68. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942) (holding that a naturalized U.S. citizen
acting as a German agent can be denied access to civilian courts in wartime).
69. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
70. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 5-67, 208-16, 377-92. See generally GLENNON,
supra note 30; Louis HENcN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1996);
NATHAN & OLIVER, supra note 10; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9; ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CoNsTrrTUoNAL POwERS: THE ORIGINS (1976).
71. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that under the Litvinov Agreement
the property in question passed to the U.S. Government); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937) (upholding the President's power to settle outstanding claims against the Soviet Union by the
sole executive agreement known as the Litvinov Agreement, even though the settlement may conflict
as a condition for establishing diplomatic relations); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding Congress' broad delegation of authority to the executive to ban the export
of arms to Latin America).
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In my view, this conventional history has overlooked fundamental
shifts in the justificatory rhetoric of presidential power that took place
during the Cold War. Expediency discourse developed out of earlier
Supreme Court opinions, but it did not emerge until the Cold War. The
Truman administration and its defenders first articulated executive ex-
pediency discourse in response to domestic political critics. The political
discourse of the Cold War shaped a new method of constitutional inter-
pretation. This new discourse, rather than objective geopolitical circum-
stances, formed the imperial presidency.
In the next Section, I distinguish pre-Cold War judicial opinions
from those subsequent. These early opinions recognized broad execu-
tive power in the Constitution's own structure without regard for geo-
political conditions. Then, I show how defenders of the Truman
administration employed the discourse of executive expediency. The
appearance of expediency discourse also marked a dramatic change in
judicial attitudes toward the executive. This geopolitical jurisprudence
fundamentally transformed the relationship among the federal branches
in ways unforeseen prior to the Cold War and led to the collapse of the
Lockean dichotomy.
B. Judicial Interpretations of the Executive's
Foreign Relations Powers before the Expediency Discourse
The discourse of executive expediency did not emerge until the
Cold War. Before that period, it was well established that the President
bore important responsibilities for foreign relations, but that his author-
ity was limited by the Constitution and acts of Congress.72 Faced with the
first foreign military threat to the new Republic, President Adams armed
U.S. vessels against the French in the undeclared naval war of 1798.
Congress authorized the President to order the seizure of any U.S. vessel
bound for French territory. The President ordered the seizure of any
U.S. vessel bound to or from French territory, but Congress prescribed
his authority to issue orders. The owner of one of the vessels seized on
route to French territory challenged the legality of the President's or-
der. The Supreme Court held that the President's authority as com-
mander-in-chief was subordinate to Congress' authority to regulate the
armed forces. 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall expressly
left open the question whether the President had plenary authority to
issue orders to seize U.S. vessels in the absence of any congressional
72. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding that U.S. Captain
Little was personally liable for seizing a foreign vessel under orders from the President that
contradicted the Non-Intercourse Act of 1799). Chief Justice Marshall opined that the President's
"instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass." Id. at 179.
73. See id.
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action.74 Ten years later, the Court answered that question in a case aris-
ing out of the executive's seizure of enemy alien property without con-
gressional authorization during the War of 181 2.1 The Supreme Court
held that the executive did not have any plenary power even in a de-
clared war to affect the property rights of enemy aliens without an act of
Congress.76 During the Civil War, the Court held that the President had
"no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or
a domestic State."' Instead, the Court found that Congress had granted
to the President explicit statutory authority "to suppress insurrection
against the government of a State or of the United States."78 Moreover,
even if Lincoln had exceeded his authority at the beginning of the con-
flict by ordering federal ships to blockade the South, Congress' subse-
quent ratification legalized his actions. Thus, even in the country's most
desperate moment, the Court minimized any implication that the
President had plenary authority to use military force under the
Constitution without congressional authority. 9
74. "It is by no means clear that the president... might not, without any special authority for
that purpose... have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States,
to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were forfeited by being engaged
in this illicit commerce" Id. at 177.
75. See Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814). During the War of 1812, a U.S.
district attorney seized a shipment of timber purchased for export to Britain for construction of enemy
ships. The Court held that the appellant's timber could not be confiscated without an act of Congress
giving the President that authority. Both Chief Justice Marshall in his majority opinion and Justice
Story in his dissenting opinion concurred that the authority to confiscate enemy alien property lies
with Congress. Story, however, opined that such authority was implicit in the declaration of war. See
id. at 143-54.
76. See id. at 128-29.
77. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-71 (1862). At the outbreak of the Civil War,
President Lincoln deployed federal naval vessels to impose a blockade on southern ports without
authorization by Congress, which had not yet convened. In upholding President Lincoln's unilateral
action, the Court held that the capture of enemy vessels was authorized both by the Acts of February
28, 1795, and March 3, 1807, authorizing the President to suppress insurrection against the United
States and ratified by Congress subsequently. Justice Grier opined that "[wlithout admitting that such
an act was necessary under the circumstances, it is plain that if the President had in any manner
assumed powers which it was necessary should have the authority or sanction of Congress... this
ratification has operated to perfectly cure the defect." Id. at 671.
78. Id. at 668.
79. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866) (holding that President Lincoln could not
subject civilians to military trial where the civil courts remained open). The Court declared that "[n]o
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
of [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." Id. at 121. Cf. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186). In
Durand, a U.S. national brought suit for trespass against a naval commander responsible for firing
upon Greytown, Nicaragua, and destroying the plaintiff's property. The commander claimed he was
acting under orders of the President to retaliate for a public disturbance in which a bottle was thrown
at a U.S. diplomat. The circuit court found that the President had both constitutional authority as the
chief executive to protect U.S. nationals abroad and statutory authority to establish and oversee the
Department of State and its diplomats stationed abroad. See id. at 112. Although Judge Nelson
interpreted the President's power to protect Americans overseas very broadly, he based his holding
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The Court's narrow construction of executive power over foreign
relations began to change in 1936. The Court's widely cited and gener-
ally misunderstood opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.80 planted the seed of a more expansive interpretation of the ex-
ecutive's foreign relations powers. Writing for the Court, Justice
Sutherland upheld a statute authorizing the President to proclaim a ban
on arms sales to certain Latin American countries if the President found
it would preserve hemispheric peace.81 Sutherland's opinion suggested
in dictum that the federal government's external sovereignty derived
wholly from the British Crown and that the Constitution only prescribed
the federal government's domestic powers." The federal government
exercised a monopoly on foreign relations power unregulated by the
Constitution. In a stunning non sequitur, Sutherland concluded from
this that the President was
on the explicit language of Article II of the Constitution. Unlike the discourse of expediency,
Nelson's opinion did not relate the extent of presidential power to the nature of the threat faced. See
id. Indeed, the facts suggested to the contrary that the President's authority to act was broad even
where there was no serious threat to the United States.
80. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The defendant appealed a conviction for violating an arms embargo
imposed by FDR pursuant to congressional statute. The defendant argued that Congress could not
delegate such unrestricted authority to the President. The Court upheld the statute authorizing the
President's embargo. See id. at 327.
81. See id. at 318. In three nearly contemporaneous opinions the Court had held that Congress
could not delegate legislative authority to the executive absent clear instructions. See Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289-90 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, in part,
because it delegated to local coal boards broad power to set wages and prices); A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29, 551 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial
Recovery Act's (NIRA) authorization to the President to adopt "codes of fair competition"); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating the NIRA's authorization to the
President to regulate the interstate shipment of oil). In all three cases, the Court found that the
legislation did not contain an "intelligible principle" to inform the President when and in what manner
he was authorized to regulate and to what end. According to the non-delegation doctrine, by
conferring on the executive a plenary authority to regulate commerce, Congress effectively assigned
to the executive its own legislative power in violation of the principle of separation of powers. By
disposing of congressional authority in this way, Congress avoided accountability for the rule-making.
See LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 263-65 (2d ed. 1988).
82. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18. However, Sutherland's opinion was not completely
without precedent. See Chisholm, Ex'r v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793). In Chisholm,
Chief Justice Jay, whose experience negotiating the Jay Treaty shaped the Senate's role in making
treaties, stated that
[t]he Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people already
united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their more domestic
concerns by State conventions, and other temporary arrangements. From the crown of
Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it; and it was then not
an uncommon opinion, that the unappropriated lands, which belonged to that Crown, passed
not to the people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but to the
whole people... thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles
of the Revolution, combined with local convenience and considerations; the people
nevertheless continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one
people...."
Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
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the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 3
In support of the extravagant metaphor of the President as "sole or-
gan," Sutherland lifted out of context a quote from Chief Justice John
Marshall, then a member of Congress, during a debate on the floor of
the House of Representatives.' Marshall was defending President
Adams' request for extradition of a British subject pursuant to the Jay
Treaty. He argued that the President "is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations" in the sense that
the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him. He
possesses the whole Executive power .... He is charged to exe-
cute the laws. A treaty is ... a law. He must, then, execute a
treaty, where, he, and he alone, possesses the means of executing
it.15
Clearly, Marshall meant that the President was bound by law to carry out
treaties. Far from asserting the executive's discretion in foreign rela-
tions, Marshall characterized the executive as the agent or "organ" of
Congress. 6 Sutherland twisted Marshall's statement to support the con-
trary proposition-that the President's foreign relations powers were
plenary and neither derived from, nor were limited by, Congress.
83. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
84. The context of Marshall's statement was the famous debate that arose out of the arrest of
Thomas Nash, who was responsible for the murder of officers on the British ship Hermione in 1797.
Under the Jay Treaty, President Adams had Nash arrested in Charleston, South Carolina, where he
arrived as a crew member on an American schooner. President Adams requested that Nash be
delivered to the British consul as provided by the Treaty. Republicans in Congress argued that Nash
was an innocent American and that the President was kowtowing to British bullies. The British insisted
that Nash was a British subject. Nash claimed that his real name was Jonathan Robbins and that he
was a U.S. national and resident of Danbury, Connecticut, who had been seized and impressed into
the British navy. The evidence confirmed that Nash was, in fact, a British subject, after the Danbury
selectmen certified that no one by the name of Robbins had ever resided there. Nevertheless,
Jefferson and his party exploited Nash's case as a winning issue in the 1800 presidential campaign.
See 2 ALBERT J. BEVERDIGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 458-62 (1918); Ruth Wedgwood, 771e
Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
85. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 596-619 (1800). Marshall argued that the Jay Treaty bound the United
States to deliver over persons who committed criminal acts on British vessels on the high seas and that
the United States had no jurisdiction over crimes committed on British ships outside U.S territory.
Thus, the U.S. courts could not decide the case; the British demand for the return of Nash was not
judicially cognizable. See id.
86. See JEAN E. SMrrH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 261-62 (1996). In Williams
v. Armroyd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 423, 432 (1813) (holding that U.S. courts must respect the judgment
of a French court which upheld the illegal seizure of a U.S. vessel), Chief Justice Marshall
emphasized that Congress governed the relationship between the United States and France, and
unless Congress chose to disavow the judgment of the French courts, the federal courts must act out
of comity.
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Sutherland's opinion was flawed as a matter of both law and his-
tory. The real issue in the case was whether Congress could delegate to
the President authority to regulate exports.Y In sustaining the delegation
of authority, the Court sought to distinguish the field of foreign com-
merce from the Court's contemporary precedents that had struck down
New Deal legislation authorizing the executive to regulate domestic
commerce.8 It was unnecessary and irrelevant for the Court to decide
that the federal government's authority to control foreign affairs was
superior to the States and unlimited by the Constitution in order to
reach the conclusion that this delegation was permissible. Sutherland's
frothy rhetoric confused the plain fact that the President's decision to
ban arms exports entailed no aspect of negotiation or diplomatic repre-
sentation.
Sutherland's historical facts were wrong as well. He argued that the
President's foreign relations powers derived from the British crown and
not from the States. 9 Yet, both the Declaration of Independence and the
Articles of Confederation acknowledged that the States retained certain
powers to make international agreements and regulate trade and com-
merce with foreign nations." The lack of cohesion and uniformity both
in foreign commerce and foreign relations had contributed to the call to
amend the Articles of Confederation.9'
Contrary to Sutherland's argument that the Constitution did not
refer to external sovereignty, Articles I and II of the Constitution exten-
sively enumerated the foreign relations powers of the Congress and the
President. Article I gave Congress extensive and explicit power to regu-
late foreign commerce, tax imports and exports, control immigration
and naturalization, define and punish felonies on the high seas and of-
fenses against the law of nations, declare war, grant letters of marque
and reprisal, make rules concerning captures on land and sea, and raise,
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating the NIRA's
authorization to the President to regulate the interstate shipment of oil); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act's (NIRA)
authorization to the President to adopt "codes of fair competition").
89. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 316-18.
90. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (stating that "as Free and
Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do."); THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION (U.S. 1781), reprinted in ROBERT W.
HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS 199-206 (1992).
91. Under the Articles, each of the thirteen states negotiated their own tariffs, frustrating the
commercial policies of sister states. The disarray in the Confederation's foreign relations permitted
Great Britain and Spain to remain in occupation of their western territories, which they had agreed to
transfer to the new nation. See SAMUEL F. BEaS, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY AND DIPLOMACY 32-37 (1959).
1998]
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support, and regulate an army and navy.9 Article II conferred on the
executive the power to command the military, receive foreign ambassa-
dors, and with the Senate's advice and consent, appoint ambassadors
and negotiate treaties. 93 The Framers did not grant the President exclu-
sive power to make treaties committing the nation internationally. 94
Hamilton, the most ardent advocate of executive power, warned that
[t]he history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.9
Sutherland's conclusion that the President was the sole organ of
foreign relations later formed the foundation of the expediency argu-
ment. Yet, courts and scholars conveniently overlooked the outlandish
premise of Sutherland's conclusion-that the President's power derives
from the British crown and not from the Constitution.96 Today, the con-
clusion appears as natural and sensible as the premise appears nonsensi-
cal and dangerous.
The potential for reshaping the Constitution into a legal foundation
for the executive expediency argument emerged in the Court's judg-
ments in United States v. Belmont' and United States v. Pink.9" Both
cases arose out of the Roosevelt administration's decision in 1933 to
establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and to settle out-
standing claims by the United States and its nationals. The claims set-
tlement was accomplished through a sole executive agreement known as
the "Litvinov Assignment."" After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet
government dissolved certain Russian companies and expropriated their
assets, including assets located in the United States. Under the Litvinov
Assignment the Soviets assigned to the U.S. Government these assets in
full settlement of all outstanding claims against the Soviet Union. In
92. See U.S. CONsr. art. 1, §8.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3. Even Sutherland had acknowleged earlier that the
executive's treaty-making authority was limited by the Constitution. See GEORGE SUTHERLAND,
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 118-27 (1919).
94. In his classic treatise on presidential powers, Professor Corwin acknowledged that the
executive power included responsibility for foreign relations, but he distinguished the President's
circumscribed powers from the Crown's much greater power. Speaking of the Virginia Constitution
of 1776, Corwin pointed out that "[e]xecutive power... was cut off entirely from the resources of
the common law and of English constitutional usage." EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: Omc
AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 6 (5th rev. ed., 1984).
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
96. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
97. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324.
98. Pink, 315 U.S. at 203.
99. See generally DONALD G. BISHOP, THE ROOSEvELT-LITvINov AGREEMENTS (1965).
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exchange, President Roosevelt agreed to release the Soviet Union from
all public and private claims by the United States and its nationals aris-
ing out of the expropriations. 1'0
In Belmont, the federal government sued to recover funds depos-
ited in 1918 by the Petrograd Metal Works Company with a private
banker, Belmont, in New York City. 101 The Soviets had expropriated the
Russian company and claimed the funds. A New York court held that
since the funds were deposited in New York, Soviet law did not govern
and that since confiscation of private property offended the public pol-
icy of New York, the Litvinov Assignment would not be given effect by
New York courts." Justice Sutherland, writing again for the Court, em-
phasized that the New York courts could not apply the public policy of
the State of New York in a way that superseded federal policy as estab-
lished by the Litvinov Assignment. 03 Citing Curtiss-Wright, Sutherland
treated the recognition of the Soviet government, the establishment of
diplomatic relations, and the assignment of claims as one transaction
within the competence of the President."'
The respondents argued that the Litvinov Assignment constituted a
treaty, which required the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate
under Article II. With circular reasoning Sutherland contended that the
Litvinov Assignment was an "international compact," which was distin-
guishable from an Article II treaty in that "[a] treaty signifies 'a com-
pact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the
public welfare.' But an international compact, as this was, is not always a
treaty which requires the participation of the Senate." 5 Surely, the
Litvinov Assignment benefited the "public welfare" by easing the rec-
ognition of the Soviet Union, and thus improving the U.S.-Soviet rela-
tionship. According to Sutherland's tautology, only treaties required the
100. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-13.
101. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 324-27.
102. See id. at 327.
103. See id. at 331-34.
104. See id. at 333.
105. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (quoting B. Altman & Co. v United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600)
(1912)). In Belmont, Justice Sutherland tried to turn a sow's ear into a purse by citing Altman and Co.
v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912). See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. In Altman, the issue before
the Court was whether it possessed appellate jurisdiction under section 5 of the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act to review an 1898 executive agreement with France. The agreement had been
negotiated under the explicit congressional authority of the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897. The
jurisdictional statute gave the Court jurisdiction to review treaties, and the Court held that for these
purposes, the term "treaty" included executive agreements and Article II treaties. The Court's
reading in Altman was a narrow construction of a jurisdictional statute, whereas Sutherland construed
the term "treaty" for purposes of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. Moreover, the
Court in Altman sided with the appellant to check the power of the executive to negotiate executive
agreements. By contrast, in Belmont, Sutherland assumed that the executive's power to negotiate was
plenary. In sum, what Altman took away from the executive's authority to act without judicial
scrutiny, Belmont paid back with interest. See id.
1998]
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advice and consent of the Senate, and if it required the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, it must be a treaty. In effect, the executive was free to
present any form of agreement as a compact and thereby exclude the
Senate's participation.
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exer-
cised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a
treaty in this respect has been recognized from the begin-
ning.... And while this rule in respect of treaties is established
by the express language of clause 2, article 6, of the Constitution,
the same rule would result in the case of all international com-
pacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power
over international affairs is in the national government and is not
and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the
part of the several states. In respect of all international negotia-
tions and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations gen-
erally, state lines disappear.1°6
In Sutherland's view, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI made all
international agreements the supreme law of the land. Sutherland as-
sumed away two problems with the Litvinov Assignment. First, he de-
nied the apparent conflict with the federal Constitution by overlooking
the impact that the Litvinov Assignment had on domestic property
rights.1" Without congressional approval or the senate's advice and con-
sent, President Roosevelt in effect transferred property rights from pri-
vate parties to a foreign state for the purpose of compensating other
private parties. Viewed that way, the Litvinov Assignment raised ques-
tions both of usurping congressional power as well as taking property
without a public purpose, compensation, or due process.
Second, Sutherland avoided the conflict with state law and public
policy respecting property rights by treating the assignment as part of a
single transaction under the rubric of "foreign relations."'0 ' He could
have disaggregated the assignment from the establishment of diplomatic
relations, at least insofar as it violated state law. Here, the President's
foreign relations powers were operating within the Territory of the
United States to appropriate private property without due process or
compensation. Belmont went even further than Curtiss-Wright by em-
powering the President, acting alone, to negotiate and enforce an
106. Id. at 331.
107. By holding that federal law had superseded New York law, the Court acknowledged
implictly that the expropriation of the Russian depositor had not extinguished the rights of Russian
shareholders in the United States. Id. at 331-34.
108. Id.
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agreement with a foreign state voiding private property rights contrary
to both state law and arguably the Constitution. 1' 9
In Pink,10 the Court considered a related case involving the
Litvinov Assignment. The respondent argued that the Litvinov Assign-
ment was ultra vires because it lacked either congressional approval as
legislation or Senate approval as a treaty. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Douglas found that the President had the authority to conclude an
executive agreement settling outstanding claims. Douglas read Belmont
as holding that
the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution
to the political departments of the federal government; that the
propriety of the exercise of that power is not open to judicial in-
quiry; and that recognition of a foreign sovereign conclusively
binds the courts."'
In effect, Douglas treated the legitimacy of the Litvinov Assignment as
if it were a non-justiciable political question. Unlike Sutherland,
Douglas did not claim that the executive possessed some exclusive ple-
nary authority to act in foreign affairs. Rather, he viewed foreign rela-
tions as a concurrent power of the executive and Congress. Although
Douglas cited Curtiss-Wright,"' he found a textual source for the
President's authority to negotiate claims settlements. Article II gave the
President power to receive foreign ambassadors."' Douglas reasoned by
painfully attenuated logic that if the President can "receive" ambassa-
dors, then he has the power to decide what government to recognize and
that included "the power to determine the policy which is to govern the
question of recognition.""' 4
Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional.
Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement
of claims of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of
the president who is the "sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations."
' 15
Douglas concluded that the settlement of outstanding claims, which in
this case meant the seizure of private property, was a coincident of the
109. See id. Still, Belmont did not contradict the traditional view of executive agreements,
discussed below, as operating only as a contemporary exchange of property and not as legally
binding the nation prospectively. See infra notes 326-356 and accompanying text. Even Justice
Sutherland had expressed the view earlier that executive agreements constituted "only a moral
obligation." SUTHERLAND. supra note 93, at 120.
110. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
111. Id. at 222-23.
112. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
113. Id. at229.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citations omitted).
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power to receive ambassadors.",6 Moreover, Douglas embraced the
proposition that a sole executive agreement was supreme over state law
and could be self-executing
n7
The Court's judgments in Curtiss-Wright, Belmont, and Pink fa-
vored the growth of executive power at a time when the shadow of fas-
cism was spreading across Europe. Together they reinforced the core
concept that the President was the sole organ of foreign relations. After
the defeat of fascism, this concept might have died a natural death. In-
stead, following World War II, judicial opinions re-integrated the sole
organ concept in light of Cold War exigencies and transformed it into a
watchword in the discourse of expediency.
C. Re-inventing the Sole Organ:
The Steel Seizure Case and the Cold War
The Cold War reclaimed the Court's central conception in Curtiss-
Wright. The Court's 1952 decision in Youngstown (The Steel Seizure
Case)"' rejected Sutherland's extra-constitutional thesis and re-
established the traditional, more limited, model of presidential powers." 9
Ironically, by divorcing Sutherland's weak extra-constitutional thesis
from the concept of the President as sole organ, Youngstown obscured
the suspect lineage of the concept and thus shielded it from scholarly
critique. In this way, Youngstown facilitated the discourse of expediency
at the height of the Cold War.
The Steel Seizure Case arose out of President Truman's executive
order to seize control of steel manufacturers in order to avert a threat-
ened strike during the Korean War.2° The President justifiably feared
that a strike could have seriously interrupted the production of arma-
ments for U.S. forces in Korea and Western Europe at a moment when
Chinese and Soviet communists seemed especially threatening to U.S.
116. See id. at 228-29. In fact, the power to receive foreign ambassadors was intended
originally to be merely a ceremonial power conferred on the executive. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69
(Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton described the power to receive ambassadors as "more a matter of
dignity than of authority." Id. at 448.
117. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-34. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations suggests
that Pink may support such a conclusion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 303, note
11. By contrast, Justice Douglas' subsequent concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case emphasized that
the executive cannot take private property without compensation authorized in advance by Congress.
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 629, 631-32 (Douglas J., concurring).
118. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
119. Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright are often viewed as opposing paradigms of presidential
power. See GLENNON, supra note 30, at 197-202. Critics of presidential power generally embrace
Youngstown as a repudiation of Curtiss-Wright. I suggest that Youngstown also made possible the
growth of presidential power in foreign affairs and thus reinforced Curtiss-Wright's conclusion that
the President is the sole organ of foreign relations.
120. See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 58-82 (1977).
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allies.' The President had no statutory authority to seize control of the
manufacturers, but relied on his plenary powers as chief executive and
commander-in-chief. Rejecting the President's action, the Court de-
clared that "[t]he president's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."'2 The
Court's judgment contradicted Sutherland's extra-constitutional theory
of presidential powers. Writing for the majority, Justice Black did not
even cite Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright.123
However, Justice Jackson's celebrated concurrence directly ad-
dressed Sutherland's opinion and sliced it to the bare bone. Jackson
asserted that Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the
President's power to act without congressional authority, but the ques-
tion of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress.""
He dismissed Sutherland's theory as mere "dictum, ''""s and read
Curtiss-Wright as affirming the power of Congress to delegate broad
power to the President over foreign commerce. Both Jackson and Black
stressed the distinction between the President acting as the commander-
in-chief in the "theater of war" and the President acting internally. 26 In
this way, the Court clearly distinguished President Roosevelt's author-
ized ban on arms exports from President Truman's unauthorized sei-
zure of steel mills in wartime.
Many scholars regard Jackson's concurrence as the most authori-
tative statement on presidential powers.'27 He described presidential
power as a function of congressional power:
When the president takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Justice Jackson's concurrence anticipated and rejected the expediency
argument. Explaining why the Constitution did not grant the President
emergency powers, he wrote:
121. See id at 74-76.
122. Youngstown. 343 U.S. at 585.
123. See id. at 582-89.
124. Id. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Justice Black's majority opinion asserted that "[e]ven though 'theater of war' be an
expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in
order to keep labor disputes from stopping production." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. Justice Jackson
stated that "the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy will constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants."
Id. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
127. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 30, at 8-13; HNIcIN, supra note 70, at 94-96; KOH, supra
note 21, at 135-37; MARcus, supra note 120, at 22-48.
128. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what
many think would be wise, although it is something the forefa-
thers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pres-
sures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they
afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that
they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies. 12
Critics of executive power have cited Youngstown as representing
the limits of executive power in foreign affairs. 1 ° However, Youngstown
also advanced the proposition that the President is the sole organ of for-
eign relations, by clearing away the doctrinal debris from Sutherland's
extra-constitutional thesis without disturbing the central holding. By
removing the taint of Sutherland's twisted logic, Youngstown preserved
the core concept of Curtiss-Wright. Since Youngstown, courts have reit-
erated that the President is the sole organ of foreign relations, but rather
than relying upon Sutherland's historiography, courts have justified this
conclusion by reference to the geopolitical necessities of the Cold
War. 3'
D. The Liberals and the Cold War
Following the Second World War, the United States occupied a po-
sition of world leadership in containing the spread of communism, sta-
bilizing friendly economies, and deterring the nuclear threat. Almost
from the moment of the Japanese surrender, a continuing spiral of in-
ternational crises-Berlin, China, Korea, Hungary, Suez, the Near East,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia-continuously
destabilized the geopolitical environment. Traditional historians like
George F. Kennan and W. W. Rostow blamed Soviet expansionism and
U.S. weakness for the persistent crisis of the Cold War.' Revisionist
historians like Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, and William Appleman
129. lId at 649-50. It is clear that Jackson's views on emergency powers were shaped or at least
supported by his own experience as the Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. His concurrence traced the
history of the Weimar Constitution and the grant of emergency powers by the Reichstag to the
President of the Republic and its tragic consequences. He concluded that recent history "suggests that
emergency powers are consistent with free government only when their control is lodged elsewhere
than in the Executive who exercises them." Id at 652.
130. See, e.g., GLENNoN, supra note 30, at 8-18.
131. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,669 (1981) (holding that the President's
sole executive agreement with Iran validly suspended claims filed in U.S. courts and transferred the
appellant's property claims to the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission in The Hague). See also
Arthur S. Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 UCLA L
REv. 1104, 1105, 1127 (1982) (arguing that the Court sacrificed constitutional principle to
geopolitical realities).
132. See GaoRGE F. KENNAN, Russ AND Tim Wasr uNDER LENIN AND STALN (1961);
W.W. Rosrow, Tm UNIT= STATES i T WORLD ARENA (1960).
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Williams argued that the United States overreacted to the Soviet Union's
reasonable security concerns and that the United States sought to exploit
the bipolar order for its own economic and political purposes.' Post-
revisionists like John Lewis Gaddis, William Taubman, and Daniel
Yergin concluded that the Cold War resulted from misunderstandings
on both sides."
Whatever the complexity of causes that led to the Cold War-
ideology, economics, power politics, Stalin's personality, Soviet intrigue,
or American ineptitude-the tension of the bipolar order seemed real,
immutable, and threatening to the U.S. public.'35 The broad consensus
of U.S. leadership held that the immediacy of the nuclear threat, the
need for covert operations and intelligence gathering, and the complex-
ity of U.S. relations with both democracies and dictatorships made it
impractical to engage in congressional debate and oversight of foreign
policy-making.'36 The eighteenth-century Constitution did not permit a
rapid response to twentieth-century foreign aggression. The reality of
transcontinental ballistic missiles collapsed the real time for decision-
making to a matter of minutes. Faced with the apparent choice between
the risk of nuclear annihilation or amending the constitutional process
for policy-making, the preference for a powerful executive was clear.'13
Early in the Cold War one skeptic of executive power, C.C. Rossiter, ac-
knowledged that
[t]he steady increase in executive power is unquestionably a
cause for worry, but so, too, is the steady increase in the magni-
tude and complexity of the problems the president has been
called upon by the American people to solve in their behalf.
They still have more to fear from the ravages of depression, re-
bellion, and especially atomic war than they do from whatever
decisive actions may issue from the White House in an attempt to
put any such future crises to rout .... [I]t is not too much to say
that the destiny of this nation in the Atomic Age will rest in the
133. See GAR ALpEmovrTz, COLD WAR EssAYs (1970); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE Luimrs op
PowER THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES PoLcY, 1945-1954 (1972); WILUAM A. WILLIAMS,
THE TRAGEDY OF AmERICAN DIPLOMACY (1988).
134. See GADDIS, supra note 1; TAuBmAN, supra note 8; DANIEL YERGiN, SHATrERED PEACE:
THE ORIGINs OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SEcuRrTY STATE (1977).
135. See WILLIAM F. MuLLEN, PRESIDENTIAL PowER AND PoLncs 39-42 (1976).
136. See SILvESREIN, supra note 9, at 9-17,65-100.
137. President Truman warned that
(w]e live in an age when hostilities begin without polite exchanges of diplomatic notes.
There are no longer sharp distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, between
military targets and the sanctuary of civilian areas. Nor can we separate the economic facts
from the problems of defense and security. [The] President, who is Comander in Chief and
who represents the interests of all the people, must be able to act at all times to meet any
sudden threat to the nation's security.
2 HARRY S. TRumAN, MEmoms: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 478 (1956) (commenting on the
Court's decision in the Steel Seizure Case).
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capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional dic-
tatorship.'
The call for executive leadership in the face of international crisis
came not only from members of the executive branch,'39 but also from
members of Congress,"4 academics, 4' and legal commentators.142 Re-
viewing the history of this period, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported at the height of the Vietnam War,
[o]ur country has come far toward the concentration in its na-
tional executive of unchecked power over foreign relations, par-
ticularly over the disposition and use of the Armed Forces. So
far has this process advanced that in the committee's view, it is
no longer accurate to characterize our government, in matters of
foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and bal-
anced, against each other .... 143
138. RossrrEa, supra note 54, at 308-09.
139. President Truman warned that upon the functioning of a strong executive "depends the
survival of each of us and also on that depends the survival of the free world." THE POWERS OF MaI
PRESIDENCY 114 (Robert S. Hirschfield ed., 1968). See also, e.g., Speech by John F. Kennedy
delivered to the National Press Club (Jan. 14, 1960), in HSCHFIELD, supra, at 129-3 1; Congress, the
President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. Policy and Scientific
Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 12-13 (1970) (statement of
McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation); Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements:
Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. of the
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 237-40 (1972) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Former Attorney General
and Former Undersecretary of State).
140. Reflecting on postwar foreign policy through Vietnam, Senator John Stennis, the powerful
Democratic chair of the Armed Services Committee, concluded that "our urgent national interests
would have been injured if the President had been forced to delay by coming to Congress ......
JOHN C. STENNIS & J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY 29-30
(1971). See also J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-
Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL LQ. 1 (1961).
141. See, e.g., HIRSHFIELD, supra note 139, at 252-53 (arguing that the degree of executive
power should vary directly with the degree of crisis). "Should the ultimate crisis of thermonuclear
war occur, the President would necessarily have to assume dictatorial authority over every other
aspect of vhate'ver rehained of our national existence. His power would be total, to meet the totality
of the disaster, and the regimes of Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt would seem pale in comparison."
Id. at 253. See also, e.g., ROBINSON Lr AL., supra note 52, at 5-7; Henry S. Commager, Does the
President Have Tob Much Power?, reprinted in 97 CONG. RaC. 3101-02 (1951).
142. See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Great Cases Make Bud Law: The War Powers Resolution, 50
Tax. L Ray. 833 (1972). Rostow stated that
the nation faces foreign policy problems today altogether different from those it faced in
1800, or even in 1900.... Our diplomacy.., was peripheral to the overriding problem of
maintaining the.., direct responsibility for protecting [the United States'] primary security
as a nation by direct and continuous involvement in world politics.... The circumstances of
modem world politics, however, require Presidents to act quickly, and often alone.
Id. at 870-71. See also, e.g., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on SJ. Res. 130 before
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 424-27 (1952) (statement of Myres S.
McDougal, William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University Law School).
143. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on National Commitments, S. Rep. No. 91-129
(1969) at 7.
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In the committee's view, the continuing series of Cold War crises and
the perceived need to expedite decision-making in the nuclear age led
to a concentration of power in the executive:
Since 1940 crisis has been chronic and, coming as something
new in our experience, has given rise to a tendency toward anx-
ious expediency in our response to it. The natural expedient-
natural because of the real or seeming need for speed-has been
executive action.... Perceiving, and sometimes exaggerating,
the need for prompt action, and lacking traditional guidelines
for the making of decisions in an emergency, we have tended to
think principally of what needed to be done and little, if at all, of
the means of doing it.1
Many liberals, who in the 1970s would become leading critics of
the President's foreign policy, advocated the expediency of executive
power in the 1950s. Liberals linked executive expediency with the cen-
tralization of power in the federal government during the New Deal and
the subsequent creation of the welfare state. From their perspective, the
presidency was the most effective and representative office from which
to manage this centralization of power. In part, executive expediency
represented the romancing of the White House by liberals, especially
during the Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Only after
the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam and the subversion of constitu-
tional government by the Nixon administration did liberals turn against
the executive expediency argument.145 By then, the idea of a permanent
crisis in foreign policy and the unquestioned supremacy of the execu-
tive in the management of foreign affairs had become an accepted fea-
ture of U.S. government.
Three historical moments were critical to the development of the
executive expediency discourse: the communist witch hunts of the
1950s, the Bricker Amendment debate in the early 1950s, and the de-
bate through the 1960s and early 1970s over the war in Indochina.
Each of these events crystallized the discourse, and in each moment, lib-
erals used the executive expediency discourse to trump conservative op-
position to the executive's foreign policy.
First, congressional Democrats employed expediency discourse in
the 1950s as a strategic maneuver in defense of the Democratic
Administration as well as the free worid. With the recovery effort in
Europe and the emergence of the Cold War, an isolationist Congress
stymied President Truman's foreign policies. For example, Truman's
decision to increase U.S. forces in Europe in 1950 ignited the "Great
144. Id. at 96.
145. See NATHAN & OLIVER, supra note 9, at 78-90; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9, at 84-100, 123-
38.
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Debate" of the Eighty-second Congress concerning the commander-in-
chief's authority to deploy troops without congressional authorization.
The leader of the Republican opposition, Senator Robert A. Taft, later
warned that
[t]here can be no question that the executive departments have
claimed more and more power over the field of foreign policy at
the same time that the importance of foreign policy and its effect
on every feature of American life has steadily increased. If the
present trend continues, it seems to me obvious that the president
will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign
policy and thereby acquire power to force upon Congress all
kinds of domestic policies which must necessarily follow."
In response to legislative opposition, Truman tried to act outside the
constraints of the legislative process. For example, in winning approval
for the Bretton Woods Agreements,'47 Truman avoided the usual process
of Senate advice and consent in establishing the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund.'48 The perceived threat of internal subver-
sion and congressional witch hunting for communists in the executive
branch complicated Truman's posture toward Congress. Republican
congressional leaders demanded that federal employees take loyalty
oaths, and some called for the resignation of Secretary of State
Acheson.'49
While many liberals worried about the implications of the right-
wing backlash, congressional Democrats accepted President Truman's
attempts to accommodate the right-wing."s Truman pre-empted con-
gressional Republican investigations of his administration by establish-
ing a security system that would deter both communist infiltration and
congressional oversight. Without congressional authorization, Truman
imposed a loyalty oath on federal employees, ordered the classification
of sensitive government documents restricting access to information,
and imposed a system of security clearances.'' In defense of the
146. ROBERT A. TAFT, A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICANS 21 (1952).
147. The Bretton Woods Agreements negotiated in 1944 include the Charter of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, and the International Bank For Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440. Both agreements were approved by
Congress in The Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945).
148. See generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGINS AND
THE PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 348-81 (1969); JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
27-32 (1991);,GEORG SCHILD, BRETTON WOODS AND DUMBARTON OAKS: AMERICAN ECONOMIC
PLANNING AND POLITICAL POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE SUMMER OF 1944, at 109-38 (1995).
149. See DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN
AND EISENHOWER 41-69 (1978).
150. See id. at 38-40, 50-53, 253.
151. See generally id. at 41-53, 267-93, 303-24; EARL LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST
CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON 362-99 (1966).
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administration, liberals in Congress argued that the threat posed by the
Soviet bloc justified deference to the executive's primacy in foreign
relations."'
Beginning in the early 1950s, the debate over the Bricker Amend-
ment triggered traditional isolationist support and a liberal backlash
supporting the President."' The Amendment was proposed by
Republican Senator John Bricker, Governor Thomas Dewey's vice-
presidential nominee. The Bricker Amendment, which took various
forms during the early 1950s," would have amended Article VI of the
Constitution to deny the supremacy of treaties or executive agreements
over state or federal law. 55 Bricker's supporters opposed U.N. human
rights conventions, such as the Genocide Convention, 56 which they
feared could interfere with state laws." They were particularly con-
cerned with the impact of human rights conventions on racial segrega-
tion in the south.' Liberals opposed the Bricker Amendment both
because it would undermine the effectiveness of the United Nations in
outlawing violations of human rights and because they believed that the
invocation of "states' rights" was designed to preserve racial apartheid
152. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 150-55.
153. See, e.g., LOcH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 86-110
(1984); Brunson MacChesney, The Fallacies in the Case for the Bricker Amendment, 29 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 551 (1954); Felix Morley, Treaty Law and the Constitution: A Study of the Bricker
Amendment, American Enterprise Institute No. 448, 21-48 (1953); John B. Whitton & J. Edward
Fowler, Bricker Amendment-Fallacies and Danger, 48 AMrR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1954).
154. See Whitton & Fowler, supra note 153, at 24.
155. In Missouri v. Hollan4 252 U.S. 416,433-35 (1920), Justice Holmes suggested that a treaty
could be used to grant the federal government authority over the states which otherwise was not
provided for in the Constitution. The immediate catalyst for Senator Bricker's amendment was a
California state court opinion striking down a state law which restricted the rights of aliens to own
property because it interfered with the U.N. Charter. See Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. CL
App. 1950). See also JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 87-89.
156. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
157. See John W. Bricker & Charles A. Webb, Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law, 29
NOTRE DAME LAw. 529, 536-45 (1954) (arguing that treaties must not interfere with state law absent
federal implementing legislation).
158. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 7 (1953) (statement of John W. Bricker, United States Senator). See
generally Arthur H. Dean, Amending the Treaty Power, 6 STAN. L. REv. 589,606 (1954) (noting that
some legislators have expressed concern that "a presidential executive agreement which could
hardly be justified as an exercise by the President of his own constitutional powers and which is
primarily legislative in purpose and effect, such as an executive agreement purporting to... protect
civil rights, will be enforced as the law of the land"); Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law
Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L REV. 903, 913-26 (1959) (arguing
in part that civil rights questions that affect foreign relations are subject to treaty power); Arthur E.
Sutherland, Jr., Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L REV. 1305, 1310 (1952) (noting that
legislators have offered several proposals to "eliminate the self-executing feature which a treaty may
have under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution,.... [thereby], preventing the
use of treaties to invade the reserved powers of the states").
1998]
HeinOnline -- 86 Cal. L. Rev. 703 1998
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
in the South."9 In other words, both concerns for domestic civil rights,
as well as internationalism, motivated liberals to support the President's
power to make treaties and executive agreements. The Senate defeated
the Bricker amendment in 1954 by one vote."w The battle over the
Bricker Amendment persuaded liberals that they should defend the ex-
ecutive's prerogative in the conduct of foreign relations.' 6'
The third historical moment that helped develop the expediency
discourse was the debate over U.S. involvement in Indochina through
the 1960s and early 1970s. As President Johnson escalated the U.S.
military commitment following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and his
landslide victory in 1964, he enjoyed the strong support of liberals in
Congress. Liberals worried that criticism of President Johnson's for-
eign policy could undermine his domestic civil rights and anti-poverty
programs. Therefore, they were willing to give the President a blank
check in Indochina. Just as liberals had defended President Truman's
foreign policy out of loyalty to his domestic policy, many liberals sup-
ported Johnson's war policy through the Tet offensive in 1968.163
The linkage between foreign and domestic policy remained an im-
portant determinate of support for the executive. Faced with rising in-
flation and urban problems, liberals abandoned President Johnson on
his Indochina policy.' 4 Civil rights leaders and anti-poverty activists saw
that the war was draining resources from domestic programs 65 Senators
Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy linked their criticism of
Johnson's domestic and foreign policy." Following Nixon's election,
liberals were free to question the wisdom of allowing the commander-
in-chief to wage undeclared wars without explicit congressional authori-
zation or oversight. President Kennedy's friend and counselor, the lib-
eral historian Arthur Schlesinger, wrote his famous critique of the
executive's control of foreign relations, The Imperial Presidency,67
during the Nixon administration. By the time the book appeared in
1973, the twin shocks of the Pentagon Papers and the Watergate scandal
159. See generally Henkin, supra note 158, at 913-30.
160. See 100 CONG. REc. 2374-75 (1954). In Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the treaty power was subordinate to other constitutional provisions. 354 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1957). The
Court's opinion satisfied most of Bricker's supporters and the movement for an amendment died out.
See JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 101-10.
161. See., e.g., J. William Fulbright, Forward to GLENNON, supra note 30, at xi.
162. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9, at 84-88.
163. See id. at 88-89; DAVID CHALMERS, AND THE CROOKED PLACES MADE STRAIGHT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 1960s, at 101-134 (1991); WILLIAM L O'NEILL, COMING
APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's, at 333-52 (1971).
164. See STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM 558-66 (1983).
165. See generally CHALMERS, supra note 163, at 126-45; O'NEILL, supra note 163, at 180-94,
275-305.
166. See O'NEELL, supra note 163, at 360-78.
167. SCHLESINGER, supra note 33.
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had revealed to the public the moral bankruptcy, incompetence, and
illegality of the imperial presidency. These revelations triggered legisla-
tion, such as the War Powers Resolution, which limited the executive's
discretion in foreign relations and required the executive to keep
Congress informed of its military and covert activities abroad.'68
The maturing views of Senator William Fulbright aptly demon-
strated the impact of these three historical events on congressional mod-
erates and liberals. One of the preeminent Democrats in foreign affairs
during the postwar era, Fulbright supported the United Nations early in
his career and viewed the Bricker Amendment as a vestige of the tradi-
tional isolationism which kept the United States out of the League of
Nations.69 Senator Fulbright believed that isolationism was no longer a
viable policy for a United States faced with the global challenge posed
by the Soviet Union. What President Washington had extolled as "our
detached and distant situation" 7' had ended abruptly with the outbreak
of World War II and the uncertain peace that followed. As the anti-
communist hysteria led to attacks on the foreign policies of the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations, Fulbright rushed to the defense of the
executive against the reckless intrusion of the Congress. 7 ' He regarded
Senator Joseph McCarthy and his cohorts as a national embarrass-
ment.' These episodes of congressional involvement with foreign pol-
icy convinced Senator Fulbright that Congress was ill-equipped to
manage foreign affairs in a dangerous time:
It is highly unlikely that we can successfully execute a long-
range program for the taming, or containing, of today's aggres-
sive and revolutionary forces by continuing to leave vast and vi-
tal decision-making powers in the hands of a decentralized,
independent-minded, and largely parochial-minded body of
legislators.
7 1
The Senator possessed greater confidence in the Republican administra-
tion of President Eisenhower than in the Democratic Congress in which
he served. He viewed the executive as inherently more internationalist
than Congress and as better structured to conduct foreign policy:
The president alone can act to mobilize our power and resources
toward the realization of clearly defined objectives and to wean
168. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1541-48 (1973).
169. See J. William Fulbright, The Bricker Amendment: "It is an Attempt to Escape the World",
reprinted in FuLBRiGrr OF ARKANSAS 124-30 (Karl E. Meyer ed., 1963).
170. Farewell Address by George Washington (Sept. 29, 1796), in BLOOM, supra note 90, at
144.
171. See Fulbright, supra note 161, at xi; FuLBRIGHT oF ARKANSAS, supra note 169, at 69-91.
172. See Fulbright, supra note 161, at xi.
173. Fulbright, supra note 140, at 7.
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the American people and their representatives from the luxuries
of parochialism and self-indulgence that they can no longer af-
ford.'74
Thus, Senator Fulbright concluded that "we must give the Executive a
measure of power in the conduct of our foreign affairs that we have
hitherto jealously withheld.... This proposition, valid in our own time,
is certain to become more, rather than less, compelling in the decades
ahead."',
Fulbright characterized the ordinary politics of legislation as
"luxuries of parochialism and self-indulgence.' 1 76 Interest-group poli-
tics were "parochial" in the context of foreign affairs, and the idea of
holding the government accountable through Congress appeared "self-
indulgent." Fulbright implied that open democratic deliberation might
be too costly. Employing the rhetoric of wartime-patriotism and self-
sacrifice-Fulbright argued that democratic accountability should be
surrendered to a higher purpose; that is, national survival. Looking back
at the growth of executive power in the 1950s and 1960s, he explained,
[t]he cause of the constitutional imbalance is crisis. I do not be-
lieve that the executive has willfully usurped the constitutional
authority of the Congress; nor do I believe that the Congress has
knowingly given away its traditional authority, although some of
its members-I among them, I regret to say-have sometimes
shown excessive regard for executive freedom of action. In the
main, however, it has been circumstance rather than design which
has given the executive its great predominance in foreign policy.
The circumstance has been crisis, an entire era of crisis in which
urgent decisions have been required, decisions of a kind the
Congress is ill-equipped to make with ... the requisite
speed.... The President has the means at his disposal for
prompt action: the Congress does not. When the security of the
country is endangered.., there is a powerful premium on
prompt action, and that means executive action."
Fulbright enthusiastically supported the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
and initially backed Johnson's escalation of the war. After the U.S. in-
vasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Senator began to harbor
private doubts about Johnson's foreign policies.7 8 Nevertheless, he
174. Id. at 12.
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id. at 12.
177. United States Commitments to Foreign Powers, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967) (statement of J.
William Fulbright, United States Senator), reprinted in Congressional Oversight of Executive
Agreements: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 370 (1972).
178. See NAoMI B. LYNN & ARTHUR F. MCCLURE, THE FULBRIGHT PREMISE 123-32 (1973).
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remained an advocate of executive expediency. Not until 1967 did
Fulbright publicly criticize the President's policy in Indochina.
179
By Nixon's election in 1968, the Senator was a leading critic of
presidential supremacy in foreign relations, which he characterized as
"executive despotism."1 80 In doing so, Fulbright frankly acknowledged
his own responsibility in abdicating congressional leadership to the ex-
ecutive.' He perceived that the actions undertaken by the President
during the Cold War had altered the traditional relationship between
Congress and the President.
After the tragic experience of Vietnam, the question for Fulbright
was whether a constitutional amendment should legitimate the new rela-
tionship between the executive and legislative branches, or whether
Congress should restore the Constitution's original design.s2 The War
Powers Resolution" 3 resolved that question. Senator Fulbright's support
for the Resolution signaled a dramatic change in his own and his party's
view of the executive. Fulbright's transformation from executive apolo-
gist to critic epitomized a generational shift among liberals from the
beginning of the Cold War to the end of the Indochina War."
E. Conclusion
In the early days of the Cold War, liberal and moderate Democrats
countered Republican opposition to the domestic and foreign policies
of the Truman administration with executive expediency discourse. We
can distinguish three strains of expediency arguments. First, liberals ar-
gued that the gravity of the international situation did not permit time
for a robust debate about amending the constitutional balance of power
between the political branches. This argument suggested that the prob-
lem was confined to the duration of the crisis, and contained no pre-
scription for what, if anything, needed fixing in the constitutional
structure. Another strain of argument treated as disloyal any criticism of
the executive's foreign policy. In the 1950s context of anti-communist
hysteria, this argument may help explain why so few legal commenta-
tors and courts questioned the extra-constitutional conduct of the
179. Id. See also Kamow, supra note 164, at 418-23, 486 (tracing the emergence of Senator
Fulbright as a leading critic of the war).
180. STEmNIS & FuLBRIGHT. supra note 140, at 35.
181. See STAFF OF SEN. CoMMs. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., DocUMENTS
RELATING TO THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORrrY AS COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF AND THE WAR IN INDOCMNA 8-31 (Comm. Print 1970).
182. See id
183. See supra note 168.
184. Some conservatives had reached the same conclusion about executive power earlier. In
1964, Senator Barry Goldwater said, "I feel very strongly that the executive branch has taken too
much power from the legislative branch." 110 CONG. Rrc. 19, 787 (1964) (statement of Barry
Goldwater, United States Senator), reprinted in LYNN & McCLuRE, supra note 178, at 106.
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executive at the height of the Cold War. Third, liberals and moderates
claimed that Congress did not possess the institutional competence to
conduct foreign policy. Congress was slow, deliberative, and unwieldy,
while the executive could act with speed, certainty, and secrecy. The
claim of institutional incompetence assumed that Congress could not
effectively respond to the Cold War. Political leaders viewed the Cold
War as sui generis, requiring extraordinary actions that would not be
justifiable in ordinary times."5
Expediency discourse began as a political rhetoric, but it quickly
transformed legal doctrines as well. Already, the Supreme Court had set
the scene for this transformation in Curtiss-Wright, Pink, and Belmont.
Yet, the Court's later decision in Youngstown suggested that Curtiss-
Wright may have been confined to its facts, and that even in a national
emergency during wartime, the President only possessed the authority
granted expressly by the Constitution or delegated by Congress. The
judiciary might have held steadfast to that vision of the Constitution.
Instead, expediency discourse changed the way that courts thought
about the Constitution and its relationship to contemporary geopolitics.
The next Part of this Article explores how courts translated the discourse
into legal doctrines.
II
How EXECUTIVE EXPEDIENCY DISCOURSE
TRANSFORMED LEGAL DOCTRINE
The liberal response to the Cold War undermined the traditional
liberal legal dichotomy between normalcy and emergency rule. A dif-
ferent method of constitutional interpretation emerged from the Cold
War, one shaped by the discourse of executive expediency. This new
interpretive modality extended the President's plenary powers in rela-
tion to geopolitical events in two ways. First, courts looked to the execu-
tive for a signal that an overriding geopolitical interest required the
executive to act on its own. Second, courts deferred to the executive to
set its own limits on the exercise of power. Many conservative jurists,
who otherwise favored a strictly textual or intentionalist reading of the
Constitution, widely endorsed this non-textual approach to constitu-
tional interpretation.
A detailed examination of how courts interpreted the executive's
foreign relations powers more expansively during the Cold War would
exceed the scope of this Article. What follows is a brief summary of
some of the ways that judicial opinions entangled executive power as a
consequence of the Cold War discourse. I offer this summary by way of
185. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9, at 65-82.
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example to show that the discourse pervaded the whole field of foreign
relations powers. Part III then traces in much greater depth how the
Cold War judicial opinions profoundly altered the executive's power to
make executive agreements, and the domestic legal consequences.
A. Foreign Act of State Doctrine
The foreign act of state doctrine is a well established bar against
U.S. courts hearing claims based on acts of foreign governments. '86
Originally, the Court said that the principle of international comity'17
required that courts not sit in judgment on the acts of another sover-
eign.' 8 In a string of cases since the 1950s, courts have shifted away
from reliance upon the principle of international comity as the founda-
tion for the doctrine. 9 Instead, courts based the foreign act of state
doctrine on "constitutional underpinnings" of separation of powers.'9
Courts should not address questions arising out of foreign acts of state
because of the risk of interference with the political branches' conduct
of foreign policy. However, courts made an exception to this rule of
judicial abstention where the executive branch expressed its view that
adjudicating the claim would not damage U.S. foreign relations. 9'
The doctrinal shift began with the Second Circuit's opinion in
Bernstein."'9 Bernstein, a German Jew, made a claim against another pri-
vate party who had purchased property that Bernstein had owned before
it was confiscated by the Nazi regime. The Second Circuit had rejected
two prior claims brought by Bernstein on the basis of the act of state
doctrine.'93 In his third attempt to obtain compensation, Bernstein ob-
tained a letter from the Department of State affirming that
[t]he policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in
the United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or
compensation in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or
duress as a result of Nazi persecutions in Germany, is to relieve
186. See RESrATEMENT (THnR), supra note 24, at § 443.
187. See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
188. "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory" Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
189. See RESTATEMENT (Triew), supra note 24, at § 443 cmt. a.
190. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THrRD), supra note 24, at § 443 cmt. h, n.8.
192. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375
(2d Cir. 1954).
193. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71,
78 (2d Cir. 1949), modified by 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres Societ6
Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246,249-51 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
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American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their ju-
risdiction to pass upon the acts of Nazi officials.'94
Based upon this expression of the executive's will, Judge Learned Hand
held that the act of state doctrine did not bar Bernstein's claim. 95
The Bernstein opinion stood the act of state doctrine on its head.
Originally, the act of state doctrine was designed as a doctrine of judicial
abstention to avoid politicizing disputes in U.S. courts which might
damage U.S. foreign relations. After Bernstein, some courts have treated
the act of state doctrine as a rule of deference to the executive. 96 The
Bernstein exception meant that the outcome of disputes in U.S. courts
would depend in large part on the executive's intention. Far from insu-
lating U.S. foreign policy from the effect of U.S. civil litigation,
Bernstein assured that in the future all such litigation would depend
upon whether the executive chose to intervene in the litigation. Now all
such suits had the potential of becoming politicized by executive action.
The Bernstein opinion was limited to its facts by subsequent opin-
ions,"re until the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of the Bernstein
letter. 9 In First National City Bank, then-Justice Rehnquist upheld the
Bernstein exception in a plurality opinion joined by just two of his col-
leagues. All six other justices questioned the Bernstein exception, but
for different reasons.' 9 Rehnquist's opinion married the "sole organ of
foreign relations" and executive expediency arguments, disguising their
quite different lineage.'o Further, he defended the act of state doctrine
as resting on both principles of international comity and separation of
powers.210 Yet, he concluded that respect for the executive should move
courts to abstain from adjudicating foreign acts of state:
[W]here the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly repre-
sents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts."°e
194. 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592, 593 (1949).
195. Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 375.
196. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Government of Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425-27
(6th Cir. 1984) (holding that appellant's counterclaim for the expropriation of its interest in an
Ethiopian company was protected by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between
the United States and Ethiopia and that the executive branch's intervention on behalf of the appellant
eliminated any risk that the claim might interfere in the conduct of foreign relations).
197. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
198. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (approving
the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine).
199. See id. at 772-73 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 774-76 (Powell, J., concurring); ik at 785-
90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. See i. at 762-70.
201. See i& at 762.
202. Id. at 768.
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First National City Bank allowed the executive to tell courts whether
civil litigation bearing on foreign acts of state should go forward. Expe-
diency discourse justified the executive's intervention in the courts'
subject-matter jurisdiction. In effect, the executive now stood as the
gatekeeper to the judicial process in cases challenging foreign laws. 3
B. Nonrecognition of Foreign Governments
The executive's new power as gatekeeper also applied to suits
brought on behalf of unrecognized governments. The President's
authority to recognize foreign states and governments based upon the
Constitution's reception clause is well established.' 4 Courts have long
held that an unrecognized government has no standing in a U.S.
court. 5 The executive determined whether to recognize a foreign gov-
ernment, but the executive could not instruct courts on a case-by-case
basis whether to permit unrecognized governments to bring claims.
During the Cold War, this direct relationship between recognition
and standing to sue began to break down. The executive intervened in
some cases to advise courts to permit claims brought by unrecognized
governments to go forward based upon the executive's assessment of
the likely impact on foreign relations.' Thus, an unrecognized gov-
ernment's access to a U.S. court was subject to the executive's control
on an ad hoc basis. For example, at the recommendation of the U.S.
Justice and State Departments, the Second Circuit allowed a company
wholly owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran to file suit, even though
the United States did not formally recognize that government.2
203. See generally RESTATEMENT (TiC m), supra note 24, at § 443 n.8.
204. U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 3 provides that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers." Some claimed at the time of the founding that the recognition power belonged to
Congress. Hamilton characterized the reception clause as "more a matter of dignity than of
authority" THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
Nevertheless, the executive has consistently performed the recognition function. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 24, at § 204 cmt. a. See generally Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of
Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rv. 1 (1972).
205. See, e.g., Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259, 261-63
(N.Y. 1929) (holding that the Soviet Republic had no standing to bring an action in a U.S. court
because it was the policy of the United States to deny it recognition, according to a letter obtained
from the State Department); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 205.
206. See, e.g., Upright v. Mercury Bus. Mach. Co., 213 N.Y.S.2d 417, 423-24 (N.Y. App. Div.
1961) (holding that where the United States did not intervene to express its views, the assignee of the
unrecognized East German government had standing to sue).
207. See National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 554-56 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that the National Petrochemical Company could sue a Liberian oil tanker where the
United States as amicus requested that Iran be given access to our courts); see also Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 410 (holding that a foreign government cannot file suit in a U.S. court if the executive branch
has refused "to acknowledge that the government in question speaks as the sovereign authority for
the territory it purports to control'); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938)
(holding that a "suit... may be maintained in our courts only by the government which has been
1998]
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Acknowledging the complexity of U.S. foreign relations, the Second
Circuit conceded that "courts are hardly competent to assess how
friendly or unfriendly our relationship with a foreign government is at
any given moment.""2 8 If the executive wished to deny recognition and
yet allow standing, the executive could have its cake and eat it, too. Ac-
cording to the court, the complexity of contemporary geopolitical rela-
tions required this extraordinary deference to the executive as
gatekeeper:
It is evident that in today's topsy-turvy world governments can
topple and relationships can change in a moment. The Executive
Branch must therefore have broad, unfettered discretion in mat-
ters involving such sensitive, fast-changing, and complex foreign
relationships.1
Prior to the Cold War, U.S. courts would not question the foreign
acts of state of any government, recognized or not. Courts held that
fundamental justice required that "the refusal of the political depart-
ment to recognize a government should not be allowed to affect private
rights which may depend upon proving the existing conditions in such
state."2 '° During the Cold War, U.S. courts increasingly looked to the
executive to decide when it was appropriate to apply the law of an un-
recognized government.2 ' One prominent example of the shift away
from the traditional understanding concerned a dispute between the
Bank of China that was chartered by the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.) and the Bank of China that was chartered by the Government
of Taiwan (Republic of China).2"2 Prior to the Chinese Revolution, the
Bank of China deposited funds at the Wells Fargo Bank in San
Francisco. Following the revolution, the Republic of China nationalized
the Bank of China without compensating the Bank's shareholders and
recognized by the political department of our own government" and accepting "as conclusive here
the determination of... [the] State Department that the Russian State was represented by the
Provisional Government").
208. National Petrochemical Co., 860 F.2d at 554 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410).
209. Id. at 555.
210. Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 33 F.2d 202, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1929),
afja4 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that where a French bank's gold was expropriated by the
Soviet Government and sold to the U.S. defendant, the effectiveness of the Soviet expropriation
should be recognized, even though the government was not); see also Sokoloff v. National City Bank
of New York, 145 N.E. 917, 919-21 (N.Y. 1924) (holding that a plaintiff who deposited money into a
U.S. bank for transfer to a Russian branch that subsequently was nationalized was entitled to the
return of his deposit because the U.S. bank still had a contractual debt in the United States);
RESTATEMENT (TmIRD), supra note 24, at § 205, n.3.
211. See, e.g., Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003.04
(D.C. Cir. 1951) (holding that the nationalization of three Latvian flag vessels by the Latvian Soviet
Socialist Republic in 1940 should not be given effect by U.S. courts because of the policy of the U.S.
executive denying the legitimacy of the Soviet occupation of Latvia).
212. See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal.
1952), affTd in part and rev'd in part, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
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reconstituted the Bank. The People's Republic, which the United States
had not recognized at that time, claimed that the Bank of China (P.R.C.)
continued to exist and to do business as before the Revolution through-
out China, Asia, and the British Commonwealth, and that the Bank of
China (P.R.C.) remained under the control of its original shareholders.
Both Banks of China claimed ownership of the Wells Fargo account.
Ordinarily, a court would judge a dispute between two private enti-
ties claiming the same property by reference to the factual circum-
stances of ownership. For example, a court could determine ownership
based on the identity of the beneficial owners, which in this case would
be the original shareholders. Although the court in this case conceded
that the P.R.C. Bank was "more representative in ability to deal with the
greater number of private stockholders and established depositors and
creditors," the court opined that it could not decide the question
"merely by balancing interests of a private nature." '213 Instead, the court
framed the issue in terms of "which government best represent[ed] the
interests of the Chinese State in the Bank of China." '214 Unsurprisingly,
the court decided that only the executive was competent to make that
determination. The court deferred to the executive's judgment in light
of the international situation and the present relations between the
United States and the People's Republic:
We have taken a stand adverse to the aims and ambitions of the
People's Government. The armed forces of that Government are
now engaged in conflict with our forces in Korea. We recognize
only the Nationalist Government as the representative of the
State of China, and are actively assisting in developing its mili-
tary forces in Formosa."'
Therefore, the court awarded the deposit to the Republic of China
Bank.
216
Just as the courts accepted the intervention of the executive in cases
concerning foreign acts of state, so too did the courts concede to the
executive the power to pick and choose in each individual case whether
to permit an unrecognized foreign government access to a U.S. court.
As "sole organ of foreign relations," the executive now operated as
213. l at 66.
214. Id. By treating a property dispute between two banks and a stakeholder as if it were a
foreign policy dispute, the court refrained the question and empowered the executive to decide it.
This case illustrates how courts construct the public and private distinctions in international law in
ways that mask political conflicts between sovereigns. See generally Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of
Private International Law, 7 Wis. IN 'l L.J. 149 (1988).
215. Bank of China, 104 F. Supp. at 66. It should be noted that since the P.R.C.'s assets in the
United States were frozen and were ultimately used to settle claims by U.S. nationals against the
People's Republic, the practical consequence of this opinion was to privilege the Republic of China's
claim over the claims of U.S. nationals, not the People's Republic.
216. See id. at 66.
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gatekeeper to our system of justice. Consistency and predictability, the
hallmarks of the rule of law, were subordinated to the authority of the
executive to conduct foreign relations.
C. The Justiciability of the President's War Powers
As discussed above, from the early days of the Republic the court
established strong limits on the reach of the President's war powers.2",
Even during the War of 1812 and the Civil War, the courts acknowl-
edged the limited nature of the President's power as commander-in-
chief. 18 President Truman deployed U.S. forces in the Korean War
without specific congressional authorization, and the executive defended
its action by reference to the geopolitical stakes.219 Democrats in the
Senate rallied in support of the President's action, arguing that the
President needed to respond quickly to deter communist aggression
around the globe.' ° The War in Indochina tested these limits, as numer-
ous suits challenged the President's power to wage war in the absence of
specific congressional authorization or a declaration of war.2 '
217. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (holding that U.S. Captain
Little was personally liable for seizing a foreign vessel under orders from the President that
contradicted the Non-Intercourse Act of 1799). Chief Justice Marshall stated that the President's
"instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass." Id. at 179.
218. See also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126-27 (1814) (holding that the
appellant's timber could not be confiscated without an act of Congress giving the President that
authority). Both Chief Justice Marshall in his majority opinion and Justice Story in dissent concurred
that the authority to confiscate enemy alien property lies with Congress. See id. at 126-27. Story,
however, opined that such authority was implicit in the declaration of war. See id. at 145-46 (Story, J.,
dissenting). See also Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that neither the President
nor Congress could authorize the trial of civilians by a military tribunal during the Civil War, so long
as the civil courts remained open); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-71 (1862) (upholding
President Lincoln's order to blockade Confederate ports while Congress was adjourned which
Congress retroactively ratified).
219. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United
Nations, 81 CEO. LJ. 597, 624-37 (1993). Although President Truman claimed that he acted at the
request of the United Nations, the U.N. Security Council did not authorize the U.S. action until after
Truman had decided to act. See id, at 624-25. Congress appropriated funds four days after the
President sent U.S. forces to Korea, but did not authorize the President's action expressly. See id. at
629. The executive insisted that "[repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon
congressional debate." Id. at 637 (citing STAFF OF JoINr COMMITTEE MADa UP OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE SENATE,
82ND CONGRESS, lsT SESSION, REPORT ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND ARMED
FORCES OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1951)).
220. Id. at 628-30. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, one of Congress' liberal leaders, argued that
modem military technology and the Soviet threat demanded localized police actions to resist
communism which did not justify a formal declaration of war. Id. at 634 (citing 96 CONG. REc. 9647
(1950) (statement of Senator Douglas)).
221. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that whether
additional congressional authorization was required for the President's actions in bombing Hanoi was
a nonjusticiable political question); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the
question whether the President's actions were authorized was nonjusticiable); Orlando v. Laird, 443
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Repeatedly, courts either avoided the issue or upheld the President's
power to act.' Even when Congress provided a justiciable standard,
such as the Mansfield Amendment' and the Fulbright-Eagleton
Amendment,' courts avoided confronting the executive by invoking
the expediency argument.'
In response to the legal questions raised by the war in Indochina, in
1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. 6 The War Powers
Resolution required the President to give Congress notice if he sent U.S.
forces into hostile situations or "situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated."' The Resolution required the
President to withdraw forces within sixty days of giving notice unless
Congress either ordered the President to withdraw forces sooner or
authorized forces to remain overseas." Yet, no President has yet given
Congress the required notice, and courts have declined to enjoin the ex-
ecutive to provide the required form of notice.'
Courts have used four alternate strategies to avoid judging the le-
gitimacy of the President's power to send troops abroad.' First, some
courts have held that the question of what constitutes military action
F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that Congress had authorized the Indochina War by appropriating
funds and approving the extension of the Military Selective Service Act). See generally Louis
Henkin, Viet-nam in the Courts of the United States: "Political Questions," 63 AM. 3 INT'L L 284
(1969).
222. See id,
223. Armed Forces Appropriations Authorization Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 601(a), 85
Stat. 430, 431 (1971).
224. Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1074, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108,
87 Stat. 130, 131 (1973).
225. See, e.g., Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 611 (holding nonjusticiable the question whether the
President was acting consistently with the Mansfield Amendment to end the War in Indochina);
Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1307 (holding that the court was not "competent" to decide whether the
bombing of Cambodia violated the Mansfield Amendment, which called for the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Indochina by July 15, 1973).
226. war Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, § 10, 87 Stat. 555, 556 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994)).
227. Id. at § 1541(a)(1).
228. Id. at § 1541(b).
229. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dismissing a case
brought by members of Congress to enjoin the President to provide notice under the War Powers
Resolution of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf because the case raised a nonjusticiable
political question about whether the ceasefire constituted "imminent involvement in hostilities" for
purposes of the Resolution). See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (D.D.C. 1990)
(dismissing a case brought by members of Congress to compel the President to provide notice under
the War Powers Resolution of U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Gulf War,
because the claim would not be "ripe" until "each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority").
230. The full history of how and why courts have not limited the President's power to send troops
abroad exceeds the scope of this Article. My purpose is merely to offer a few prominent examples of
some of the ways that courts weakened constitutional controls over the President's ability to send
forces abroad. See KOH, supra note 21, at 1313-18; GLENNON, supra note 30, at 314-25.
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requiring congressional authority is itself a nonjusticiable political
question."3 Second, courts have held that neither members of
Congress" nor private citizens 3  have standing to challenge the
President's decision to send troops. Third, courts have held that even
where there was a justiciable issue brought by a party with standing, the
issue would not be ripe unless Congress took some further action to
prohibit the President from exercising war powers without its consent.'
Finally, courts have implied congressional authorization for the
President's war powers from a variety of legislative actions or inaction,
231. For example, in Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990), an officer in the National
Guard sought a mandamus ordering the President to comply with the War Powers Resolution before
deploying troops in the Persian Gulf. The court held that the question was nonjusticiable, because "the
court would have to determine'precisely what allocation of war power the text of the Constitution
makes to the executive and legislative branches." Id. at 512. The court found that such a
constitutional determination "is one which the judicial branch cannot make pursuant to the separation
of powers principles embodied in the court's equitable discretion and in the political question
doctrine." Id. See also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative
Standing, 25 GA. L. REV. 227, 322-34 (1991).
232. See, e.g., Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 333. In Lowry, 110 members of Congress sought a
declaratory judgment that the President should have filed a report under section 4(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution before initiating naval escort operations during the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian
Gulf for reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers and ordering an attack on an Iranian vessel laying mines in the
Gulf. The congressional plaintiffs also sought an injunction ordering the President to file the 4(a)(1)
report within twenty-four hours. The court held, inter alia, that equitable discretion counsels judicial
restraint in granting relief to congressional plaintiffs where there are congressional remedies
available. See id. at 339. While the form of the court's judgment pertained to justiciability, the effect
was to deny congressional plaintiffs standing to complain where the President exercised his powers as
commander-in-chief without authority from Congress. The court stated that it could not "impose a
consensus on Congress" unless a majority passed legislation to enforce the Resolution. Id. See also
Blumoff, supra note 231, at 303-22.
233. See, e.g., Johnson v. Weinberger, 851 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1988) (a private citizen had no
standing to challenge the U.S. strategic defense policy); Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir.
1972) (holding that three members of the Reserves and a draft registrant lacked standing to obtain a
judgment enjoining the President from conducting military operations in Cambodia without
congressional authorization); cf Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) (persons ordered
to Vietnam did have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the war). In general, only citizens
who are under order to fight possess standing to object to a military deployment. See, e.g., Holtzman,
484 F.2d at 1315 (holding that whether additional congressional authorization was needed for the
President's military action in Indochina was a nonjusticiable political question). In general, the
Supreme Court has held that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the government's actions
unless the taxpayer has suffered a particularized harm. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge CIA budget secrecy); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (upholding taxpayer's standing to challenge aid to parochial schools).
234. See, e.g., Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1150-51 (holding that where fifty-three members of
Congress sought a declaration that the President had violated the War Powers Resolution by stationing
230,000 U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf without congressional authorization or notice to Congress, as
required under the Resolution, the issue was not ripe for review unless a majority of Congress took
legislative action to enforce the Resolution); see also Blumoff, supra note 231, at 233-35 (arguing that
instead of the political question doctrine, courts should only consider a question where there is a
genuine conflict between Congress and the President); see generally J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare
War, 41 DuKE LU. 27 (1991). But see David I. Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers:
Protecting Public and Private Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1083 (1992).
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such as appropriations for defense that did not contain explicit restric-
tions on the use of funds for that purpose." All four strategies were
justified by the claim that courts lacked institutional competence to
judge the executive's actions, or that national security concerns com-
pelled broad judicial deference to the President.
Courts framed the issue as if it involved a contest between judicial
power and presidential power. Thus, by largely deferring to the
President, the judiciary appeared respectful to the executive. In fact, ju-
dicial deference masked the real conflict between the executive and
Congress. By deferring to the President, courts were choosing sides in
this conflict-for executive power and against congressional control.
Geopolitical concerns rationalized that choice, both for the judges them-
selves and for the nation.
D. National Security Controls on
Information, Travel, and Communication
Since the Cold War began, the executive has justified a wide range
of restrictions on individual access to information, travel, and communi-
cations by reference to national security concerns. In 1986, then-D.C.
Circuit Judge Scalia wrote that "[t]he concept of a special rule for na-
tional security matters is no stranger to court-made law."' 6 Instead, the
whole structure of limitations on access to information, travel, and
communication did not emerge until the Cold War. Prior to the Cold
War, the Espionage Act of 1917 limited access to specific military in-
formation only during wartime.?7 While President Roosevelt had issued
an executive order during World War II authorizing the civil service to
fire anyone on reasonable suspicion of disloyalty, no system of peace-
time security clearance emerged until the Cold War.
235. See, e.g., Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 615 (holding that the strategy chosen by the President to
terminate the war is a nonjusticiable political question); Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1310-12 (holding that
the issue of whether Congress authorized the continuation of the war in Indochina after the passage
of the Fulbright-Eagleton Amendment barring the deployment of U.S. forces in Indochina after Aug.
15, 1973, is nonjusticiable); DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1368 (holding that the question of whether the
President's unilateral decision to mine the harbors of North Vietnam and to bomb targets in that
country constituted an illegal escalation of the war was a non-justiciable political question); Orlando,
443 F.2d at 1042 (holding that the question of whether Congress was required to take some action to
authorize the war in Indochina was justiciable and finding such authorization in the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, the Selective Service Act, and the war appropriations).
236. Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
237. See Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 792).
Intended to prohibit foreign espionage in war time, the Act criminalized the possession and transfer
of any information "respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the
information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."
Id. at § 793(a).
238. See Executive Order 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), as amended, which established the
clearance procedure used throughout the federal government.
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The threat of Soviet hegemony, the development of a vast defense
and national security bureaucracy, and the fear of domestic communist
infiltration aroused by McCarthyism led to the establishment of a wide
range of controls on access to sensitive information. The principal
source of authority for classifying information was a series of executive
orders beginning with Truman's 1949 executive order reluctantly is-
sued to quell Republican charges that communists had infiltrated the
administration. 9 Congress, however, never authorized these controls nor
enacted specific criminal penalties for their violation. The only restric-
tion imposed by Congress pertained to specific limits on information on
atomic energy,' ° the use of classified materials in criminal trials, 4 and
declassification.242 Yet, courts applied these executive controls to prevent
or punish the release of both government documents 3 and information
in the public realm that might affect national security.' The rhetoric
employed by the courts in these cases demonstrates quite clearly the
impact of geopolitics and weapons technologies on legal doctrine.
One dramatic instance of government censorship based on national
security concerns involved a prior restraint on the publication of an arti-
cle in the Progressive. The article in question purported to explain how
to construct a hydrogen bomb, based on information available in a
public library. No federal court had ever before issued a prior restraint
on publication. The court reasoned that even if an injunction proved
239. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed.
Reg. 28,949 (1978); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972); Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3
C.F.R. 979 (1949-1953). President Truman created a security system to respond to Republican
congressional critics of the administration. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 152-55. Truman
feared that the FBI would become a secret police operation like the Gestapo, and he believed that the
entire issue had been manufactured by the Republicans without any substantive basis. Truman
regretted the decision to establish a security program, but he saw no alternative politically. See
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 550-53 (1992).
240. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, §134, 60 Stat. 755, 756 (1946)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-63, 2165,2274).
241. See The Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. app.).
242. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552); Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 833).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D.Md.), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d
1156 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (holding, inter alia, that the defendant's
possession and transmittal of documents was criminally punishable under the Espionage Act because
such documents had been classified by executive order).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994-95 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(enjoining the Progressive from publishing an article that purported to describe how to construct a
hydrogen bomb from information available in a public library). In Progressive, the government
alleged that the publication would violate section 2274 of the Atomic Energy Act which prohibited
anyone from communicating "restricted data 'with reason to believe such data will be utilized to
injure the United States or to secure an advantage to any foreign nation."' Id. at 994 (citation
omitted). Thus, strictly speaking, it did not rely upon the President's executive order.
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unconstitutional, it was justified under these facts. "A mistake in ruling
against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihi-
lation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the
right to publish becomes moot." '45 On its face, the magnitude of the
threat justified some limits on access to some information concerning
nuclear technology. Yet, the court assumed that only the executive
could evaluate the potential risk of nuclear war and refused to address
the absence of any congressional authorization for the executive's ac-
tion. Thus, the gravity of the possible harm obscured the real issue:
whether the President or Congress had the power to criminalize the use
of information in the public domain when the information posed a seri-
ous threat to the public.
In the New York Times, "Pentagon Papers," case, the Supreme
Court held that the government had failed to overcome the heavy pre-
sumption against preliminary injunctions on publications. 46 Yet, Justices
Brennan and Stewart reflected the view, in their respective concurrences,
that the executive's power to control access to sensitive information was
related directly to geopolitical circumstances. Justice Brennan con-
curred:
Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tanta-
mount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available
armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of
information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in
neither of these actions has the Government presented or even
alleged that publication of items from or based upon the mate-
rial at issue would cause the happening of an event of that na-
ture. 7
In a similar vein, Justice Stewart concurred that
[i]n the governmental structure created by our Constitution, the
Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related
areas of national defense and international relations. This power,
largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial branches, has
been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear mis-
sile age. For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President
of the United States possesses vastly greater constitutional inde-
pendence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a
prime minister of a country with a parliamentary form of gov-
ernment.48
245. Id. at 996.
246. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). Note that the Court's
brief three-paragraph per curiam opinion did not address the reach of the executive's power to
restrict access to sensitive information.
247. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The executive's power over national security went beyond the
scope of government employment or government operations to intrude
upon the movement and communications of private citizens. An indi-
vidual's right to travel abroad is a liberty interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment, 9 and as such, the Court has struck down McCarthy-era
legislation denying the right of the individual to travel based upon his
or her political beliefs." Nevertheless, the Court has allowed the execu-
tive without congressional authorization to ban travel to Communist
countries on the grounds of national security."ss The Court has distin-
guished the executive's authority to ban travel to a particular country,
which implicates national security considerations, and an executive ban
on a certain individual's travel based upon that individual's beliefs or
associations."s In the Court's view, geopolitical exigencies empowered
the executive to act without legislation to restrict the constitutionally
protected right to travel abroad."sa Indeed, even after Congress prohib-
ited the President from denying passports for the purpose of restricting
travel to communist countries,2 the President continued to ban some
foreign travel by restricting travel-related payments under economic
boycott legislation.s The Court has upheld these restrictions on foreign
travel expenditures despite both the constitutional right to travel and
Congress' explicit opposition. 6 In upholding restrictions on travel to
Cuba imposed by the executive, the Supreme Court reasoned:
249. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (holding that Congress had not delegated to
the Secretary of State the authority to deny passports to communists).
250. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (invalidating a provision of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 which prohibited issuing a passport to a member of the
Communist Party). Writing for the majority, Justice Goldberg reasoned that because "freedom of
association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, restrictions imposed upon the right to travel
cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be fully exercised if the individual
would first yield up his membership in a given association." Id. at 507.
251. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding the Secretary of State's denial of a
passport for travel to Cuba).
252. See id. at 13. Chief Justice Earl Warren explicitly based the Court's judgment on
geopolitical conditions: "That the restriction which is challenged in this case is supported by the
weightiest considerations of national security is perhaps best pointed up by recalling that the Cuban
missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's complaint by less than two months."
Id at 16.
253. See id; see also Halg v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,306 (1981) (upholding the executive's power
to revoke the passport of an ex-CIA officer who had threatened to identify other U.S. agents abroad;
noting, "the freedom to travel abroad... is subordinate to national security and foreign policy
considerations"); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding the executive's power to deny
travel to Cuba).
254. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 963, 971
(1978) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 211a).
255. See International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, § 201, 91 Stat.
1625, 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994)), as amended by Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1101, 102 Stat. 1107, 1108 (1988) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2901 (1994)).
256. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 224.
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[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contempo-
rary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is
immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly pre-
sented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature,
Congress in giving the Executive authority over matters of for-
eign affairs must of necessity paint with a brush broader than
that it customarily wields in domestic areas. 7
The Court's reasoning contained all the classic elements of executive
expediency discourse: the gravity of the international circumstances, the
executive's superior knowledge and ability to act in foreign affairs, and
the need for a rapid response justified broad deference to executive ac-
tion, even without statutory authority. Similarly, a district court judge
upheld travel restrictions imposed by the executive, finding that
[n]ational interest may require that American citizens be ex-
cluded from a specified area at a particular time for their own
protection as well as to prevent their interference with the proper
conduct of American foreign policy. This is especially true in
this era in which the line of distinction between war and peace
has been blurred by the less conventional hostility of cold war.
The vast scope of the interwoven military, economic and propa-
ganda activities of the nations of the world in furtherance of
their foreign policies, without any declaration of war, has ex-
panded the field of presidential action to further American pol-
icy.25
8
Courts also used concerns about contemporary geopolitics to sus-
tain the President's power to engage in foreign intelligence operations.
For example, in United States v. Clay, 9 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of Cassius Clay, Jr., (Muhammad Ali), for refusing to submit
to induction into the military. The Government had secretly recorded
Clay's phone conversations without a warrant and without revealing the
existence of these secret recordings to Clay's attorney.26 The court held
that the executive had plenary authority to use electronic surveillance
without a warrant if national security required it. The Fifth Circuit did
not question the executive's dubious claim that Clay's refusal to serve
in the military actually threatened the nation's security. Instead, the
court asserted that
[n]o one would seriously doubt in this time of serious interna-
tional insecurity and peril that there is an imperative necessity
for obtaining foreign intelligence information, and we do not
257. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17. See also Agee, 453 U.S. at 280.
258. MacEwan, 228 F. Supp. at 308-09.
259. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), revda 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
260. See &L at 166-71.
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believe such gathering is forbidden by the Constitution or by
statutory provision.... 261
The executive's ability to control access to ideas, communication,
and travel seriously undermined liberal principles of free expression
and free movement of persons. Courts did not question the executive's
authority to act. Rather, geopolitics eclipsed the fundamental constitu-
tional issue: whether the President was acting ultra vires.
E. Conclusion
This brief survey of cases demonstrates that courts during the Cold
War extended the reach of presidential power in a multitude of ways that
collapsed the Lockean dichotomy between the rule of law and the rule
of necessity. Questions of recognition, respect for foreign acts of state,
the President's powers as commander-in-chief, or national security
controls on sensitive information implicate international relations. It
might have been appropriate for courts to consider the international
context in interpreting the reach of their own jurisdiction or the separa-
tion of powers between Congress and the executive. However, the courts
did not exercise independent judgment in these cases. Rather, they re-
lied exclusively on the executive's description of reality.
Even in those cases in which it was highly improbable that judicial
interpretation could affect geopolitical relations, the courts still yielded
to the executive. The discourse of expediency obscured any judicial
critique of the executive's own claims about the nature of the threat
faced. Courts evinced the same degree of deference to executive
authority regardless of whether geopolitics was even relevant to the ex-
ecutive's action. Courts simply assumed a nexus to the Cold War when-
ever the executive claimed one.
III
How EXPEDIENCY DISCOURSE TRANSFORMED THE STATUS
AND PRACTICE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
A. Introduction
One striking illustration of Cold War judicial deference to the ex-
ecutive arose in connection with the power to make international agree-
ments. With judicial approval, presidents have relied increasingly upon
executive agreements 26 in lieu of treaties as the primary form of
1
261. Id. at 172. See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 109-10 (holding that the President
had inherent authority both as commander-in-chief and as the "[niation's organ for foreign affairs,"
and that courts are not institutionally competent to review the relevant secret information on which
the President relies).
262. Any international agreement made by the President which has not been approved by two-
thirds of the Senate under Article II of the Constitution is an executive agreement. Sometimes the
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international agreement. 63 In particular, during this period almost all
commerce and trade pacts were executed in the form of executive
agreements, and courts regularly treated these executive agreements like
treaties for purposes of domestic law. Generally, there was no logical
nexus between these commercial agreements and the spectre of a Soviet
threat. The need for speed or secrecy did not explain why an agreement,
openly negotiated over a substantial period of time with a friendly for-
eign government, could not be submitted to the Senate. Yet, the courts
accepted the executive's self-serving justification for ignoring the
Senate's advice and consent powers, even when an agreement was obvi-
ously unrelated to the Cold War, and the Senate permitted the executive
to intrude on its constitutional prerogative in this way. Part III examines
how expediency discourse empowered presidents to make agreements
that displaced Article II treaties even in the absence of any actual neces-
sity.
Why should it matter whether the President made an agreement
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate (Article II
treaty), with the approval of a majority of both houses (congressional-
executive agreement), or on his own (sole executive agreement)? The
Constitution limits the powers of each branch and constructs checks and
balances to prevent concentrations of power. If the President detours
from the advice and consent procedure, he appropriates the power to
make international and domestic law.2' Moreover, by short-circuiting
the legislative process, the President lets Congress off the hook. Mem-
bers of Congress are not held accountable for the President's actions.
The situs for policy-making shifts from the Congress to the National
Security Council, and to a large degree, the opportunity for public scru-
tiny closes. An international agreement without the Senate's advice and
consent frustrates representative government.
First, why is it more democratic to allow thirty-four senators to de-
cide whether to reject a treaty favored by the majority, than it is for the
President to make a sole executive agreement? I am not arguing that the
President is less "representative" than the Senate. However, the process
of public deliberation by the Senate necessarily engages constituents
President will make an executive agreement without any congressional authorization. Such
agreements are sole executive agreements. Alternatively, he may submit the agreement to Congress
for its approval, or Congress may authorize the executive agreement before the fact. In that case, it is
a congressional-executive agreement. For purposes of this paper, the term "executive agreement"
refers to either form of agreement, unless otherwise noted. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
24, at § 303 cmt. a.
263. See generally LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIvE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN FOREIGN POWER 105-06 app. (1986).
264. For example, as discussed below, the President has used this power to make agreements that
directly affect individuals' civil rights, income tax, imports and exports, and private property rights.
See infra notes 457-462.
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more directly than policy-making by the executive. Senate proceedings
are open and public, whereas the process of foreign policy-making by
the executive is generally secret. 65 One constituent surely has a larger
voice in her state than she has in the nation as a whole. It is more likely
that a senator will represent the concerns of a particular community,
union, or industry affected by an international agreement than will the
chief executive; the President has many constituencies, including for-
eign governments and future generations. The public has only one
chance to fire a President, and it is unlikely that the voters would deny
any President re-election because of a particular international agree-
ment .2
Second, why is the Article II treaty process more democratic than
allowing both houses of Congress to vote on a congressional-executive
agreement? There is some facial appeal to the idea that an executive
agreement that has been approved by a majority of both houses of
Congress is at least as representative of the demos as a treaty approved
by two-thirds of the Senate. The problem is that there is no principled
distinction between congressional-executive and sole executive agree-
ments. Neither were expressly authorized by the Constitution, but there
is a long history of precedents for both. Presidents have used congres-
sional-executive and sole executive agreements interchangeably, and
courts have not articulated any limitation on which of the two instru-
ments the President should employ. If one is permitted, then so is the
other. The President has the sole discretion to decide whether to submit
an agreement as a treaty, as a congressional-executive agreement, or as a
sole executive agreement.67 In practice, presidents have chosen the path
of least resistance, meaning that if the President does not think the
Senate will support the treaty, he might treat it as a congressional-
executive agreement. If the President cannot get a simple majority of
both houses either, then he is more likely to treat it as a sole executive
agreement.
A congressional-executive agreement is not necessarily subject to
the same legislative process as an ordinary act of Congress.28 The usual
indicia of legislation include extensive committee hearings, often by
several committees, amendments, delays, sometimes filibusters, joint
265. See NATHAN & OLIvER, supra note 9, at 3-6, 149-51,236-39.
266. Perhaps the only instance in which an unpopular treaty eventually contributed to the defeat
of the incumbent party was the Jay Treaty ratified in 1796, which contained significant concessions to
avoid war with Great Britain. Indeed, opposition to the treaty led to the creation of the Republican
party. Nevertheless, the Federalists continued to hold power until 1800. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
McKrrRicK, TrE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 415-36
(1993).
267. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIRCULAR No. 175
(1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J INT'L L. 784 (1956).
268. See Koh, supra note 25, at 162.
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committees of the House and Senate negotiating compromises, and then
presentment to the President, whose veto can only be overridden by two-
thirds of both houses. These aspects of the legislative process are frus-
trating, but they are important constitutional checks on the power of the
executive and congressional majorities. Congressional-executive agree-
ments like NAFTA or WTO, however, are subject to special "fast-track"
procedures that shorten the time for committee hearings, do not allow
amendments, and require Congress to vote within a relatively short time
frame. Thus, the mere fact that a congressional-executive agreement is
approved by both houses does not mean it is equivalent to ordinary
legislation. Even if a congressional-executive agreement were subject to
the regular legislative process, the fact remains that a simple majority
vote overrides the Senate's Article II powers.
Whether the President acts with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate or with a simple majority of both houses matters because process
has normative consequences. More democracy may not be better de-
mocracy. For example, imagine that the executive decided to submit a
budget proposal to a popular referendum rather than to both houses of
Congress. The President could argue that a referendum is more demo-
cratic, but no one would doubt that such a decision would have a differ-
ent quality of democratic deliberation than the usual budget process.
The normative consequences of such a procedure would not be all for
the good. It would give the President much more authority to define the
budget with no opportunity for amendment. There would be a tempta-
tion to appropriate funds for programs that appeal to specific voting
blocs regardless of their effectiveness, while denying necessary funds
for less appealing, but more critical expenses, like water treatment facili-
ties, paying the interest on the national debt, or funding the highway
police. The budget process would be unintelligible to most voters, and a
popular referendum would open the way for interest groups to buy ad-
vertising that is more likely to confuse the issues. For these reasons, a
popular referendum on the budget probably would not constitute effec-
tive democracy.
The Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate in order to
check the President's negotiating power. The super-majority was a
normative requirement that changed the dynamics of the ordinary leg-
islative process. When the President knows that the agreement can be
rejected by any thirty-four senators, he must insist on negotiating terms
that command broad support; whereas he is not under the same negoti-
ating pressure if he submits the agreement as a congressional-executive
or sole executive agreement. In some respects, the President's negotiat-
ing position may be strengthened if the foreign government knows that
the President needs the votes of two-thirds of the Senate. Often, it is not
1998]
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easy to persuade a super-majority of senators to support a treaty. The
Constitution creates obstructions to forming treaties for good reasons:
both to protect state law from being readily overturned by foreign
agreements and to discourage entangling alliances. Though the United
States plays a larger role in the world today than it did in 1789, there is
still wisdom in not undertaking foreign commitments lightly. When two-
thirds of the Senate votes to ratify a treaty, our commitments have
greater credibility. We are more likely to keep commitments that are
endorsed by super-majorities and to stay the course through good times
and bad. Finally, because treaties are the supreme law of the land, and
are difficult to change without the participation of the other contracting
parties, the Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to ensure that
changes in domestic law reflect the will of a broad majority.
B. Executive Agreements and Treaties
under International and U.S. Law
To understand how the law of executive agreements has changed, it
is first necessary to compare the attributes of treaties and executive
agreements under international and domestic law. Any written agree-
ment between two or more states governed by international law is a
treaty for purposes of international law.269 International law does not
distinguish between Article II treaties that have been approved by two-
thirds of the Senate and executive agreements that are signed by the
President either with, or without, the approval of a majority of both
houses of Congress. Thus, Article II treaties and executive agreements
bind the United States under international law with equal force. How-
ever, the legal consequences of a treaty and an executive agreement are
both more complex and less certain for purposes of U.S. domestic law.
These consequences fall into three categories: the effect of an interna-
tional agreement on state law, the effect on federal law, and the degree
to which the agreement grants private parties enforceable rights in do-
mestic courts.
A treaty may be "self-executing," meaning that the treaty takes
effect in domestic law at the moment of its adoption without imple-
menting legislation.2 70 Self-executing treaties in some cases can create
269. See Vienna Convention, supra note 23.
270. This distinction was first drawn by Chief Justice Marshall, who opined:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not
generally affect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is
intra-territorial....
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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rights and obligations enforceable by private parties without imple-
menting legislation approved by Congress. 7' By contrast, a "non-self-
executing treaty" has no effect on domestic law until Congress ap-
proves implementing legislation. A non-self-executing treaty may create
rights or obligations under domestic law only if Congress approves im-
plementing legislation. Whether a treaty is self-executing depends upon
the parties' intention at the time of negotiation 2
At least until 1945, no consensus existed among courts or legal
scholars that an executive agreement could function like a treaty.273 As
the Cold War intensified, the scholarly consensus began to shift. By
1965, the authors of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Second Restatement) concluded that congres-
sional-executive agreements made pursuant to an Article II treaty or
authorized by Congress could relate to any subject matter of interna-
tional concern which did not contravene a constitutional limitation.274 A
self-executing congressional-executive agreement would be effective as
domestic U.S. law and could supersede both inconsistent state and prior
federal law. 5 The Restatement acknowledged that a sole executive
agreement has a more limited scope and effect on domestic law. Ac-
cording to the Restatement, a sole executive agreement could deal only
with subject matters within the President's independent constitutional
authority, for example, as commander-in-chief.276 A sole executive
agreement could supersede inconsistent state law, but never federal
law.27 Even with regard to state law, the Restatement cautioned that there
were almost no examples of a sole executive agreement displacing state
271. See RESTATEMENT (TrIRD), supra note 24, at § 111 cmt. h, n.5; §§ 703, 713, 906-07; see
also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,598-99 (1884).
272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § I1I cmt. h; see, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1924) (holding that a 1911 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with Japan invalidated a Seattle ordinance that prohibited issuing pawnbroker licenses to aliens).
Some authorities have concluded that under the Supremacy Clause, all treaties should bb considered
self-executing unless explicitly conditioned upon implementing legislation. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust,
Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988). Whether the same argument would apply to
executive agreements is uncertain.
273. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?. 53 YALE
LJ. 616 (1944) (arguing that executive agreements cannot substitute for Article II treaties). But see
WALLACE McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 330-53 (1967) (arguing that the
President has broad authority to use executive agreements in lieu of Article II treaties); Myers S.
McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 534 (1945) (arguing that
executive agreements are interchangeable with Article II treaties).
274. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FoRmION RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 117-20 (1962) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
275. See id. at §§ 141-43.
276. See id. at § 121.
277. See id. at § 144.
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law." Indeed, the only examples cited by the Restatement's authors
were the Supreme Court's opinions in Belmont279 and Pink,10 which
concerned claims settlements coincident with the recognition of a for-
eign government.
With the growth of executive power over foreign relations through
the 19 60 s,si a new consensus emerged favoring the expanded use of
executive agreements. As early as 1972, Professor Louis Henkin, a
leading authority in the field and subsequently the Reporter of the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Third Restatement), pointed to Belmont and Pink as evidence that "[a] t
least some [sole] executive agreements, then, can be self-executing and
have some status as law of the land. '"sa Assuming the expediency of the
executive's power in foreign affairs,213 Henkin argued that
[i]f one sees the Treaty Power as basically a Presidential power
(albeit subject to check by the Senate) there is no compelling
reason for giving less effect to agreements which he has author-
ity to make without the Senate. If one accepts Presidential pri-
macy in foreign affairs in relation to Congress, one might allow
his agreements to prevail even in the face of earlier Congres-
sional legislation. If one grants the President some legislative
authority in foreign affairs-as in regard to sovereign immu-
nity-one might grant it to him in this respect too.'
278. See id at § 144, n.2.
279. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), discussed supra note 97.
280. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), discussed supra note 98.
281. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 9, at 83-100; SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 177-263.
282. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITION 185 (1972).
283. Henkin argued that the executive possesses a natural advantage over Congress in
confronting "the proliferating, complex affairs of a growing country with interests flung far about a
growing international society." Id. at 38. Thus, Congress has found it necessary to delegate broad
authority to the President over foreign relations. Id. In the second edition of his book, Henldn is even
more explicit about the geopolitical concerns favoring centralized executive control of foreign
policy: "[Tihe realities and exigencies of international relations (particularly in the age of nuclear
weapons and during the Cold War and its aftermath), and the practices of diplomacy have afforded
Presidents unique temptations and unique opportunities to acquire unique and ever larger powers."
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 31 (1996). Henkin now
acknowledges that "[ifn the second half of the twentieth century, the President's control of
information and expertise has loomed overwhelming, as military technology and foreign intelligence
have become more complex and the need for secrecy appeared more compelling." Id at 32-33.
284. HENIN, supra note 282, at 186 (citation omitted). Of course, the assumption that the treaty
power is the President's alone begs the question. As discussed below, the Senate's role is more than a
mere formality. Indeed, the President has used executive agreements in large part to avoid the
Senate's rejection of a treaty. See JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 56-79. Henkin might as well argue
that since the President is the comander in chief, there is no compelling reason for insisting that he
must wait for Congress to appropriate funds for use in military operations. Henldn's argument rests on
the necessity for a strong, centralized executive directing foreign affairs. In an earlier 1959 article
discussing the treaty power, he rejected the argument that the treaty power could be shared with
Congress: "It is not the moment to attempt it when all ability, flexibility, wisdom are needed for
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By 1986, the Third Restatement represented a consensus favoring
broader executive agreement authority than the Second Restatement had
endorsed. The Third Restatement provided that the President may make
any agreement on any subject matter either in the form of a treaty or
executive agreement."' The Third Restatement confirmed that a self-
executing congressional-executive agreement could supersede both state
and federal law without implementing federal legislation.286 The authors
of the Restatement added that a sole executive agreement could super-
sede at least state law, and possibly federal law, without implementing
legislation.' The Restatement suggested that even a non-self-executing
executive agreement could be considered federal policy superseding
inconsistent state policy or preempting a State from legislating in that
subject matter."S The status of sole executive agreements in domestic
law remains contestable.8 9
cooperation for survival by a frightened race, on a diminishing earth, reaching for the moon."
Henkin, supra note 158, at 936.
285. RESrATEMENT (THIn), supra note 24, at § 303, n.8; § 111 cmts. d, h.
286. Id. See HENIUN, supra note 282, at 173-87. According to Henkin, "[lit is now widely
accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is a complete alternative to a treaty ..... Id. at
175.
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 303 cmt. j. Some authorities have not
distinguished between treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements
for purposes of domestic legal effect. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUcriON To
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-78 (1988); see also HENIUN, supra note 282, at 184-85. By contrast, in
1941, one of the leading proponents of the idea that executive agreements could substitute for
treaties, Wallace McClure, had written that it would be contrary to "the entire tenor of the
Constitution" for sole executive agreements to supersede federal law. McCLuRE, supra note 273, at
343. See also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (holding that a sole executive agreement regulating imports of
Canadian seed potatoes was void because it contravened an act of Congress). See generally Peter J.
Lesser, Superseding Statutory Law by Sole Executive Agreement: An Analysis of the American Law
Institute's Shift in Position, 23 VA. J. INT'L L 671 (1983). At one time even the State Department
argued that GATT cannot supersede state law. Letter from Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor of the
Department of State, to Mr. Sharpe, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, February 26, 1957. Henkin
has recanted his earlier view that executive agreements are completely interchangeable with treaties.
He now takes the position that some forms of agreements can only be accomplished by an Article II
treaty. See Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMocRAcY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 57 (1990).
288. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 115 cmt. e.
289. See id at § 115, n.5. The doctrinal instability has resulted from apparently contradictory
interpretations of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. Article VI provides that "all Treaties
made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." US.
CONST. art. VI. Article II treaties are supreme law, displacing all inconsistent state law, whether
enacted prior to, or subsequent to, the adoption of the treaty. See id at § 115. It is unclear why
executive agreements should have any domestic effect on state law under the Supremacy Clause.
After all, the Supremacy Clause refers solely to "treaties" and not to the more generic category of
"international compacts or agreements" used elsewhere in the Constitution. According to at least
some authorities, executive agreements have the same constitutional status as customary international
law, which is regarded as federal common law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 111
cmt. d. Under Article VI, federal common law is supreme over state law, though not supreme over
prior treaties or federal law. See id.
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Both the use and the effect of sole and congressional-executive
agreements changed markedly during the Cold War. Prior to the Cold
War, there was a well-established understanding of the limits of execu-
tive agreements that traced back to the founding. In the Sections that
follow, I will trace the historical development of executive agreements
from the founding through the Cold War to demonstrate that the mod-
em executive agreement power had no historical antecedent.'
C. Executive Agreements at the Founding
The Framers carefully considered the treaty-making power in light
of the experience of the Articles of Confederation.29 The Articles of
Confederation gave the Confederation Congress power to make treaties
only with the consent of at least nine of the thirteen states.2' The appa-
ratus for negotiating and approving treaties proved unwieldy, and for-
eign governments were unwilling to negotiate with a thirteen-headed
sovereign.' The general weakness of the national government, its in-
ability to finance itself, raise an army, or enforce the domestic tranquil-
lity undermined its credibility as an international partner. Congress
could not effectively negotiate boundary and trade disputes with
European powers. Britain refused to honor its commitments under the
Treaty of Paris and retained forts along the Great Lakes for the purpose
of denying the former colonists access to the waterway.9" Simultane-
ously, the Spanish had closed the Mississippi to the Americans, while
290. In reviewing the historical development, I am not contending that the Framer's original
intention necessarily binds the United States today. The problems with originalism have been
examined elsewhere. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 41, at 3-22. The concept of separation of
powers itself had multiple meanings for the Framers such that the original intention to define and limit
legislative and executive powers is indeterminate. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of
Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L REV. 211 (1989); William B.
Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L
REV. 263 (1989). For example, a strong originalist argument could be made in favor of either
expanding congressional or executive power. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era
of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 123 (1994). Thus, a formalist approach to separation
of powers is difficult to defend based upon the Framers' own intentions. The most that may be said is
that the separation of powers was intended to control government by setting the various departments
into conflict so that the exercise of concentrated power was obstructed. See Philip B. Kurland, The
Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986).
291. See GLENNON, supra note 30, at 181-83 (1990). According to Glennon, the Framers
intended to restrict the executive's authority to make international agreements. See id; see also
Arthur Bestor, "Advice"from the Very Beginning, "Consent" when the End is Achieved, in FORMN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONsTrrUTIoN 6-15 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
292. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. III (U.S. 1781), reprinted
in HOFFERT, supra note 90, at 199.
293. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & KYM S. RICE, ARE WE 7o BE A NATION?: THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 83-90 (1987); CLINTON ROSSrrER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 45-53
(1987); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, 41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
294. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 293, at 83-84.
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France restricted American trade with the Caribbean.9 5 In this context,
the new republic, was isolated and unable to engage in commerce.
Alexander Hamilton warned that
[t]he treaties of the United States, under the present
[Confederation] Constitution, are liable to the infractions of
thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of fi-
nal jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those Legislatures.
The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union, are there
continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the
interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible
that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a gov-
ernment? Is it possible that the People of America will longer
consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so
precarious a foundation?"6
Committees of merchants called for amending the Articles of
Confederation to give Congress exclusive power to impose a uniform
interstate and foreign trade policy.' Sympathetic to these commercial
interests, the Framers agreed on the need to centralize control over for-
eign affairs and foreign commerce in the national government. 98
The Committee of Detail's first draft of the Constitution gave the
Senate the exclusive authority to negotiate and ratify treaties.2 l Once the
delegates reached the Great Compromise, establishing a bicameral leg-
islature, they debated which house should exercise the treaty-making
295. See id at 84.
296. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright, 1961).
297. See BERNSTREIN, supra note 293, at 90; MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF THE
CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 77 (1940).
298. Even Alexander Hamilton, who proposed establishing a life-tenured executive with powers
like those of a British monarch, would have empowered the executive to make treaties only with "the
advice and approbation of the Senate." See MAX FARRAND, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 292 (June 18, 1787) (1911). The need for such commercial agreements
contributed to the calls for reform of the Confederation. James Iredell, one of the leading legal minds
at the Convention, wrote in defense of the Constitution that
[w]e must have treaties of commerce, because without them we cannot trade to other
countries.... [Mie have none with Great Britain; which can be imputed to no other cause
but our not having a strong respectable government to bring that nation to terms. And surely
no man who feels for the honor of his country, but must view our present degrading
commerce with that country with the highest indignation, and the most ardent wish to
extricate ourselves from so disgraceful a situation.
Answers to Mason: Marcus IV, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION
386-87 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
299. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 131
(1913); Berger, supra note 204, at 10-11 (concluding that the Framers assumed that the treaty power
ought to be vested in the Senate and that the President was added to the process as a check on the
Senate's prerogative).
19981
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power.m There was concern expressed that a treaty might result in spe-
cial advantages to some states over others."' The representatives of a few
large states could dominate the House of Representatives. If the House
possessed the treaty power, small states would have no recourse if they
were adversely affected by a treaty. As between the two Houses of
Congress, the Senate represented the states as equals, and therefore, the
Senate's approval more closely followed the Confederation's require-
ment that the states themselves authorize treaties. Delegates from small
states argued that vesting the treaty-making power in the Senate would
be consonant with the principle of federalism and would preserve the
sovereignty of the states.m Delegates from the large states responded
that their states' interests were insufficiently represented in the Senate."
As late as September 6, eleven days before completing the
Constitution, the delegates had not resolved which house of Congress
would have the power to make treaties, including the power to negotiate.
The draft submitted to the "Committee on Postponed Matters" pro-
vided that the Senate retained the exclusive power to make treaties.
3 4
The committee amended the draft in the final days of the Convention to
provide that, "The president by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall have power to make Treaties... But no Treaty shall be
made without the consent of two-thirds of the members present. ' "3°
It is uncertain why the delegates unanimously agreed to this sudden
change which gave the President power to negotiate treaties. 31 Most
likely, the delegates from the large states hoped to counter the dispro-
portionate representation of small states in the Senate by granting the
300. See RAKOVE, supra note 41, at 262-67; Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and
President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L REV. 1, 94-96 (1979).
301. See id,
302. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 298, at 392-93; Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 808-13.
See generally Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 300, at 91-98.
303. See Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 300, at 95-96. See generally Bruce Stein, The
Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11 HosTRA L REV. 413, 432-40 (1982).
304. See 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1264-65 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986);
McHenry's Notes, Sept. 6, in THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 529-31
(Max Farrand ed., 1966).
305. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, at 532
(Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840); CLIrTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 220 (1987);
FA RAND, supra note 299, at 171.
306. It is clear from Madison's notes that the delegates did not view the treaty power as naturally
belonging to the executive. Indeed, the delegates generally viewed the executive's foreign relations
powers as limited to ceremonial functions like receiving ambassadors and exchanging
correspondence. On the other hand, many delegates, especially from the large and southern states,
distrusted the Senate and feared that the executive and Senate would collude in making treaties
against their commercial interests. Once it was clear that the electoral college would give the larger
states a proportional voice in choosing the President, the President's participation in treaty-making
was seen as a way to check the Senate's bias. See RAKOVE, supra note 41, at 262-68.
[Vol. 86:671
HeinOnline -- 86 Cal. L. Rev. 732 1998
1998] GEOPOLITICAL CONSTITUTION
executive responsibility for negotiating.3 Clearly, the Framers did not
entrust the executive with all of the treaty power.38 As Hamilton later
cautioned:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.
3°9
The President's negotiating role was a convenience to the Senate. To
have denied the President any role would be "to relinquish the benefits
of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign
negotiations." 310 Working together, the President and Senate would jeal-
ously check each other's power and provide greater security against
tyranny or entanglement with foreign sovereigns.3 1' In this respect, the
President's power to make treaties was far more limited than that of the
British king. Hamilton pointed out by contrast that
the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its ut-
most plenitude; and that the compacts entered into by the royal
authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection,
independent of any other sanction. ... In this respect... there is
307. James Wilson later explained to the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention that the
executive could check the power of the small States. See James Wilson's Summation and Final
Rebuttal, Dec. 11, 1787, in Bailyn, supra note 298, at 843-45. It is interesting to note that in Wilson's
discussion of the treaty clause he argued that the distance of three thousand miles and the difficulty of
communication with the Europeans necessitated the reliance on the President as an agent for the
Senate. "A long series of negotiations will frequently precede them; and can it be the opinion of these
gentlemen, that the legislature should be in session during this whole time?" Id. at 844. (It seems
especially ironic that twentieth-century scholars have argued that the immediacy of communication
and the risk of air attack are rationales for relying on the President as the sole organ of foreign
relations. See supra note 9 for examples of scholars making this assertion.) Further evidence of the
collaborative, cooperative relationship envisioned concerning the relative roles of the Senate and the
President is found in Bestor, Respective Roles, supra note 300, and Arthur Bestor, "Advice" From the
Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End is Achieved, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 718 (1989).
308. Hamilton distinguished the president's limited negotiating powers from the king's power to
make treaties on his own. Hamilton specifically argued that the British monarch could make treaties
concerning trade and tariffs on his own, whereas the President could only make trade agreements
with the participation of Congress. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 383 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961); see also Lee B. Ackerman, Executive Agreements, The Treaty-
Making Clause, and Strict Constructionalism, 8 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 587, 617 (1975) (noting that
Hamilton had argued that the executive's power was subject to the "exceptions and qualifications"
expressed in the Constitution).
309. Tim FEDERALIST No. 75, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
Hamilton argued that the treaty power was not executive in nature, nor was it strictly speaking a
legislative power. In the debate over the Jay Treaty in 1795, Hamilton rejected the argument that the
House had any authority in treaty-making by insisting that the Article II power belonged exclusively
to the President and Senate. See RAKOVE, supra note 41, at 356-58.
310. The FEDERALIST No. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
311. See id. at 454.
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no comparison between the intended power of the President and
the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform
alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a
branch of the legislature.3"2
In Hamilton's view, the President had no authority to make commercial
agreements on his own; all trade agreements required the Senate's ad-
vice and consent.
The requirement of a supermajority was intended as a further
check both on the influence of smaller states in the Senate and on re-
gional rivals.3"3 Some delegates feared that a bare majority of the Senate
would compromise navigation rights on the Mississippi or access to
Canadian fisheries." 4 Morris argued that if "[tireaties are to be made in
the branch of the Government where there may be a majority of the
states without a majority of the people" the two-thirds majority re-
quirement would preserve democracy.
3 5
We can draw two conclusions from this debate. First, the Framers
viewed treaty-making as a legislative power. Second, the delegates' con-
cern arose over protecting their own State from having a treaty imposed
on them without fair representation in the treaty-making process. The
Framers did not intend that the President act alone and make executive
agreements that could displace state law.
316
The Constitution clearly provided that treaties would displace con-
flicting state law and constitutions. 3 7 The Court has interpreted the
Supremacy Clause to mean that treaties can supersede state law or prior
federal statute; subsequent federal statutes, by contrast, supersede
312. TIE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
313. See Stein, supra note 303, at 436.
314. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Madison (June 2, 1788), in 3 FARRAND, supra note
298, at 306-07; MCCLURE, supra note 273, at 264-68.
315. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATE IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, at 533
(Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840). The Articles of Confederation required the consent of nine of the
thirteen state legislatures to make a treaty. The Framers transformed the Confederation's requirement
of two-thirds of the States into the constitutional requirement of two-thirds of the senators, who would
be chosen by the state legislatures. Southern states in particular insisted on a supermajority
requirement, because they feared that commercial treaties could disadvantage their regional interests
in navigation and free trade. See RAKOVE, supra note 41, at 90.
316. This concern for defending state sovereignty was reflected in the public debate over
ratification. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter VI, Oct. 12, 1787, in Bailyn, supra note
298, at 276; George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, Oct. 1787, in Bailyn, supra note 298, at
348.
317. In the minds of the Framers, it made sense for the Senate, as the representative of the
States, to exercise the treaty power. States could only be expected to comply with a treaty approved
by their own representatives in the Senate. Article VI was designed specifically to require the States
to comply with the 1787 Treaty of Paris, which ended the War of Independence. States had refused
to honor article 4 of the Treaty, which provided that all debts owed to British creditors before the
War must be repaid in full in British sterling. The failure to repay these debts had aggravated
relations with Britain. See generally Emory G. Evans, Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in
Virginia, 1776 to 1796,28 WM. & MARY Q. 373 (1971).
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treaties." 8 Scholars dispute whether the Framers intended that both
Article II treaties and executive agreements would supersede prior in-
consistent federal and state law.319 The term "treaties" was understood
in the 1700s as referring to a broad variety of international instruments
relating to commercial, navigational, political, diplomatic, religious, and
property issues.30 Hamilton read the Treaty Clause broadly
to give to that power the most ample latitude-to render it com-
petent to all the stipulations, which the exigencies of national af-
fairs might require; competent to the 'making of treaties of
alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other
species of convention usual among nations; and competent, in
the course of its exercise for these purposes, to control and bind
the legislative power of Congress. And it was emphatically for
this reason, that it was so carefully guarded; the cooperation of
two-thirds of the Senate, with the president, being required to
make any treaty whatever.32" '
Nevertheless, treaties were distinguished from other forms of inter-
national agreements. Although the Constitution prohibits States from
entering into "any Treaty," it allows States to enter into an
"Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,"
with the consent of Congress.3" What was the significance of the distinc-
tion between a treaty, agreement, or compact? Proponents of a wider
executive agreement power have argued that the Founders intended to
authorize two methods for obtaining ratification of international agree-
ments.3" A "treaty" required the approval of two-thirds of the Senate,
while an "agreement" could be approved by a majority of both houses
or by the President acting alone. This interpretation relegated the
Senate's advice and consent power to an optional procedure for making
international agreements. If the States could make an international
agreement with the consent of Congress, then surely the executive could
as well.
This reading of the Constitution ignores the Founders' contempo-
raneous understanding of the meaning of an "Agreement or
318. See, e.g., The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that customary international
law is part of U.S. law to be applied by our courts in the absence of any controlling legislative,
executive, or judicial act); see also RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 24, at § 303 cmt. j.
319. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 808 (concluding that the Framers believed that
only Article 11 treaties could bind the nation). Cf. McCLURE, supra note 273, at 330 (concluding that
since the founding, treaties and executive agreements have been interchangeable).
320. See Treaties and Executive Agreements: An Analysis Prepared for the Committee on
Foreign Relations by Henry S. Fraser, 78th Cong., SEN. Doc. No. 244, Sept. 21, 1944, at 5-13.
321. See Camillius Letters, in VII THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 518 (J.C. Hamilton
ed., 1851).
322. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 2.
323. See MCCLURE, supra note 273, at 255-59; McDougal & Lans, supra note 273, at 237.
1998]
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Compact." Their understanding is relevant for two reasons: first, to re-
but the intentionalist argument advanced by proponents of the executive
power, and second, to show that a consistent understanding about the
limits of the executive agreement power prevailed from the time of the
founding to the eve of the Cold War.
The distinction between treaties, agreements, and compacts ap-
peared in the Articles of Confederation,324 and in both early and subse-
quent drafts of the Constitution,32 suggesting that the Framers chose
these words deliberately. 26 This distinction would have been familiar to
the Framers through the work of the mid-eighteenth century Swiss pub-
licist Emerich de Vattel. Vattel's treatise, The Law of Nations or
Principles of Natural Law,327 first published in French in 1755, was the
most authoritative contemporary source of international law among the
thirteen States. 28 The Framers relied upon Vattel in constructing the
Constitution's foreign relations powers.3 29
Vattel outlined a temporal distinction between treaties and com-
pacts or agreements. Vattel defined a treaty as "a pact made with a veiw
324. Under the Articles of Confederation, treaties and agreements between a State and a foreign
government, or between two or more States, required the consent of Congress. THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. VI (U.S. 1781), reprinted in HOFFERT, supra note 90,
at 200-01.
325. Borchard, Replace the Treaty?, supra note 273, at 667-70.
326. See Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by
"Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. Cm. L REV. 453, 455-57 (1936) (discussing the inclusion and use
of the terms "compacts" and "agreements" in the different drafts of the Articles of Confederation).
327. EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Newberry et al. 1760). Vattel's
influence on the Constitution has been widely recognized. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 85-86;
see also 1 FARRAND, supra note 298, at 437-42 (Luther Martin, Attorney General of Maryland, citing
Vattel, inter alia, for the preposition that individuals are free and independent in the state of nature).
328. See Bailyn, supra note 298, at 348. Vattel's treatise was first published in English in 1760
and again for the American market in 1775. Three of the leading jurists at the Convention and
members of the committee of detail cited Vattel during the Constitutional Convention and the
ratification debates, including James Wilson, who helped Madison draft the Constitution, John
Rutledge, chairman of the committee, and later-Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Oliver
Ellsworth, a judge on the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors and later-Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court. See MADISON, supra note 315; Bailyn, supra note 298, at 348. Moreover, Benjamin
Franklin wrote the publisher of the English edition of Vattel that it "has been continually in the hands
of the members of our Congress now sitting, who are much pleased with your notes and preface, and
have entertained a high and just esteem for their author .... Letter by Benjamin Franklin to Dumas
(Dec. 19, 1775), reprinted in 2 WHARTON, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 64
(1889). See also Weinfeld, supra note 326, at 458. At least one of these copies was used at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 by the Framers. See id. at 459; see also Peter Haggenmacher, Some
Hints on the European Origins of Legislative Participation in the Treaty-Making Function, 67 CHI.-
KENT L REV. 313, 325-26 (1991).
329. See Bailyn, supra note 298, at 27; HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY LAW TREATIES IN AMERICAN LIBRARIES, 1700-1799, at 54, 63, 66 (1978) (listing Vattel as
one of the writers whose work was contained in the libraries of prominent Americans).
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[sic] to the public welfare by the superior power, either for perpetuity,
or for a considerable time."33 By contrast, Vattel wrote,
The pacts with a view to transitory affairs are called agreements,
conventions, and pactions. They are accomplished by one single
act, and not by irritated oaths [repeated acts] [sic]. These pacts
are perfected in their execution once for all: treaties receive a
successive execution, the duration of which equals that of the
treaty.3
31
Thus, the Constitution's distinction between treaties, international
agreements and compacts was deliberate, well-understood, and intended
by the Framers in 1789.332 While treaties would bind the nation in per-
petuity, agreements and compacts functioned like contemporaneous
exchanges which imposed no future obligations on any party; agree-
ments and treaties were not interchangeable. Significantly, presidents,
Congress, and courts alike respected this distinction until the advent of
the Cold War. The question to pursue is, when did the understanding
change, and what precisely brought about that change?
330. VATFEL, supra note 327, at § 152.
331. Id. at § 153. The curious reference to "irritated oaths" appears to be a mistake in the 1760
translation from the 1758 French edition, which reads "prestations rditdrdes." EMERICH Da VATTEL,
LE DRorr DES GENS, § 153 (1758). Subsequent editions of Vattel translated the French correctly as
"repeated acts." VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 153 (Joseph Chitty, trans., T. & J. W. Johnson &
Co. 1858) (1760).
Vattel's influence on the design of the treaty clause was further evidenced by the phrase
"advice and consent" of the Senate. In explaining the constitutional processes for making treaties,
Vattel wrote that while some sovereigns who possess "the full and absolute authority" make public
treaties on their own, rulers whose authority is limited "are obliged to take the advice of a senate, or
of the representatives of the nation." Id. at § 154. One of the early commentators, and a
contemporary of the Framers, St. George Tucker, cited these specific sections of Vattel in his
discussion of treaties, agreements, and compacts. See I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. 309 (1803),
cited in Weinfeld, supra note 326, at 461.
332. The most obvious form of agreement or compact which the States likely would negotiate,
either among themselves or with a foreign power subject to Congress' consent, would have involved
boundary disputes. The cessation or acquisition of land on either side would have been an appropriate
subject for the States. Consistent with Vattel's view on "international agreements and compacts,"
such agreements could be executed contemporaneously without committing the State or the nation in
the future. See Weinfeld, supra note 326, at 461. Indeed, during the Confederation, there were many
instances of States engaged in agreements with sister States pertaining to boundary lines and
navigation, as permitted by the Articles. See id. at 464. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Consfitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.. 685 (1927). It
does not appear that any State has entered into an agreement with a foreign power. See
SUTHERLAND, supra note 93, at 121-22; Jill E. Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society:
The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L REV. 1 (1997).
Since 1871, the House of Representatives has insisted that all cessations of land from the Indians
to the United States be in the form of compacts rather than Article II treaties. See Nell J. Newton,
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Source, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L REv. 195, 206 (1984).
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D. The Use of Executive Agreements Prior to the Cold War
The evolution of the executive agreement parallels the growth of
U.S. power and the increased role the United States plays in the world.333
Periods of relative isolation have been accompanied by periods of
quietude in the use of executive agreements. By contrast, periods of ex-
pansionism, either military or economic, have been characterized by
greater reliance on executive agreements.33
There is some historical dispute as to the first use of an executive
agreement.335 In acquiring the Louisiana Purchase, President Jefferson
contemplated the possibility of relying on his sole executive agreement
with the French government. Concluding that the acquisition of territory
exceeded his own constitutional authority, Jefferson submitted the
agreement to the Senate as a treaty. In addition, he requested enabling
legislation from both houses of Congress, suggesting that even an ex-
ecutive agreement approved by both houses would not have sufficed on
its own.336 Strictly speaking, the first executive agreement was the 1817
Rush-Bagot Agreement, which was concluded by President Monroe.3 37
The agreement between the United States and Great Britain limited
military forces on the Great Lakes.33 Arguably, as commander-in-chief,
Monroe possessed the power to enter into military agreements and did
not need the Senate's advice and consent. Yet, more than a quarter of a
century after the founding of the Republic, there was no single
333. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 85-99.
334. There were no executive agreements in the first quarter century of the Republic while the
avoidance of "entangling alliances" was the watchword of U.S. foreign policy. The assertion of a
Manifest Destiny led to a number of important executive agreements. See MARGOLIS, supra note 263,
at 7-12. The internationally-minded administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and
FDR relied on executive agreements in unprecedented numbers. Beginning with Harry Truman, the
Cold War inaugurated an exponential growth in executive agreements, both in absolute number and
relative to treaties. See id. at 5-23.
335. The earliest claim is that President Washington's Postmaster General, Timothy Pickering,
negotiated an exchange of postal service with the Canadian colonies in 1792 by way of an executive
agreement. More recent authorities dispute the characterization of the postal agreements as anything
more than an exchange of letters between postmasters with no binding effect on either party. See
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT's CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 117 (1917);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 86.
During the debate over the Jay Treaty in 1795, Jefferson argued that the treaty should be
submitted to the House of Representatives essentially in the form of a congressional-executive
agreement. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 250-52 (1962).
Madison, however, dissuaded Jefferson from pursuing that extreme position, which Madison believed
was inconsistent with Article II. Instead, Madison argued that the House could refuse to implement
the treaty by denying funding. See JOSEPH L ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 161-62 (1997); RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 359-63 (1990).
336. See 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIs Tamr 311-32 (1948).
337. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 283, at 211; Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 816.
338. See 2 HUNTER MILLER, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 645 (1931) (Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817). See also Message from the
President of the United States, S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. (1892).
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precedent upon which Monroe could rely for the power to make execu-
tive agreements. After signing the agreement, Monroe doubted its con-
stitutionality,339 and submitted the agreement to the Senate for its advice
whether it was "such an arrangement as the Executive is competent to
enter into, by the powers in it by the Constitution, or is such a one as
requires the advice and consent of the Senate."' The Senate confirmed
Monroe's own doubts that a prospective military commitment could be
accomplished by executive agreement and consented to Rush-Bagot as
an Article II treaty." It is therefore debatable whether the Rush-Bagot
Agreement evidenced the general acceptance of a practice of making
executive agreements, or conversely, whether it proved that such agree-
ments were not contemplated by the generation of the Framers.
At the dawn of this century, executive agreements remained rela-
tively rare, and were used only for contemporaneous exchanges.' In-
deed, when President Theodore Roosevelt concluded an agreement for
taking control of Santo Domingo's customs houses to prevent Santo
Domingo from being pushed into receivership by European creditors,
he acknowledged that his executive agreement with Santo Domingo
could not bind future presidents. Therefore, like Jefferson and Monroe,
Theodore Roosevelt felt obliged to ask the Senate to approve his execu-
tive agreement as an Article II treaty." After the acquisition of the
Philippines in the Spanish-American War established the United States
as a Pacific power, Roosevelt concluded several executive agreements
with Japan to avoid conflict with the region's leading power.3 While
Roosevelt used executive agreements more frequently than his
339. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 169-70 (1974).
340. In submitting the Rush-Bagot Agreement to the Senate, President Monroe expressed his own
doubts about the constitutionality of the executive agreement. "I submit it to the consideration of the
Senate, whether this is such an arrangement as the executive is competent to enter into, by the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, or is such a one as requires the advice and consent of the Senate."
McCLuRE, supra note 273, at 31.
341. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEm MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 102-03
(1916).
342. By 1900 there were only 124 executive agreements, or an average of one per year since
the Founding. See MARGOLIS, supra note 263, at 101-06.
343. Roosevelt subsequently explained that
[t]he Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement
with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did .... But it
was far preferable that there should be action by Congress, so that we might be proceeding
under a treaty which was the law of the land and not merely by a direction of the Chief
Executive which would lapse when that particular executive left office.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 551-52 (1920). This expression is further evidence
that even as late as Theodore Roosevelt's administration, executive agreements were never used to
bind the nation prospectively.
344. See MARGOLIS, supra note 263, at 10-11.
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predecessors,' 5 he respected the traditional distinction between treaties
and executive agreements.?
World War I occasioned another dramatic increase in the number
of executive agreements, but without any fundamental change in their
function. 7 Despite the bitter defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, President
Wilson did not attempt to join the League of Nations by an executive
agreement, nor did he negotiate executive agreements to end the state of
war." Like his predecessors, Wilson understood that executive agree-
ments could not bind the nation prospectively? 9
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt transformed the role of the
federal executive. The executive branch grew with the expansion of the
welfare state and the growth of the military. Mired in the Depression, the
nation looked to a powerful activist presidency as a panacea; threatened
abroad, the country rallied behind the commander-in-chief. 3s Executive
power offered an expedient solution to domestic and foreign crises.
Nevertheless, Roosevelt respected the limits on his executive agreement
power even in economic crisis and wartime. In order to relieve the world
345. In all, President Roosevelt concluded a total of fifty-two executive agreements, more than
40% of the total of all executive agreements negotiated in the previous century. SEE MARGOLIS,
supra note 263, at 101-04 app.
346. Roosevelt's understanding of the executive agreement power was consistent with the view
expressed in Professor Corwin's classic work on presidential power in foreign affairs, published in
1917. Corwin, a strong proponent of the President's powers, asserted that "[tihe national
Government's power of entering into agreements with foreign states is not exhausted in treaty
making, and there are agreements with such states which do not have to be submitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent." CORWIN, supra note 335, at 116. After conceding the limited role of
executive agreements in other administrations, Corwin concluded that "our final verdict must be that
the president's prerogative in the making of international compacts of a temporary nature and not
demanding enforcement by the courts is one that is likely to become larger before it begins to shrink."
Id. at 125. Corwin, who clearly sought to enlarge the executive power in foreign relations, conceded
that the executive agreement was merely "temporary" and that it cannot bind domestic courts; hence,
it operated only as an agreement between the chief executive and a foreign government. The
President, according to Corwin, was in effect bound by his honor. Neither the courts, Congress, nor
future presidents could be held to an executive agreement. See id.
347. Wilson negotiated fifty-four executive agreements, compared to Roosevelt's fifty-two. See
MARGOLIS, supra note 263, at 104.
348. Instead, Congress declared peace by joint resolution in 1921. Joint Resolution of July 2,
1921, 42 Stat. 105 (1921). Subsequently, formal treaties were approved by the Senate with Germany,
Austria, and Hungary. Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-121, 45 Stat. 254
(1928).
349. From 1900 to 1920, there were some agreements that arguably substituted for Article II
treaties, including an armistice with Spain. The consensus of opinion among legal scholars, however,
was that these agreements did not bind succeeding presidents. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note
44, at 817-18. At the end of WWI, President Coolidge was unable to obtain congressional support for
debt settlements; therefore, he negotiated settlements in the form of executive agreements. Coolidge
negotiated 120 executive agreements, far exceeding all previous Administrations. See MARGOLIS,
supra note 263, at 104.
350. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 100-26.
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economy of the burden of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,351 President
Roosevelt asked Congress for authority to renegotiate these tariffs on a
reciprocal basis.352 Facing a Congress that hesitated to commit the coun-
try to another European war, Roosevelt used the executive agreement as
a device to aid the Allies without requiring congressional approval or
appropriation.353 Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson counseled the
President that his authority to exchange U.S. destroyers for British air
and naval bases flowed from his authority both as commander-in-chief
and as the "sole organ" of the government in foreign relations.3 -
Jackson reaffirmed the traditional view that an executive agreement
could only be used to effectuate a contemporaneous exchange. The
contemporaneous exchange of destroyers for bases would not bind fu-
ture presidents, and therefore, it did not require the advice and consent
of the Senate. Attorney-General Jackson advised the President that
[s]ome negotiations involve commitments as to the future which
would carry an obligation to exercise powers vested in the
Congress. Such Presidential arrangements are customarily sub-
mitted for ratification by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before
the future legislative power of the country is committed. How-
ever, the acquisitions which you are proposing to accept are
without express or implied promises on the part of the United
States to be performed in the future. The consideration.., is
completed upon transfer of the specified items .... It is not
necessary for the Senate to ratify an opportunity that entails no
obligation.355
351. The Depression partially can be attributed to the congressional intervention in foreign
economic policy. Protectionist sentiments in Congress had led to the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies
exemplified by the excessive 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L.
No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1307). The Smoot-Hartley Tariff sought to
protect U.S. producers from import competition, but led to retaliatory tariff increases from other
trading partners and so aggravated the worldwide depression. See STEPHEN D. COHEN, JOEL R.
PAUL & ROBERT A. BLECKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY: ECONOMICS,
POLrrICS, LAWS AND IssuEs 32-33 (1996).
352. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
353. Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador Lothian, by an exchange of letters in
1940, concluded the destroyers-for-bases agreement by which the United States gained a ninety-
nine-year rent-free lease to naval and air bases in the Atlantic in exchange for fifty U.S. naval
destroyers. See JOSEPH PAIGE, THE LAW NOBODY KNEW 77-82 (1977).
354. Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att'y
Gen. 484, 485-86 (1940).
355. Id. at 487. The Republican presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie, denounced the
agreement as "the most arbitrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any president in the history of
the United States." James A. Hagerty, Willkie Condemns Destroyer Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1940,
at 8. Yet, there was no general public outcry or significant opposition from Congress, and FDR
proceeded to use the executive agreement to coordinate military defenses with other countries,
including Great Britain, Canada, and Iceland. See United States-Canada Exchange of Defense
Articles, April 26, 1941, reprinted in 6 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTs OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1949, at 216 (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1971); United States-United
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During FDR's thirteen years in office, he signed 609 executive
agreements, almost doubling the number of agreements signed by all
his predecessors combined. FDR was the first President to sign far more
executive agreements than Article II treaties. Nevertheless, FDR pre-
served the traditional limits on the use of executive agreements."'
E. When Did the Executive Agreement Power Change and Why?
At least through the Roosevelt Administration, presidents used ex-
ecutive agreements, with or without congressional approval, in a few
limited circumstances. As traditionally understood, executive agree-
ments were appropriate only for purposes of a contemporaneous ex-
change or performance. Because of this temporal limitation, they had
no effect on U.S. domestic law. After World War 11, presidents began to
use executive agreements interchangeably with Article II treaties. Courts
gave effect to those agreements in U.S. domestic law, regardless of
whether Congress authorized the President's action. Like other aspects
of presidential power over foreign relations, expediency discourse trans-
formed executive agreement power. This argument contradicts a recent
history of the executive agreement power by Professors Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove,3s which helped to persuade Congress of
the constitutionality of NAFTA and WTO. Ackerman and Golove raised
critical issues about when and why the executive agreement power
changed, and consequently, I am obliged to address these issues.
Writing in defense of the constitutionality of NAFTA, Ackerman
and Golove trace the transformation of the executive agreement power
to the 1944 presidential campaign. A central campaign issue was
whether the United States should join the United Nations, and if so,
whether doing so required the advice and consent of the Senate. Ac-
cording to Ackerman and Golove, FDR's re-election to a fourth term
signaled popular support for joining the United Nations without the
Kingdom Lend-Lease Agreement, Feb. 23, 1942, reprinted in 12 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1949, at 603 (Charles I.
Bevans ed., 1974).
356. Was the Litvinov Assignment, discussed above, a contemporaneous exchange of property
rights, or should it have been subject to the Senate's advice and consent as an Article II treaty? The
Litvinov Agreement settled outstanding claims against the Soviet Government in connection with
mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. Arguably, the Senate did not need to
advise and consent, because FDR was acting within his Article II authority "to receive foreign
ambassadors" by removing an obstacle incident to establishing diplomatic recognition. The agreement
merely facilitated the exchange of property rights between private persons and the two governments.
Since the agreement did not bind the nation prospectively, it was appropriate for FDR to act by sole
executive agreement. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); see generally John Bassett Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 PoL. Sc.
Q. 385, 398, 403 (1905) (arguing that agreements to settle claims against foreign governments are
within the executive's prerogative and do not require the Senate's advice and consent).
357. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44.
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need for an Article II treaty. In their eyes, the 1944 election represented
a "constitutional moment" which transformed the Constitution itself to
permit congressional-executive agreements to be used interchangeably
with Article II treaties." 8
Ackerman and Golove find that until the end of World War II, ex-
ecutive agreements had a limited utility and effect. I agree with that
conclusion, but disagree with three important points Ackerman and
Golove derive from it: first, that the 1944 election triggered this trans-
formation; second, that the change only pertained to the status of con-
gressional-executive agreements and did not affect sole executive
agreements; and third, that the change was "constitutional," in the sense
that it permanently altered the way in which international agreements
could be approved.359
First, Ackerman and Golove argue that the public's support for the
interchangeability of executive agreements and treaties largely decided
the 1944 election."w Both FDR and the Republican nominee, Thomas
Dewey, ran as internationalists firmly committed to the establishment of
a United Nations Organization, which enjoyed the overwhelming sup-
port of the American public (according to public opinion polls).36 FDR
and Dewey agreed on the necessity of a United Nations. Moreover, both
thought the charter could be approved as an executive agreement rather
than as an Article II treaty.362 Ackerman and Golove point out one re-
spect in which the Republican and Democratic party platforms differed:
the Republican platform provided that "pursuant to the Constitution of
the United States any treaty or agreement to attain such aims [of creat-
ing a United Nations] ... shall be made only by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate." '363 The Democratic platform merely provided
that the President would "make all necessary and effective agreements
and arrangements" for the establishment of the new international or-
ganization." Roosevelt defeated Dewey, and Democrats replaced four
Republican isolationists in the Senate. From that electoral victory,
Ackerman and Golove conclude that
358. See id at 861-75.
359. Professor Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments has been discussed and debated
widely. Professor Ackerman's theory sheds light on how the political reality of the popular will has
influenced the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation. See ACKERMAN, supra note 45.
Professor Laurence Tribe has disputed Professor Ackerman's major thesis of "constitutional
moments." See Tribe, supra note 46, at 1239-49, 1278-88. Even accepting Ackerman's general
description of the political-constitutional process, in my judgment, this particular historical incident is
not a persuasive example of his theory in practice.
360. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 883-96.
361. See id. at 883.
362. See id at 883-84.
363. REPUBLICAN PLATFORM FOR 1944, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS: 1840-1960, at 408
(Kirk Porter & Donald B. Johnson eds., 1961).
364. DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM OF 1944, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, id at 403.
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[g]iven the overwhelming shift toward internationalism ex-
pressed by both leading candidates and the popular support
given to the more internationalist slate, wouldn't the American
citizenry support a much bolder challenge to the Senate
monopoly ?36.1
The "immediate consequence of the 1944 election" was that the "lame
duck" House Judiciary Committee sent to the House floor a proposed
constitutional amendment requiring treaties to be "made by the
President with the advice and consent of both Houses of Congress." '66
The following year, the House approved the amendment and sent it on
to the Senate. Ackerman and Golove argue that the threat posed by this
amendment forced the Senate to approve the Bretton Woods
Agreements Act,367 rather than insist on each of the agreements being
presented as a separate treaty. Ackerman and Golove's characterization
of 1944 as a "triggering election" that transformed the power to make
congressional-executive agreements does not adequately explain four
historical facts.
First, Roosevelt and Dewey agreed about this issue, so it is difficult
to see how the vote for the Democrats represented any sort of popular
mandate to change the treaty-making power.368 After all, few Americans
probably read and compared the party platforms. Rather, the
Democratic victory reflected FDR's popularity and the Allied success in
the war. In addition, the public probably trusted the Democratic party to
support the United Nations with greater enthusiasm than the Republican
party with its traditional isolationist wing. The treaty-making power was
at best a peripheral issue, arousing interest only among constitutional-
ists.369
Second, despite FDR's victory, the U.N. Charter was in fact ap-
proved as an Article II treaty with the advice and consent of two-thirds
365. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 885.
366. H.RJ. Res. 320,78th Cong. (1944); H.R. REP. No. 2061 (1944).
367. Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945).
368. Ackerman and Golove concede that Dewey actually objected to the inclusion of this plank
in the Republican platform. Dewey never called for submitting the U.N. Charter as an Article II
treaty to the Senate. Ackerman and Golove further concede that the 1944 election certainly was not
"a European-style referendum on this key issue." Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 884.
Nevertheless, Ackerman and Golove speculate that if Dewey had won, the isolationist wing of his
party would have insisted that the U.N. Charter be submitted as a treaty to the Senate. See id. at 884.
369. Ackerman and Golove do not present any evidence either from polling data or from
popular debates to show that the public was strongly mobilized against the Senate's treaty-making
monopoly. Ackerman and Golove characterize the defeat of four Republican senators as signaling
the public's opposition to the Senate's monopoly on treaty-making. Conversely, Ackerman and
Golove imply that if the public had voted out the Democratic majority, that would signal support for
the Senate's treaty-making monopoly. Yet, it would seem illogical to interpret the loss of Senate
control as a victory for the Senate's prerogatives. If Dewey had defeated FDR, Dewey might have
resisted the isolationists in his own party and presented the U.N. Charter as a congressional-executive
agreement. There is no way to know what would have happened.
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of the Senate.37 It was not obvious that a congressional-executive
agreement would have been equally as effective. Ackerman and Golove
claim that the decision to introduce the Charter as an Article II treaty
was part of a compromise by which the Senate implicitly conceded the
larger argument that congressional-executive agreements could substi-
tute for treaties. 7 1 They point to the Bretton-Woods Agreement Act as
evidence that the House asserted its authority to make international
agreements.372 Yet, subsequent practice has been inconsistent. The
President has continued to submit some international agreements to the
Senate for its advice and consent, including important and controversial
treaties like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,373 the Treaty on Chemical
and Biological Weapons,374 and the Panama Canal Treaty. 75 The House
did not object to these treaties precisely because it is far from clear that
the House had a constitutional role to play in treaty-making, and in any
event, the House had no ready mechanism to prevent the Senate from
enacting a treaty.376 This evidence suggests that the President's decision
to submit the Bretton Woods Agreements to both houses as a congres-
sional-executive agreement was not a concession to the power of the
House. Rather, the claim that congressional-executive agreements were
interchangeable with Article II treaties represented an acknowledgment
of the enlarged power of the executive following the Second World War.
Third, the proposed 1945 constitutional amendment would have
been superfluous if the constitutional transformation were apparent. In-
deed, the Senate's rejection of that amendment further evidenced that
public support for the United Nations did not translate into popular
pressure to concede the Senate's prerogative. The plain fact was that
after the 1944 election the U.N. Charter was subject to the Article II
370. See Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (June 26, 1995) 3 Bevans
1153 entered into force on Oct. 25, 1945. The Senate approved the Charter by a vote of 89-2 on July
28, 1945. See 91 Cong. Rec. 8190 (1945).
371. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 890-91. In fact, as early as 1934 FDR had used
a congressional-executive agreement to accede to the International Labor Organization (ILO). See
S. J. Res. 131, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 1182 (1934); PAIGE, supra note 353, at 56. See generally Ackerman
& Golove, supra note 44, at 853-54.
372. See id. at 891.
373 Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed May 26, 1972, entered into force October 3, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. 7503.
374. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, entered into force
March 6, 1975,26 U.S.T. 585, T.I.A.S. 8061, Convention done April 10, 1972.
375. Panama Canal Treaty, signed Sept. 7, 1977, entered into force Oct. 1, 1979, 33 U.S.T. 40,
T.I.A.S. 10030.
376. Indeed, DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIRCULAR No. 175 (1955), supra note 267, which is the
executive branch policy statement on the use of treaties and executive agreements, makes no mention
of the claim that the House has a constitutional prerogative to make treaties.
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procedure. The 1944 election did not influence the decision to submit
the Charter as an Article II treaty.
Finally, Ackerman and Golove's argument does not explain the
outcome of the debate over the International Trade Organization (ITO)
Charter. Though Congress rejected the ITO Charter as a congressional-
executive agreement, in 1948, President Truman signed a sole executive
agreement to bring the United States into compliance with GATT.377 If
the new congressional-executive agreement process were regarded as
constitutionally mandated, Congress and the public should have
strongly opposed Truman's action. In fact, no such opposition materi-
alized. 78 This experience suggests that whatever change had occurred in
the status of congressional-executive agreements had also occurred in
the status of sole executive agreements. Thus, it was not the authority of
the House, but the authority of the President as the "sole organ of for-
eign relations," that was invoked to justify substituting executive
agreements for treaties.
Ackerman and Golove characterize the 1944 presidential campaign
as a signaling event in the nation's turn toward permanent international
engagement. The historical significance of that election pales in com-
parison to the larger context of the Cold War. Contrary to Ackerman
and Golove's thesis, the proliferation of congressional-executive agree-
ments reflected the enlargement of executive-not congressional-
power. All of the executive's foreign relations powers expanded in the
same moment. What Ackerman and Golove characterize as an amend-
ment to the Constitution was in actuality a new way of reasoning about
the Constitution: reading the text through the lens of geopolitics.
A precursory form of expediency discourse shaped the question in
1944-whether to submit the U.N. Charter as an Article II treaty. Pro-
ponents of using an executive agreement as a vehicle for joining the
United Nations blamed the Senate's failure to approve the Treaty of
Versailles as a cause of the Second World War.79 In their view, expedi-
ency required a more flexible approach, allowing the President the dis-
cretion to make international commitments either by treaty or executive
agreement.380
In 1944, Professor Edwin Borchard of Yale Law School summa-
rized the constitutional argument in favor of the Senate's monopoly
377. See Protocol of Provisional Application, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 2051; 55 U.N.T.S. 308. See
generally John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 249, 251-53 (1967).
378. Ronald A. Brand, The Status of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. Domestic
Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479,482 (1990).
379. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 861-65.
380. See id. at 889-96.
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power to approve treaties in a widely cited series of law review articles.38" '
Professor Borchard demonstrated that since the early days of the repub-
lic)3 82 presidents have consistently relied upon Article H treaties when-
ever they sought to commit the nation prospectively." He defended the
Senate's wisdom for approving all but a handful of treaties)
14
Borchard's Yale colleagues, Professors Myers McDougal and
Asher Lans, answered his argument in a highly influential law review
article that justified the interchangeability of treaties and congressional-
executive agreements in light of the new post-war responsibilities facing
the United States.38 McDougal and Lans argued that the Constitution
adapted to changed circumstances 86 In the aftermath of the Second
World War, the nation recognized the need for creating international
institutions for collective security:
Above the holocaust of the present war has arisen a demand
from the people of the United States for a foreign policy that
will do everything humanly possible to prevent future wars and
to secure their other interests in the contemporary world. 7
Technological changes in communication, transportation, and produc-
tion shrank the modem world. Both developments in military technol-
ogy and economic interdependence made it impossible for the United
States to maintain its traditional isolation:
This basic condition of interdependence, the profound weakness
of the world's present system of organization, and, conversely,
the strong power position of the United States in the world soci-
ety make it imperative that the United States not only participate,
but take a leading part, in establishing a new order of political,
economic, and cultural relationships and institutions, both in di-
rect association with other nations, great and small, and through
international organizations."'
The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in
power from Congress to the executive. "Other governments must know,
if they are to be willing to undertake indispensable joint commitments,
that the United States can so act to implement integrated and responsible
381. See Borchard, Replace the Treaty?, supra note 273; Edwin Borchard, American
Government and Politics: Treaties and Executive Agreements, 40 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 729 (1946);
Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE LJ. 616 (1945); Borchard,
Replace the Treaty?, supra note 273.
382. See Borchard, Replace the Treaty?, supra note 273, at 667-74.
383. See id. at 673-77.
384. See id. at 664-65.
385. McDougal & Lans, supra note 273.
386. See id. at 290-96.
387. Id. at 181.
388. Id. at 185.
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policy.""3 9 In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a pow-
erful executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the
new world environment, the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy
took precedence over the deliberative process:
[E]xecutive officers, who are charged with the task of conduct-
ing negotiations with other governments, must be able to treat
the national body politic as a whole and must be able to canvass
it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, with-
out being subjected to delays, obstructions, and disintegrating ef-
forts by minorities .... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction and
of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly charac-
teristic of past eras when economic and political change pro-
ceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an
effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing
the interests of the United States.3 °
McDougal and Lans' expediency discourse ultimately triumphed
over Borchard's appeal to constitutional process. Courts or other legal
commentators never clearly drew on McDougal and Lans' distinction
between sole executive agreements and congressional-executive agree-
ments. Instead, the expediency argument created a legal justification for
a new executive power to make agreements that legally bound future
generations both internationally and domestically.
F. The Cold War and the Transformation
of the Executive Agreement Power
The modem understanding of executive agreements began with
President Truman, who employed executive agreements in lieu of
Article II treaties. This use reshaped both the postwar world and the role
of the U.S. President in foreign affairs.39 Prior to the Truman admini-
stration, most executive agreements concerned military or diplomatic
affairs, which related to the President's power as commander-in-chief or
as diplomatic representative. Departing from tradition, Truman used
executive agreements primarily as an instrument of economic policy.
Since Truman, the number of executive agreements has vastly exceeded
the number of Article II treaties.3 9 The largest portion of all executive
agreements has concerned foreign trade and commerce. 93 More signifi-
cantly, Truman established the precedent of using a sole executive
agreement to bind the country prospectively as a member of a
389. Id. at 186.
390. Id. at 185-86.
391. In seven years, he signed 1,466 executive agreements, more than double FDR's record in
thirteen years in office. See MARGOLIS, supra note 263, at 104-05.
392. See id at 105-06.
393. See JOHNSON, supra note 153, at 22-25; MARGOLIS, supra note 263, at 104-09.
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multinational organization or framework, without any explicit congres-
sional authorization ex ante.
394
With the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States
assumed global economic responsibilities for providing liquidity and
stimulating economic growth among friendly trading partners. The
growth of free-market economies was closely related to the twin Cold
War objectives of stabilizing western democracies and containing com-
munism.3 95 Containing communism was the over-arching goal of U.S.
foreign policy, which required the United States to strengthen free mar-
ket democracy by promoting trade. However, the objective of promot-
ing free trade per se did not explain the need for expanding the
executive agreement power. Arguably, the need for quick and secret
decision-making in the face of the Soviet threat offered a plausible ex-
planation for the executive to act alone in foreign policy-making. But
neither speed nor secrecy could explain why the executive should act
alone in negotiating agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATI). In the view of the executive, regulating foreign
commerce was too important to leave to Congress, as the Constitution
provided. 6 Congressional parochialism and insularity made Congress
ill-suited to directing trade policy. Since Congress could not be trusted
to do the right thing, the executive insisted on acting alone. Executive
agreements were expedient, both because they allowed the President to
by-pass the Senate's advice and consent, and because they allowed
senators to avoid responsibility for the consequences of imports on do-
mestic competitors. Expediency discourse had established that presi-
dential power is a function of foreign exigencies; economic concerns
readily substituted for strategic threats. Once the President employed
executive agreements in lieu of trade treaties, he established a precedent
for negotiating military, diplomatic, tax, political, and economic
394. Truman used a sole executive agreement to accede to GATI'. He also used congressional-
executive agreements to accede to the IMF, the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization,
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the World Health
Organization, among other international agreements. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 892.
Truman was not the first president to use an executive agreement to accede to an international
organization. In 1934, FDR used a congressional-executive agreement to join the ILO. Arguably,
GATT is distinguishable on two counts. Frst, GATT Protocol of Provisional Application was a sole
executive agreement which was employed to accomplish a specific objective that Congress had
previously rejected. Second, GATT contained specific rules that bound the United States in the
regulation of its foreign trade and obligated the United States to settle disputes with other contracting
parties through GATT auspices.
395. Drawing a direct connection between economic and security interests, President Truman
argued for foreign aid for Europe, "because we... cannot enjoy prosperity in a world of economic
stagnation... [and] because economic distress anywhere in the world is a fertile breeding ground for
violent political upheaval." Truman Army Day speech, PUB. PAPERS 186. See also GADDIS, supra
note 1, at 342.
396. See generally Koh, supra note 21.
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agreements without the Senate's advice and consent. Thus, the expedi-
ency discourse enlarged the President's powers to make executive
agreements that infringed Congress' authority to regulate foreign trade,
tax, spend, or transfer federal property.
At Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, delegates from forty-
four states drew up the blueprint for a new world economic system. The
Bretton Woods Agreements established the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO) as the
pillars of a more open market system of trade and investment."9 In
1945, the Truman administration submitted the Bretton Woods
Agreements Act,398 authorizing U.S. participation in the IMF and the
World Bank, to both houses as a congressional-executive agreement."t
Truman chose not to submit these agreements for the Senate's advice
and consent, because of their economic importance and the Senate's
traditional opposition to international organizations.' ° Although there
was no clear precedent for asking Congress to approve a major com-
mitment to an international organization by joint resolution,4' the
Senate acquiesced.' The Bretton Woods Agreements Act set a prece-
dent for other congressional-executive agreements that facilitated U.S.
involvement in international organizations. President Truman subse-
quently submitted for congressional approval executive agreements es-
tablishing U.S. participation in a number of such organizations,
including the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the World Health
Organization, and most notably, the ITO.'
397. See generally Raymond F. Mikesell, The Bretton Woods Debates: Essays in International
Finance No. 192, Princeton University (1994); SCHILD, supra note 148.
398. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945).
399. Moreover, the executive interest here coincided with the interest of the House of
Representatives in supplanting the Senate's constitutional monopoly over treaties. The House sought
to use congressional-executive agreements as a substitute for treaties to insinuate itself into the
process. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 44, at 890-92.
400. See id at 889-91. See generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DtPLOMACY
(1969); William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, in EssAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 16, at
6-37 (Princeton University 1952).
401. The Administration argued that both the U.N. Refugee Relief Association and the Food and
Agricultural Organization previously had been approved as congressional-executive agreements. Of
course, neither of these humanitarian organizations constituted the same level of obligation as the
World Bank or the IMF. See i. at 891.
402. Ackerman argued that the Senate did not insist on exercising its Article 11 advice and
consent powers because of popular support for internationalism expressed in the 1944 election and
the fact that the Senate feared a constitutional amendment being considered in the House that would
have required that all treaties be approved by a majority of both Houses. It is unclear why the Senate
would be worried by such an amendment, since it could not have become law without the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate. See id. at 886-91.
403. Id. at 892.
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The ITO faced strong opposition from domestic political interests
in the United States. Labor unions and some domestic industries feared
import competition. Labor and industry opponents charged that foreign
imports were "unfairly" advantaged by lower labor costs, lower levels
of regulation, and hidden subsidies from their governments.' Nation-
alists charged that U.S. sovereignty would be threatened by a multilat-
eral organization dominated by countries with competing economic
interests. 4° Some opponents of the ITO warned that trade preferences,
which the Europeans maintained with their former colonies, would dis-
advantage the United States and perpetuate colonial dependency. Fi-
nally, states-rights advocates opposed international commitments that
threatened local autonomy, especially concerning race relations. These
domestic interest groups combined to stop the ITO Charter. In 1950,
President Truman acknowledged defeat and withdrew the ITO Charter
from further consideration.
While Congress never approved the ITO Charter, Truman found a
back-door way to accomplish the same goal. Even before the parties
completed the Charter, negotiators had reached an agreement to reduce
tariffs and establish rules for regulating imports and exports, GATT.
GATT would implement key rules immediately while the ITO Charter
negotiations continued."5 Speed was paramount since the negotiating
authority would lapse in mid-1948, and there was a risk that Congress
might limit further authority to negotiate. Accordingly, the parties com-
pleted a Protocol of Provisional Application410 which applied GATT
temporarily, pending the ITO's ratification. Truman signed the Protocol
as a sole executive agreement.411 Under the authority of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act, as amended in 1945,412 which authorized the
President to "proclaim" negotiated tariff rates, the President
"proclaimed" GATT provisions as domestic law.41 3
404. See JOHN IL JACKSON, VORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT (1967); Jackson, supra
note 377, at 297-312 (discussing the problems that GATT raised with federal control of foreign
commerce, precluding state regulation of foreign imports and exports); GARDNER, supra note 400.
405. See Diebold, supra note 400, at 21-4.
406. See GARDNER, supra note 400, at 348-61 (discussing the U.S. interest in eliminating
Imperial Preferences in the ITO negotiations).
407. See id. at 37 1-80.
408. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 32-37 (1991).
409. See Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 350, 48 Stat. 943
(1934). See generally Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GA7T in the Domestic Law of the United
States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY AND GATT 196-99 (Meinhard Hilfet al. eds., 1986).
410. See Protocol of Provisional Application, 61 Stat. pt. 6, at A2051; 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
411. See Brand, supra note 378, at 482-85.
412. 59 Stat. 410.
413. See Jackson, supra note 377, at 253-69.
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The GATT Provisional Protocol remained in effect as a sole execu-
tive agreement until it was replaced by the 1994 GATT.4 4 Congress
never approved the ITO Charter,45  although between 1947 to 1994,
Congress passed several trade acts implementing various GATT agree-
ments.4 6 Every trade bill from 1951 to 1979 provided that nothing in
the legislation should be construed to imply congressional approval of
GATT.417 Despite the absence of congressional support for GATT, U.S.
courts4 " and legal scholars419 treated GATT like an Article II treaty, both
for purposes of superseding inconsistent state law and for purposes of
filling gaps in federal law.
Courts often cite numerous cases challenging the domestic applica-
tion of GAT to support the general proposition that executive agree-
ments could function like Article II treaties. 40 GAIT served as a striking
example of executive power, because President Truman signed it despite
congressional antipathy. 2 Congress maintained its distance from GATT
414. See STEPHEN D. COHEN, JOEL R. PAUL & ROBERT A. BLECKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S.
FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 162-72, 260-73 (1996).
415. See supra notes 377-378 and accompanying text.
416. See Brand, supra note 378, at 482-85.
417. From 1951 through 1988, Congress five times extended the President's authority to negotiate
trade agreements with the proviso that the legislation "shall not be construed to determine or indicate
the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." See, e.g., Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No.
82-50, § 10, 65 Stat. 72,75 (1951) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §1351). In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress
stated that it did not imply approval or disapproval "of all articles" of GA'T. For the first time in
1974, Congress approved payment of the U.S. fees to GATT secretariat. Again, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979,. Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 3, 93 Stat. 144, 145 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
2501-82 (1988)), provided that, if any of GATT multilateral codes conflicted with federal law,
federal law prevailed, and that the codes did not create "any private right of action or remedy" under
U.S. law. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1307). See also Brand, supra note 378, at 486.
418. See Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (holding
that tax on wine gallon rather than proof gallon was consistent with GATT); George E. Bardwil &
Sons v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A. 118 (1955) (upholding President's authority to terminate trade
concession negotiable under GATT); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n of New Jersey, 75 N.J. 272 (N.J. 1977) (stating that GATT is a treaty, but that GATT
does not prohibit state government procurement policies that prefer domestic products), appeal
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that state procurement law was precluded by the federal government's
exclusive power over foreign relations); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
App. 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that California's Buy America law violated GATT); Hawaii v.
Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (Haw. 1957) (invalidating under GAIT a Hawaiian law requiring grocers who sold
imported eggs to give public notice); see also 40 Op. Att'y Gen. (Cal.) 650 (1962) (concluding that
GATT preempts contrary state law).
419. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 303j; Brand, supra note 378, at 486; Hudec,
supra note 409, at 195-226; Jackson, supra note 377, at 280-92.
420. See supra note 418.
421. The record of congressional hostility toward GAT is wel-established. After Congress
rejected the ITO, GAT was never submitted to Congress for its approval. In 1951, Congress
provided in the Trade Agreements Extension Act that "[t]he enactment of this Act shall not be
construed to determine or indicate approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive
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even after it was firmly established as an international framework for
trade relations. Nevertheless, courts and legal academics invoked the ex-
pediency rationale to justify GATT's special status.4"
Professor John Jackson provided the theoretical foundation for the
legal status of GATT in a famous law review article published in 1967. 42
Jackson found authority for the executive to negotiate GATT and to
"proclaim" it as domestic law,424 under section 350 of the Trade Act of
1945."" Section 350 authorized the President to negotiate bilateral
Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 10, 65 Stat. 72, 75 (1951) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §1351). Congress
reiterated this provision in trade legislation in 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1958. See Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-215, § 103, 67 Stat. 472 (1953); Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 445 §3; 68 Stat. 360 (1954), Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub.
L. No. 84-86, § 3(a), 69 Stat. 162, 163 (1955); Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-686, § 10, 72 Stat. 673, 580 (1958). See generally Jackson, supra note 377, at 265-66. In 1955,
Congress signaled its opposition to GATT by rejecting the Draft Charter for the Organization for
Trade Cooperation, H.R. 5550, 84th Cong. (1955), which would have established an international
trade organization to enforce GATT. See HR. REp. No. 2007 (1956). The Trade Act of 1974
provided in a curiously elliptical phrase that it was not implying approval or disapproval of "all of the
articles" of GATT. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121(d), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-95). The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, provided that none of the
implementing legislation should be construed as creating a private right of action and that in the event
of a conflict with any act of Congress, federal law prevails over GATT codes. See Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 3, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-
82 (1988)). During the congressional debates over the 1994 '/TO Charter, the leading GATT
authority reassured critics of GATT that the approval of the WTO would not have any effect on
domestic law. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 64 (concluding that neither the WTO rules nor a WTO
panel report is binding on U.S. courts, and neither is a part of U.S. law).
Defenders of GAT have tried to diminish the significance of this legislative record. Professor
Ronald Brand pointed to the fact that the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act did not
contain any language qualifying the domestic legal effect of GATT as implying "full legal status for
GATT." Brand, supra note 378, at 501. Professor John Jackson has argued that despite congressional
objections, "GAT is recognized by Congress as well as the executive branch as an important
cornerstone of United States policy." Jackson, supra note 377, at at 268. According to Jackson,
Congress' authorization of specific tariff concessions negotiated through GAT signalled that
Congress' opposition was "equivocal." See id. at 253-69. In light of the economic expediency of
GAIT, Jackson concluded that Congress must have intended it as domestic law: "GAIT has been so
central to Western foreign economic policies that Congress has as a practical matter recognized and
accepted its existence." Id. at 268-69.
422. See i at 260,268.
423. See id. at 253-69.
424. Unlike the authors of the Restatement (Third), Jackson did not claim that GAIT was a self-
executing agreement. See id. at 253-80, 312. Rather, Jackson contended that GATT was made
effective in U.S. law only through the President's proclamation. See id. at 290-92, 312.
425. Section 350 provided in relevant part that
(a) For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United
States ... by regulating the admission of foreign goods into the United States ... by
affording corresponding market opportunities for foreign products in the United States, the
President, whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other import restrictions of
the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign
trade of the United States and that the purpose above declared will be promoted by the
means hereinafter specified, is authorized from time to time-
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agreements to lower the Smoot-Hawley tariff rates and to "proclaim"
the new tariff rates as domestic law overriding prior inconsistent federal
and state law. Jackson warned that in any case "to disown GATT at this
point would be a jolt to this nation's foreign policy and, indeed, to the
stability of international economic relations throughout most of the
world."426
Here was an unmistakable appeal to the exigencies of the Cold War.
Jackson self-consciously linked the nation's trade policy to the eco-
nomic foundations of the free world and the strength of U.S. world
leadership. Jackson recognized that GATT was a Cold War institution,
much like Bretton Woods, built to fortify democratic market economies
against economic instability, which in turn bred authoritarianism. Hav-
ing relied upon GATT structure for two decades, the United States was
estopped from questioning its authority in domestic courts. If courts
failed to honor GAIT, they would both damage the nation's foreign
relations and undermine free economies. The implication of his argu-
ment was that GATT was simply too important to leave up to Congress;
the President alone could negotiate agreements that would serve U.S.
economic and security interests. Thus, Jackson's argument rested firmly
on the executive expediency principle. Professor Jackson's use of ex-
pediency discourse provided the basis for expanding the executive
agreement power generally.4 7 Although Jackson treated GAT as sui
generis, courts subsequently cited his work in particular to buttress the
(1) To enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments or instrumentalities
thereof; and
(2) To proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions, or such
additional import restrictions, or such continuance, and for such minimum periods, of
existing customs or excise treatment of any article covered by foreign trade agreements, as
are required or appropriate to carry out any foreign trade agreement that the president has
entered into hereunder. No proclamation shall be made increasing or decreasing by more
than 50 per centum any rate of duty or transferring any article between the dutiable and
free lists.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943, 943-44
(1934).
426. Jackson, supra note 377, at 260.
427. Other legal scholars also defended GAIT's domestic legal status in terms of executive
power. Professor Robert Hudec argued that GATT superseded all state law either because of the
implicit authority in § 350 or because of the President's inherent foreign affairs powers. Hudec, supra
note 409, at 200-10. Implicitly, Hudec acknowledged the power of the expediency discourse. He
observed that judges have facilitated the expansion of executive powers out of "extreme caution
toward the field of foreign affairs." Id. at 245. Hudec questioned whether foreign trade issues really
entailed "matters of high foreign policy," and he suggested that by confusing trade and vital security
issues the courts have abdicated judicial review of executive actions and undermined democratic
accountability. Id. at 246-48. Professor Ronald Brand of the University of Pittsburgh Law School
argued that Congress' failure to disapprove GAT over fifty years and its willingness to approve
legislation consistent with GATT demonstrated a pattern of congressional acquiescence. See Brand,
supra note 378, at 497-502.
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general proposition that executive agreements would operate like Article
II treaties.428
Jackson's rhetoric of expediency helped shape the way federal and
state courts understood executive agreements in domestic law. One fed-
eral judge opined that "[i]t probably is not necessary to cite authority
for the proposition that GATT, a multiparty trade agreement, has the
legal force of a treaty and its obligations are treaty obligations," at least
for purposes of certain federal statutes.429 More often, federal courts
have assumed implicitly that GATT operates like a treaty. Although no
federal court has held that GATT superseded a specific federal law,43
federal courts have implied that GATT could override federal law.43 In
an early federal case, the court asked whether GATT had modified cer-
tain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 32 The court held that
since Congress had reenacted the statute in 1954, Congress must have
intended that the Code be read as consistent with GATT.433 The court
assumed that an executive agreement could modify a statute, and it
428. See, e.g., China Liquor Distrib. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (upholding the federal tax on liquor as consistent with GATT). See also Schieffelin & Co. v.
United States, 424 F.2d. 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that federal taxation of distilled spirits
imported from Scotland and Ireland did not violate GATT).
429. Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 942, 951 (Dunlon, J., dissenting)
(Cust. Ct. 1957) (citing B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1921)). The dissent
distinguished that GATT's status as a treaty was for the purposes of the statute in question and not
necessarily for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause in general. See id, at 951-52.
430. See, e.g., United States v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 575 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
(holding that a tariff surcharge imposed by the President under the authority of the Trading with the
Enemy Act was valid even if it violated Article H of GATT binding tariff concessions; "Though... it
is true that the GATT forbids the use of surcharges, our Congress has never ratified GATT... ");
Select Tire Salvage Co., Inc. v. United States, 386 F.2d 1008, 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding that an
excise tax imposed on imported used automobile tires in a discriminatory fashion violative of Article
III of GATr was inconsistent with the federal statute); American Express Co. v. United States, 332
F. Supp. 191, 200-01 (Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A.1973) (holding that a
countervailing duty imposed on a foreign tax rebate arguably prohibited by Article VI(4) of GATT
was authorized by U.S. countervailing duty law; "GATT is a trade agreement, which if in conflict
with a law of Congress, must yield to the latter."). See generally Hudec, supra note 409, at 210-18.
431. See, e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 693 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (holding in a private antitrust action, inter alia, that an injunction
against imports issued by a district court was permissible under an exception to GATE for measures
necessary to enforce competition laws); United States v. Star Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A.
1972) (holding that the President may retaliate against unfair trade practices without violating GATT
where Congress authorized the President to act "having due regard for the international obligations of
the United States," which included the most favored nation provision of GATT); Michelin Tire Corp.
v. United States, 2 C.I.T. 143, 146, 149 (C.I.T. 1981), vacated, 9 C.I.T. 38 (1985) (holding that an
administrative determination of a subsidy did not violate GATE); see also Talbot v. Atlantic Steel Co.,
275 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Morgantown Glassware Guild, Inc. v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956); C. Tennant, Sons & Co. v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
432. See Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 151 F. Supp. at 946-48 (interpreting § 2800(a)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code in a manner consistent with GATT).
433. See id. at 947.
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implied a congressional intent to accept GAT, even in the absence of
express congressional approval. 414 A few federal courts have gone as far
as finding that federal law was contrary to GAIT, although the federal
law was not expressly superseded.435
Other federal courts have suggested that GAT has some other hy-
brid status in U.S. law:
The GATT does not bind Congress or have the status of a treaty,
because it has never been ratified. However, it is an agreed code
of international good behavior. An unambiguous statutory
command, contrary to the GATT, would of course prevail, but
the one here involved can be construed to harmonize.436
Plainly, GATT did not "bind Congress;" but neither could an Article II
treaty bind Congress; a later statute could always supersede a prior
treaty.437 For that matter, GATT did not bind the President either.438
State courts have consistently held that GATT preempted state law.
The most widely cited state court opinions have expressed the view that
GATT superseded contrary state and local law.439 "Compacts and simi-
lar international agreements, such as GA I, which are negotiated and
proclaimed by the President are 'treaties"' for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause.' In a few cases, state courts have side-stepped the
434. See id.
435. See, e.g., Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(holding that where regulations on imports may have violated GATT, importers were entitled to an
oral presentation on appeal to the Department of Agriculture, even though such an appeal was not
specifically provided for by the federal law); C. Tennant, Sons & Co. v. Dill, 158 F. Supp. 63, 68
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stating that the requirements of the Agricultural Adjustment Act supersedes GATT,
because a treaty is superseded by subsequent legislation).
436. Select Tire Salvage Co., 386 F.2d at 1014 (holding that tire carcasses were not tires for
excise tax purposes).
437. See REATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, at § 115(l)(a).
438. See, e.g., Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 583-84 (upholding the President's unilateral imposition of a
surtax on imports, which was otherwise GATT illegal); Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp.
771, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (1979) (rejecting the claim that a marketing
agreement negotiated by the executive to limit imports from Taiwan and South Korea violated GATT,
"since the Congress has never ratified the GATT").
439. See K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., 75 N.J. at 272 (stating that GATT is a treaty, but GATT
does not prohibit state government procurement policies that give a preference to domestically
produced goods over foreign goods); Ho, 41 Haw. at 565 (holding that a requirement that all grocers
selling foreign eggs post a notice to that effect violated the nondiscrimination provisions of GATT,
which the court found was equivalent to a treaty); Delta Chem. Corp. v. Ocean County Util. Auth.,
554 A.2d 1381 (NJ. Super. 1988). affd in part and rev'd in part, 594 A.2d 1343 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (holding that, although GATT trumps inconsistent state and municipal law, the "buy
American" requirement in municipal law did not violate GATT because it fell within GATT's
exception for "products which were produced by a governmental agency for governmental purposes
[and] not for commercial sale"); American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie, 7
N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 302 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
440. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 208 Cal. App. 2d at 820, 824-26 (holding that San Francisco
must comply with GATT's nondiscrimination provisions in accepting bids for electrial generating
equipment); see also 78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Tenn.) 303A (1978) (concluding that Tennessee's Buy
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legal status of GATT by holding that state law was preempted by the
federal government's exclusive control of foreign relations."1 These
opinions treated GATT as federal law, even though Congress had not
exercised its exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce by adopting
GATT.
Expediency discourse ran through these federal and state decisions.
Courts have found that GAT derived its domestic legal status from the
President's power to conduct foreign relations. By invoking the talis-
man of "foreign relations," the courts raised the stakes; implicating not
merely economic interest, but national security as well. In Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, one California Court of Appeal
judge explained in his concurrence how the California Buy America
statute violated the national treatment provision of GATT:
Juxtaposition of the text of the California Buy American Act
alongside those of GATT and the Trade Agreements Act
(19 U.S.C.A. § 1351) as amended and extended, not only makes
manifest the seriousness of the potential, if not presently actual,
interference by California with the federal government's power
to conduct its foreign affairs, but lays bare California's uncon-
stitutional intrusion into the congressional power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations .... I
In effect, courts regarded GAT as an expression of the federal
government's policy, even without the imprimatur of Congress. That
conclusion rested on the assumption that the President is the "sole or-
gan of foreign relations," and therefore, the President alone could
speak for the entire nation in foreign trade, as well. Thus, the majority in
Bethlehem Steel cautioned that the California Buy America law "has
more than some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries, and its
great potential for disruption or embarrassment makes us hesitate to
place it in the category of a diplomatic bagatelle." 43
The claim of expediency did not depend on an actual or threatened
exigency or risk to foreign relations. When a few state courts held that
GAT did not displace state procurement laws that discriminated against
America statute was allowable under GATI"s Article H exception for "governmental purpose"); 36
Op. Att'y Gen. (Cal.) 147 (1960) (concluding that GATT is equivalent to a self-executing Article II
treaty).
441. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 224-26, 229
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that federal power over foreign relations and commerce supersedes
state legislation).
442. Id. at 230 (Aiso, J., concurring) (citing Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,441 (1968)).
443. Id. at 228. A federal Court of Appeals court upheld President Johnson's retaliatory trade
measures against the European Economic Community's poultry tariffs, the so-called Chicken War, as
consistent with the Trade Expansion Act's stated purposes, inter alia, "to prevent Communist
economic penetration." Star Indus., 462 F.2d at 563 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1801).
19981
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imported products, foreign relations were not damaged.' 4 Even where
U.S. federal law has been held to contravene GATT, our foreign rela-
tions have not suffered." There was no serious risk of embarrassing the
executive in the conduct of foreign relations when a state judge struck
down as violating GATT a state law requiring merchants to post a sign
stating, "We sell foreign eggs."' Judicial deference toward GATT
simply was not necessary for the purposes of protecting national inter-
ests.
G. The New Supreme Law of the Land
Early in this century the Supreme Court recognized the breadth of
the treaty-making power. 47 The Court hinted that treaties were not sub-
ject to the same constitutional limitations as acts of Congress.," Before
the Cold War, the Court was equally clear that an executive agreement
was not the equivalent of an Article II treaty for purposes of domestic
law."9 Since the Cold War, this distinction has disappeared in the courts.
As presidents increasingly relied upon executive agreements to per-
form the function of Article II treaties, questions frequently arose about
the effectiveness of these agreements in domestic U.S. law.4"° In only a
444. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., 75 N.J. at 272 (stating that GATT' is treaty, but GATl does not
prohibit state government procurement policies that give a preference to domestically produced
goods over foreign goods).
445. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GAIT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1992).
446. Ho, 41 Haw. at 566.
447. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that an Article II treaty gave
Congress power to regulate migratory birds within States, even though such power was not
enumerated in the Constitution, and that such regulation did not interfere with the rights reserved to
the States by the Tenth Amendment).
448. "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States."
Id at 433.
449. Early in this century the Court opined that a commercial agreement negotiated and
"proclaimed" by the executive, pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1897, "was not a treaty possessing the
dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate of the United States, it was an international
compact.... Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912). The Court held that such a
commercial compact is a treaty for purposes of the jurisdictional requirements of the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act. See id at 601.
450. In 1957, the Court struck down a sole executive agreement as a violation of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court considered whether an executive
agreement could transfer criminal jurisdiction over the civilian dependents of military personnel
stationed abroad to a military court. Mrs. Covert was convicted by a military court of murdering her
husband, a military officer, while stationed in England. See id. at 3. The military court claimed
jurisdiction under the sole executive agreement regarding the stationing of forces then in effect with
Great Britain. See idL at 3-4. Mrs. Covert argued that the executive agreement denied her Fifth and
Sixth Amendment procedural rights. See id. at 4-5. Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black
declared that the federal government is "entirely a creature of the Constitution" and cannot deny
constitutional rights at home or abroad by an international agreement. Id. at 5-6. The opinion was
greeted by proponents of the Bricker Amendment as support for the proposition that all treaties and
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handful of cases have federal courts denied the effectiveness of a sole
executive agreement in domestic law.451 One such opinion concerned an
importer's violation of an import restriction imposed by an 'executive
agreement with Canada. 42 In striking down the import restriction, the
court held that only Congress could legislate a penalty on imports. In
another case, the court considered whether income earned abroad could
be tax exempt under an agreement with Panama.453 The court concluded
that since the Internal Revenue Code could not be altered by the
President acting alone, the executive agreement was ineffective. 41 Both
of these decisions concerned sole executive agreements that involved
specific enumerated powers of Congress. The Supreme Court refused to
affirm either case on this ground, and neither has been followed by any
other court.455
With these few exceptions, since the advent of the Cold War federal
and state courts have treated both sole executive agreements and con-
gressional-executive agreements as functional equivalents to Article II
treaties for purposes of state and federal law.456 In some cases, courts
have held that sole executive agreements are "treaties" for purposes of
interpreting a treaty exception clause in a federal statute.4 7 Other courts
international agreements were subordinated to the Constitution. See THOMAS M. FRANK & MICHAEL
J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SEcuRITy LAW 297-98 (1993). See also Ozonoff
v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 225 (lst Cir. 1984) (holding that a loyalty screening agreement with the
World Health Organization could not justify an executive order requiring a loyalty check that
otherwise violated the plaintiff's First Amendment rights).
451. One federal court went so far as to claim that "[tihe Supreme Court has never held an
executive agreement ultra vires for lack of Senate consent" United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852,
856 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing HENKIN, supra note 282). In Walczak, the Ninth Circuit upheld a pre-
border crossing search conducted by U.S. customs officials based upon an executive agreement with
Canada. See id., 783 F.2d at 853.
452. See Guy W. Capps, 204 F.2d at 658 (holding that executive agreement with Canada
concerning limitations on the import of seed potatoes was not enforceable because only Congress
could regulate trade).
453. See Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D.Colo. 1983) (holding that a
sole executive agreement cannot supersede the Internal Revenue Code). Cf. Coplin v. United States, 6
C1. Ct. 115, 122-25 (Cl. Ct. 1984) (holding that the executive agreement could exempt certain income
where Congress had acquiesced and the Code provided for excluding some income by treaty), rev'd
on other grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed Cir. 1985), affrd sub nom., O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S.
27 (1986). For a discussion of Coplin, see infra notes 486-488 and accompanying text.
454. See Swearingen, 565 F. Supp. at 1021-22.
455. See id., affi rmed sub silentio, 475 U.S. 27 (1986); Coplin, 6 Ct. C. 115, reversed on other
grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985); O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
456. See HENKIN, supra note 282, at 173-87.
457. For example, in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982), U.S. nationals residing in the
Philippines complained that the U.S. military had a preference for hiring Filipino nationals over U.S.
nationals and that this violated a congressional statute protecting U.S. nationals from employment
discrimination on foreign U.S. military bases. The military defended its policy under a sole executive
agreement, the Base Labor Agreement. The congressional statute provided an exception for
preferences granted by treaty to foreign nationals. The Court held that for purposes of the treaty
exception clause in the statute, the executive agreement was a treaty, and therefore, the military
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have held that executive agreements, like treaties, may effectively super-
sede federal law. For example, courts have held that sole executive
agreements can be used to transfer property held by the U.S.
Government to a foreign government, 458 deny U.S. nationals the benefits
of claims against foreign governments, 4 9 and exempt foreign income of
U.S. nationals from U.S. income tax.41 Similarly, congressional-
executive agreements have been interpreted by courts, inter alia, to af-
ford substantive rights and remedies to inhabitants of the Pacific Trust
Territories, 46' to preclude the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act abroad,"2 and to permit the Palestine Liberation Organization to
maintain its U.N. office contrary to federal statute.463
These judicial opinions evidenced a profound change in the under-
standing of executive agreements. Despite the claim by some scholars
that GATT was sui generis, GATT had become a persuasive precedent
for the general proposition that executive agreements could function
like Article II treaties for purposes of domestic law. The expansion of
the executive agreement power reflected a broader shift of authority
from Congress to the President over foreign relations, as we have
could discriminate against U.S. nationals. See id. at 28-36. See also Belk v. United States, 858 F.2d
706, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Bennett, J., concurring) (stating that claims brought by former Iranian
hostages against the United States in the United States Claims Court were barred by the Algiers
Declarations, 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1981), which the court held was a treaty for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1502, which provides that "the United States Claims Court shall not have
jurisdiction of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty
entered into with foreign nations"); Harris v. United States, 768 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 1985),
vacated, 479 U.S. 957 (1986) (holding that for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code's exclusion
from gross income, an executive agreement constituted a treaty).
458. See Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the power of
President to return the Crown of St. Stephan to Hungary by executive agreement without a vote of
Congress presented a nonjusticiable political question).
459. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654 (holding that the Iran Hostage Agreement is
enforceable against the property claims of U.S. nationals); Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl.
Ct. 237, 247-49 (Cl. Ct. 1983), affid, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985)
(upholding claims settlement with P.R.C. by executive agreement).
460. See Coplin v. United States, 6 CI. Ct. 115, 122-23 (Cl. Ct. 1984) (holding that a sole
executive agreement has the force of law and repeals prior inconsistent portions of the Internal
Revenue Code).
461. See People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96-98, 100 (9th Cit. 1974)
(holding that Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement with the Pacific Islands gives the citizens rights
to assert against the High Commissioner). This was a congressional-executive agreement signed by
Truman in 1947.
462. See Robinson v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. Ala. 1989), aff'd, 912 F.2d
1423 (11th Cir. 1990) (denying right to recover unpaid overtime wages required by § 213(0 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act for work performed on Kwajalein Atoll because of a congressional-
executive agreement, the Compact of Free Association, which superseded the Act).
463. See United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 could not be interpreted to apply to the P.L.O.'s U.N. offices unless
Congress expressly stated its intention to violate the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, which was
approved as a congressional-executive agreement in 1947).
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already seen. The courts used the same justificatory discourse to defend
this power shift, but GATT cases illustrate the transparency of that justi-
fication. The courts deferred to the executive's characterization of geo-
political relations, even where the executive defied common sense. This
suspension of disbelief represented a collective fantasy about our rela-
tionship to the world.
Since the collapse of Soviet communism, that image of the world is
more difficult to defend. Now that the Cold War has ended, the expedi-
ency discourse appears vulnerable to attack. There is a temptation to
argue that after the emergency, the President's powers should retract to
their "normal" boundaries. I want to turn to that argument in the con-
cluding Part of this Article.
IV
EXECUTIVE EXPEDIENCY AFTER THE COLD WAR
A. Dames & Moore: The Persistence of Expediency Discourse
In the waning days of the Cold War, the Supreme Court set down
one of the clearest and boldest formulations of the discourse of execu-
tive expediency. The opportunity to amplify expediency discourse
arose in connection with the executive agreement that ended the Iran
hostage crisis in 1980. The Court's opinion in Dames & Moore"4 repre-
sented the full flowering of this line of cases in the context of a real in-
ternational crisis. To appreciate the significance of the Court's decision,
it is necessary to review the facts of the case in some detail.
On November 14, 1979, following the taking of U.S. diplomats as
hostages by Iranian nationals at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, President
Carter, acting under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA),4 65 declared a national emergency and froze all assets of the
Government of Iran subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Treasury Depart-
ment issued a regulation voiding any attachments, liens or judgments
with respect to property owned by Iran.' After prolonged negotiations
464. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654.
465. International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, § 201, 91 Stat.
1625, 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701). The IEEPA provided in relevant part that
[the President may act] to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, it the president declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat
If the President declares such an emergency, he is authorized by the act to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition,
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exploitation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.
ld. at §§ 202-03.
466. 31 C.F.R. 535.203(e)(1980).
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with the Iranian government through the intermediation of Algeria, on
January 20, 1981, President Carter signed the Declarations of Algiers to
obtain the release of all U.S. hostages. 7 The President had not re-
quested negotiating authority from Congress, and the Declarations were
submitted neither to the Senate for approval as a treaty nor to the
Congress for implementing legislation. As a condition for the release of
the hostages, the Declarations provided, inter alia , for the termination
of all litigation against Iran and the transfer of all Iranian assets held by
U.S. banks. 6 Pursuant to the Declarations, one billion dollars of these
assets were deposited at the Bank of England in a fund to satisfy awards
rendered against Iran by a Claims Tribunal established in the Hague. To
affect the transfer of the assets, President Carter issued a series of execu-
tive orders. 9
On December 19, 1979, more than one month after the hostage
crisis began and the executive order froze Iranian assets, Dames &
Moore filed a claim in U.S. district court against the Government of
Iran for breach of contract. Dames & Moore obtained a pre-judgment
attachment against the property of certain banks owned by the Govern-
ment of Iran.470 On January 27, 1981, a week after the Algiers Declara-
tion was signed and President Carter had issued executive orders
transferring the assets, Dames & Moore moved for summary judgment
against the Government of Iran. The district court granted summary
judgment, and awarded Dames & Moore $3.4 million in damages, plus
interest.47' The Government of Iran appealed, and the district court
stayed execution of its judgment and vacated all pre-judgment attach-
ments. Dames & Moore then filed an action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against the United States to prevent enforcement of the
executive orders implementing the Algiers Declarations. The executive
order would have prevented Dames & Moore from executing its lien
and forced it to relitigate its claims through the Claims Tribunal with no
prospect of obtaining full compensation for the breach of contract.
Dames & Moore argued that the executive order and Treasury regula-
tions were ultra vires and violated due process rights.472
In upholding the Algiers Declaration, the Supreme Court stressed
the unique circumstances of the hostage crisis. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion began by emphasizing that the Court was "acutely aware of the
necessity to rest the decision on the narrowest possible ground capable
467. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
initiated Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran-Algeria, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981).
468. Id.
469. Exec. Order Nos. 12276-85, Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981).
470. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663-64.
471. See id. at 664.
472. See id. at 666-67.
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of deciding the case."473 After setting out general principles of the
Court's power to review the President's action, Rehnquist acknowledged
the "episodic" ad hoc quality of the Court's decisions regarding sepa-
ration of powers:
[W]e are obviously deciding only one more episode in the
never-ending tension between the President exercising the ex-
ecutive authority in a world that presents each day some new
challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under
which we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort
of system of checks and balances.474
This excerpt revealed the extent to which expediency discourse
shaped judicial reasoning about executive power. Here the Court ac-
knowledged a permanent state of emergency, which had existed for
some time. In the Court's view, geopolitical circumstances have consti-
tuted a "never-ending" condition of constitutional life. The Court ac-
cepted without question that both the responsibility and the authority to
respond rested primarily, if not exclusively, in the executive. Further, the
Court candidly admitted that the executive was acting in opposition to
normal constitutional life. The "tension" that the Court alluded to was
the necessity for executive action counter-poised against "some sort of
system of checks and balances."475 In this way, the Court characterized
the separation of power as a vague, fluid measure of day-to-day practi-
calities. This characterization hardly conformed to the Court's conser-
vative commitment to constitutional structures.
The Court admitted that the text of the IEEPA did not explicitly
authorize the President to suspend claims by U.S. nationals against for-
eign governments.476 The statute only applied to "property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest"4' and did not
refer to judicial proceedings or claims by U.S. nationals. Setting aside
normal principles of statutory construction, Justice Rehnquist's opinion
relied on the conjunction of two sets of circumstances.
First, Rehnquist noted that Congress had approved settlements of
foreign claims against foreign governments by international arbitration
in the past. To the Court, this suggested a pattern of acquiescence to
claims settlements by the executive. Rehnquist insisted that Congress
could not have anticipated every conceivable circumstance, and there-
fore, the failure of Congress to grant specific authorization did not im-
ply disapproval, at least in the areas of foreign policy and national
473. Id. at 660.
474. Id. at 662.
475. Id.
476. See id. at 675-79.
477. International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, §§ 202-03, 91 Stat.
1625, 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).
1998]
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security.47 In making this argument, the Court accepted as a given that
the case implicated foreign policy and national security because the
President had invoked the national emergency provisions of IEEPA.
Second, the Court emphasized the uniqueness of the hostage crisis
and the very real threat that it posed to the lives of U.S. diplomats.79 In
evaluating the character of these dangers, the Court again deferred to
the executive's characterization of the nature of the threat. The Court
did not independently evaluate whether U.S. interests were actually at
risk. In fact, the Court's decision in this case followed by many months
the release of the hostages and the return of the assets. By the time the
Court issued its opinion, Iran could no longer harm the freed hostages
or refuse to participate in the claims settlement. While arguably an ad-
verse decision might have embarrassed former President Carter, that in
itself did not explain the Court's unquestioning attitude toward the ex-
ecutive.
Adding these two factors together and re-emphasizing "the nar-
rowness of our decision" the Court concluded,
[W]here, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to
be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign pol-
icy dispute between our county and another, and where, as here,
we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's ac-
tion, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the
power to settle such claims. 0
The Court's analysis cannot be defended as a "functionalist" approach
to separation of powers.4 ' The opinion did not rest on an argument that
the President generally should exercise this function. Rather, the Court
relied upon the character of geopolitical events and an interpretation of
congressional inaction as a justification for allocating powers in this
way. By contrast, a truly functionalist approach would have been to ar-
gue that the executive was best situated to settle international claims in
all cases. 4 l
478. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678.
479. See id at 676.
480. Id. at 688.
481. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of.Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L REV. 488 (1987) Strauss notes that
[t]he Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to
separation-of-powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three
distinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp
boundaries), and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and
permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened.
Id at 489.
482. By contrast, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), represents a good example of
functionalist reasoning about the separation of powers. In Morrison, the Court found that Congress
properly vested in the federal courts the power to appoint an independent counsel to investigate the
executive.
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By reading Congress' silence as acquiescence, the Court deferred
to the President's primacy in foreign affairs. Congressional inaction was
treated as equivalent to legislation approving a claims settlement proce-
dure. Without the prerequisites of legislation-bicameral majority votes
and presentment to the President-Congress had authorized executive
seizure of private assets. 3 In effect, the executive exercised a virtual
monopoly to manage foreign relations so long as Congress did not have
enough votes to override a presidential veto of restrictive legislation. In
other words, the President's monopoly of foreign affairs power was
protected so long as the President retained the support of at least one
vote more than one-third of either house of Congress.' According to
this interpretation, Dames & Moore represented a radical shift away
from the zones of presidential authority envisioned by Justice Jackson
and consolidated the power of the Cold War President as sole organ of
foreign relations. The Lockean dichotomy between conditions of nor-
malcy and conditions of emergency had collapsed. Jackson had opined
in Youngstown that presidential powers "are not fixed but fluctuate, de-
pending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress. '4 ' Now presidential powers fluctuated according to the
President's own characterization of geopolitical circumstance. The dif-
fusion of constitutional power over foreign relations worked for more
than 150 years before the Cold War to discourage foreign entangle-
ments. In Dames & Moore, the Court legitimated the concentration of
powers in the executive to facilitate foreign commitments and meet for-
eign challenges. Citing Dames & Moore, Judge Alex Kozinski, then sit-
ting on the U.S. Claims Court, wrote that
the president had ample authority to bind the United States to all
terms of the Implementation Agreement. Dames & Moore v.
Regan... established-if doubt existed before-that the Presi-
dent has significant powers to bind the United States to interna-
tional agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate.
Such agreements supersede prior United States law to the extent
it is inconsistent. In Dames & Moore... [t]he Supreme Court
483. In this respect, the Court's opinion in Dames & Moore contradicted the Court's prior
opinion in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-58 (1983). In Chadha, the Court struck down a one-
house legislative veto on the ground that it violated the rule that Congress can only legislate through
the bicameral process and presentment to the President. In other words, Chadha stood for the
principle that Congress could only speak through the legislative process constructed in Article I of the
Constitution. By contrast, in Dames & Moore, the Court treated congressional silence as equivalent to
a legislative enactment without bicameral process or presentment.
484. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of
the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. LJ. 515, 524-
29 (1982) (discussing the interpretation and implications of congressional silence).
485. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
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ruled that the President's action "effected a change in the sub-
stantive law."... [I]t upheld the President's authority to unilat-
erally change domestic law by executive agreement with a
foreign state... .6
Kozinski acknowledged that the Constitution limited the President's
power "unilaterally [to] dislocate domestic law." However, reasoning
from Dames & Moore, he concluded that in the absence of an expres-
sion of congressional disapproval, the executive agreement "repeals
prior conflicting [federal] laws."4"
In Dames v. Moore, the Court had reasoned that the Algiers
Declarations must be given effect in domestic law because of the geo-
political circumstances of the hostage crisis. Nevertheless, the principle
that executive agreements could supersede domestic law has been ap-
plied where no special circumstances were alleged.4 " Just as some courts
and scholars argued that GATT was an exceptional form of executive
agreement that operated like a treaty, the exceptional case has become
the new norm. Expediency discourse eroded explicit constitutional
grants of authority to Congress to regulate foreign commerce, tax, and
appropriations. As the President acquired new powers, foreign trade and
commercial policy drifted farther from the reach of Congress. Congress
could not be held accountable for executive agreements that affected
domestic jobs and economic conditions.
B. After the Cold War
If expediency discourse derived from the circumstances of the
Cold War, then we might expect that after the Cold War, the courts
would restore the pre-existing balance of power between Congress and
the executive. The Lockean dichotomy assumes that emergency powers
486. Coplin, 6 Cl. Ct. at 122 (upholding a sole executive agreement with Panama that exempted
from U.S. tax the income of U.S. nationals employed by the Canal Commission) (citations omitted).
487. Id. at 124. Arguably, Kozinski construed executive power as co-extensive with the power
of Congress to tax and appropriate. An exemption of income from iaxation constitutes a form of tax
expenditure, which has the same net revenue effect as an appropriation. In effect, then, by
expending tax revenue, the President used the executive agreement in conflict with the power of
Congress to appropriate under Article I, § 9. Ironically, in upholding the executive agreement, the
court rejected the executive branch's own concession that the agreement was ineffective. The court
did not have to reach the issue of whether the President could change the Internal Revenue Code by
sole executive agreement. The Code provided that gross income did not include income excluded "by
any treaty obligation of the United States." 26 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1982). Precedent supported an
interpretation of the term "treaty obligation" to include executive agreements. See B. Altman & Co. v.
United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1921). Alternatively, the court might have relied upon the fact that the
Implementation Agreement was disclosed to the Senate at the time it approved the Panama Canal
Treaty, suggesting that the income exemption was an implied term. Rather than relying upon the
narrowest ground for his decision, Judge Kozinski chose this occassion to expound on and expand the
principle of Dames & Moore.
488. See, e.g., Coplin, 6 Cl. Ct. at 122 (upholding a sole executive agreement with Panama that
exempted from U.S. tax the income of U.S. nationals employed by the Canal Commission).
[Vol. 86:671
HeinOnline -- 86 Cal. L. Rev. 766 1998
GEOPOLITICAL CONSTITUTION
did not change the rule of law and that after the emergency, the rule of
law would resume unaffected. But, as we have seen, presidential powers
have not in fact retracted to their original form. The music has stopped,
but the melody lingers.
Now that the Cold War has ended, will the powers of the President
retract to the status quo ante? A decade after the Cold War, neither
Congress nor the courts seem prepared to challenge presidential control
over foreign relations. Congress barely challenged the President's
decisions to intervene in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.
Perhaps the length of the Cold War, and the way in which the discourse
operated to normalize the emergency, had the effect of erasing any in-
stitutional memory of a different arrangement between the branches of
government. But it remains possible that after a time the President's
power over foreign relations may wane as courts consider new cases
challenging presidential power and as Congress reasserts its constitu-
tional prerogatives. Historically, presidential power has expanded during
war time and gradually contracted during peace time.48 9 We are not nec-
essarily locked into the current power arrangement among the federal
branches.
Does the principle of stare decisis favor preserving the judicial de-
cisions of the Cold War that expanded executive power? In general, the
argument for stare decisis is weaker for constitutional interpretations
than for statutory interpretations. The reason generally given for this
preference is that legislative action can easily erase errors in statutory
interpretation, but that only a constitutional amendment, which is more
difficult and much slower to accomplish, can repair an error in constitu-
tional interpretation. Thus, courts are less bound by their own constitu-
tional interpretations, unless individuals may have relied on a
constitutional interpretation to their detriment.419
489. After the Civil War, for example, both Congress and the executive exercised emergency
powers over civilians, courts, and state governments. The federal government retained some
emergency powers as late as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prevented the military from
exercising control over civilians without specific congressional authorization. See Act of June 18,
1878,20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878). See generally Jill E. Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing
the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1996). Similarly, after the
Armistice, President Wilson continued to issue emergency orders, which, among other things, caused
the seizure of railroads and telegraph lines to discourage strikes, censored press reports, controlled
prices, prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages, and imposed the first rent control regulation on the
District of Columbia. See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR (1989).
490. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(holding, inter alia, that the Court was bound by its prior decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), recognizing a woman's right to an abortion). The majority pointed out that
for two decades of economic and social developments, [people] have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.
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In its strongest form, stare decisis derives from a social preference
for preserving settled expectations.490 ' In contract, tort or property law,
this preference for protecting expectations may lower transactional costs
and allow individuals to arrange their lives and businesses with some
confidence in the future. That argument seems less compelling in the
context of protecting the expectations of executive power. Who, besides
the executive and foreign governments, relies upon the fact that the
President can order troops overseas without Congress' authorization?
Though there may be good reasons for keeping our commitments to
our allies, that does not argue for preserving a particular internal deci-
sion-making structure.
C. Interpreting Foreign Relations Powers
Foreign relations powers have not retracted to the pre-Cold War
boundaries between Congress and the executive, but the rule of stare
decisis need not lock the Constitution into a permanent state of emer-
gency. My critique suggests that it is possible to interpret the execu-
tive's foreign relations powers in the contemporary context without
relying upon expediency discourse. What I am proposing is neither
novel nor untested. To imagine an alternative way of reading constitu-
tional powers, I will posit two circumstances correlating to the traditional
Lockean dichotomy. In the first case, the court determines that the
President is acting in normal circumstances under the ordinary rule of
law. In the second case, the court determines that the President is acting
in emergency circumstances that leave no opportunity for congressional
participation in policy-making.
When analyzing a case implicating foreign relations, a court must
first inquire whether circumstances require emergency powers. Since
our Constitution was designed to operate in good and bad times, only
the most extreme circumstances could justify an extra-constitutional
exercise of power. So long as Congress could gather and participate in
the decision, then the executive must confer with Congress to the extent
envisioned by the Constitution. Unless the court finds that it is tempo-
rally impossible for Congress to deliberate on the question, the court
should not legitimate the executive's extra-constitutional actions, even at
the risk of embarrassing the President or contradicting a policy he has
implemented already. Otherwise, presidents could always use the risk of
embarrassment as a shield to defend extra-constitutional acts. Moreover,
even after the President acts, his actions should be subject to a congres-
sional override. If Congress disapproves the executive's actions-
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sending troops, authorizing funds, signing agreements---courts should
defer to the will of Congress and nullify any acts he undertook. Clearly,
not all executive acts are defeasible; once a military operation is started,
it may be impractical to cease actions immediately. But there is no rea-
son to doubt that Congress would exercise self-restraint in overriding
executive actions taken in the heat of the moment, and that the courts
could find practical solutions to wind down executive actions super-
seded by Congress. I will illustrate my point with two hypotheticals:
A financial crisis sweeps southeast Asia. The Thai stock market
crashes, and the Thai baht loses 50% of its value. Thai consumers are
now unable to afford U.S. imports. Thai imports to the United States,
now priced 50% less, threaten American competitors. U.S. companies in
Thailand have lost millions of dollars, and the flow of capital to
Thailand is cut off by nervous investors. The Thai government falls, and
an election is called. Some observers fear that the opposition socialist
party may gain power. Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Singapore may be
the next to be pulled down by the crisis. The Treasury Secretary rec-
ommends that the United States provide one billion dollars of financial
aid to bolster the baht. It may be difficult to obtain congressional ap-
proval for such aid, so the President decides to take money from other
sources in the Treasury and State Department budgets. He argues that
there is no time to debate the issue, and that he has plenary authority to
act. In the past, other presidents have used Treasury funds to support
foreign currency, and Congress has not objected. Members of Congress
challenge the President's action in a federal district court. They argue
that their right to vote on appropriations as members of Congress has
been denied by the President's unilateral decision.492
In this instance, Congress has time to deliberate, although debate
may last for a few weeks or even months. Delay might hurt Thailand,
and might even aggravate the situation internationally, but delay will not
cause direct, immediate, and grave damage to the national security of
the United States. Ultimately, if the Congress fails to act, there might be
long-term damage to our trading situation or a recession, but no imme-
diate danger looms and none likely to damage our national security.
Arguably, Congress is insensitive to foreign financial crises.
Congress may be too parochial, uninformed, or incompetent to respond
appropriately. The executive may be better qualified to evaluate the se-
riousness of a foreign devaluation and to react quickly and effectively.
492. This hypothetical is not so farfetched. For a good discussion of the legal issues concerning
the U.S. rescue plan to stabilize the Mexican peso, see Russell D. Covey, Adventures in the Zone of
Twilight: Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE LJ.
1311 (1996). See also James D. Humphrey, II, Foreign Affairs and "The First Crisis of the 21st
Century": Congressional vs. Executive Authority and the Stabilization Plan for Mexico, 17 MIcH. J
INT'L L. 181 (1995).
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These might be good reasons why Congress should delegate greater
authority to the executive to handle foreign financial crises. Perhaps the
Constitution should be amended to give the executive power to appro-
priate funds in financial crises. But courts have no place deciding
whether Congress is competent to exercise its appropriation power. Un-
less Congress has appropriated funds to rescue Thailand's currency, the
executive has no inherent authority to do so, regardless of the wisdom
of our financial intervention. In the worst case, Congress may fail to act,
and the financial crisis may spread. If Congress makes the wrong
choice, let the voters hold Congress accountable. Nothing in the
Constitution empowers courts to save us from Congress' bad judgment.
The court should interpret the President's constitutional authority
according to Justice Jackson's classic formulation in Youngstown.""
Jackson characterized presidential power as a function of congressional
power. The relevant inquiry for a court is whether the President is acting
with congressional support, on his own, or against congressional oppo-
sition. In either case, the court should look to the specific provisions of
the Constitution to determine the President's own powers. As Justice
Black wrote for the majority in Youngstown, the President's authority
"must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution it-
self."'494 In the absence of congressional legislation, the President has
only those specific powers explicitly granted to him by the Constitution.
The Constitution clearly vests all of the appropriation power in
Congress, and Congress has not given the President any authority to
deal with this financial crisis. The fact that Congress may have appropri-
ated funds in other crises or that Congress did not object to the
President's prior interventions, is hardly the constitutional equivalent of
an appropriation. No one would argue that because Congress appropri-
ated funds last year for the National Endowment for the Arts, the
President can appropriate funds this year for the same purpose without
Congress' approval.
A second case posits a different result: A group of terrorists
threaten to disperse a biological weapon in New York unless all of their
comrades are released from U.S. prisons within seventy-two hours. The
President learns that the biological agent is located somewhere in
Manhattan's West Village, and his advisers recommend a massive search
of this area. In order to carry out such a search, it would be necessary to
use trained military personnel, and there would be no time to obtain
warrants. A military search and seizure would contravene both federal
493. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 636-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
494. Id. at 585.
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law495 and the Fourth Amendment,496 but there is no alternative, and so
the executive orders federal troops to conduct the search. West Village
residents seek a court injunction to prevent the search operation.
In this situation, it would be temporally impossible for Congress to
meet to amend federal law or the Constitution without posing a serious
threat of direct, immediate, and substantial injury and death to millions
of New Yorkers. This situation requires the executive to act outside the
Constitution. Should the court deny the injunction and uphold the right
of the executive to use federal troops to conduct a warrantless search? A
court should hesitate to establish a precedent that, as Justice Jackson
warned, "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need."4,
While the emergency exists, the court could easily avoid rendering a
judgment or could declare the question nonjusticiable. As a practical
matter, the court is unlikely to reach a judgment while the search is be-
ing conducted. Once the emergency ends, the court may still reaffirm
the rule of law by declaring the action unconstitutional. In this way the
court acknowledges both the duty of the executive to safeguard society
in emergencies and upholds the Constitution.
What distinguishes these two hypotheticals is temporal impossibil-
ity. The courts possess the exclusive power to decide whether in extreme
circumstances temporal impossibility bars the ordinary constitutional
processes. As a historical matter, there may be only a few rare examples
of temporal impossibility: the Civil War is the only clear case that comes
readily to mind where Congress, then adjourned, might not have met in
time to save the nation had President Lincoln hesitated to act. Perhaps
there are other examples, but it is striking to recall that even when our
nation was invaded by foreign powers during the War of 1812 and the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress still met to authorize the President's
actions and to declare war. In judging whether there is time for Con-
gress to deliberate, courts should not be swayed by the executive's char-
acterization of a crisis. The executive has shown itself to be far too
anxious to invoke the talisman of crisis when it lacked the patience for
constitutional government. The courts can and should read the
Constitution in the context of our times without relying upon the ex-
ecutive's optic.
495. "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse
comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
496. The Fourth Amendment requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particulary describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
497. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1998]
HeinOnline -- 86 Cal. L. Rev. 771 1998
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
From-the beginning of the Cold War, liberals responded to Repub-
lican congressional criticism of President Truman's foreign policy by
arguing that the President alone could meet the threat posed by world
communism. Exigent circumstances justified the expansion of executive
power. As tensions with the Soviet Union persisted, the President's
emergency powers became an accepted constitutional norm.
Normalizing the emergency in this way undermined the distinction be-
tween constitutional actions in normal times and extra-constitutional
actions in emergencies.
The discourse of executive expediency transformed presidential
powers relative to Congress. Less visibly, the discourse changed the re-
lationship between the judiciary and the political branches. The expedi-
ency principle justified an extraordinary degree of deference to the
executive. Courts deferred to the executive in the exercise of their juris-
diction over foreign entities and foreign acts of state. Courts allowed the
President to send military forces abroad even in the face of congres-
sional opposition. And courts acknowledged the President's inherent
control over information, civilian and military personnel, and foreign
travel, all in the name of national security. As courts used expediency
discourse even in situations where there was no actual threat to U.S. na-
tional security, the expediency principle became de-contextualized. The
discourse even transformed the doctrine of executive agreements. No
threat of nuclear catastrophe or communist subversion justified the
President's authority to make sole executive agreements like GATT.
Nevertheless, judges invoked the expediency principle to accept execu-
tive agreements as the functional equivalent of Article II treaties ap-
proved by the Senate.
A less powerful executive would not weaken U.S. foreign policy.
Public scrutiny of the deliberative process and an independent judiciary
have been a source of political stability and vitality in our system of
government. The advantages of the President acting with the support of
a strong consensus are evident. A congressional authorization to use
force overseas sends a serious message to a foreign adversary that the
nation is united. Congressional debate can educate the public about the
nature of a foreign situation and consolidate public support for foreign
assistance. Compelling members of Congress to take a public position in
favor of a policy makes it less likely that they will abandon the policy
when the going gets tough.
For a generation the executive has told us how to imagine the world
beyond our borders. Our collective fear displaced reason as we deferred
to the President's greater wisdom. As a consequence, the people no
longer hold Congress accountable for the failures and excesses of U.S.
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foreign policy. We cannot afford to ignore global forces that are re-
shaping our economy and our politics. Foreign and domestic issues
have converged. Accordingly, we must reassert some measure of de-
mocracy in the formulation of foreign policy. Holding our government
accountable for foreign policy requires the vigilance of the courts no
less than Congress.
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